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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

AFTER DETERRENCE: POLICY CHOICES DURING CRISES OF
CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR DIRECT DETERRENCE FAILURE
by
Yang Gyu Kim
Florida International University, 2019
Miami, Florida
Professor Félix E. Martín, Major Professor

Despite a plethora of research on the conditions of successful deterrence, the
literature has been remarkably silent on the aftermath of its possible failure. Especially in
the situation of direct deterrence where the defender’s people and territory are at stake,
the defender experiences tremendous pressure and stress when a challenger defies the
former’s threat. Due to the high interest at stake, direct deterrent threat is regarded as the
most credible type of deterrence and, according to the literature, is most likely successful.
How could an intrinsically credible threat fail? What should the defender do when direct
deterrence fails and its reputation is decisively in jeopardy? What happens next when the
defender chooses a certain policy after the failure?
This dissertation addresses the question by emphasizing the significance of the
feasibility of punishment and belief updating. It highlights that challengers would
consider even the most determined defender’s threat non-credible if it is militarily and
politically infeasible for the defender to implement the punishment. Also, the
challenger’s defiance against the defender’s credible deterrent threat would lead the
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defender to identify the challenger as a determined aggressor. This belief updating will
encourage the defender to modify its level of resolve accordingly and will, thus, choose
less aggressive policies fearing a war that may ensue. In this regard, direct deterrence
failure would not result in war in numerous instances of direct deterrence failure.
This research uses a mixed-methods approach by incorporating regression
analysis and process tracing. The research hypotheses are tested first against the
population of direct deterrence failure, a total of 192 cases. This study uses logistic and
ordered logistic regression techniques as dependent variables are either binary or ordinal.
Case studies, then, follow to determine the most decisive factor among explanatory
variables in deciding short- and long-term outcomes of the five selected crises: the 1936
Rhineland Crisis, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1969 Sino-USSR Border Dispute,
the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the 1982 Falklands War.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The history of humanity is littered with instances of deterrence failure. From
biblical depictions of Adam and Eve eating the forbidden fruit, to the case of Mytilene, a
member of the Delian League, revolting against Athens around 428 BC, and in
contemporary times from the North Korean bombardment of South Korea’s Yeonpyeong
Island in 2010 in defiance of the armistice agreement, to the Assad regime crossing
President Obama’s “red line” with the use of chemical weapons in 2013; deterrence has
failed repeatedly and will likely continue to do so in the future.
Faced with failure, the defender in different contexts confronts a similar question:
What should a defender do when deterrence fails, and its reputation is in jeopardy? Based on
rich and sophisticated empirical research, deterrence literature provides practical advice on
making a credible and successful deterrence threat.1 However, the literature is remarkably
silent on the issue of formulating a desirable policy after failure.2 My dissertation aims to
address this lacuna in the literature.
1

The rational deterrence perspective, the prominent approach in the literature, suggests three models with
regard to deterrence success: (1) the Classical Rational Deterrence; (2) the Costly Signaling, and (3) the
Inherent Credibility. For the exemplary works in each model, see Paul K. Huth and Bruce Russett, “Testing
Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference,” World Politics 42, no. 4 (1990): pp. 466-501; Frank C.
Zagare, and D. Marc Kilogue, Perfect Deterrence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and
Vesna Danilovic, When the Stakes Are High: Deterrence and Conflict Among Major Powers (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2002). They share one fundamental assumption: the defender’s deterrent
threat is most likely to succeed when the opponent considers it credible. Divergence emerges from how
each model defines threat credibility. This will be more thoroughly discussed in Chapter 2.

2

Notable exceptions are Paul K. Huth and Bruce Russett, “Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation,”
International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 1 (1988), pp. 29-45; and Samuel S. G. Wu, “To Attack or Not to
Attack: A Theory and Empirical Assessment of Extended Immediate Deterrence,” Journal of Conflict
Resolution 34 (1990), pp. 531-52.

1

1. Background: Why Should We Care about Direct Deterrence Failure?

This project stems from my personal experience with the Yeonpyeong crisis, which
occurred on November 23, 2010. As a participant in the reserve forces training when the
North Korean artillery attacked the South Korean island, I vividly remember the tense,
perplexed, and confused atmosphere in the South Korean Army as it struggled to
implement the President’s ambivalent guideline: “sternly respond” yet “make sure that the
situation would not escalate.”3 Similarly, when various intelligence reports confirmed that
the Assad regime challenged President Obama’s “red line” by using chemical weapons, the
President refused to punish the regime immediately and changed his wording: “I didn’t set
a red line; the world set a red line.”4 These cases explicitly reveal the problem with an
atheoretical approach: making security policies without a consistent, coherent, and
sophisticated guiding principle.
The Yeonpyeong crisis is a case of direct deterrence failure, and this type of
deterrence failure is an especially perplexing one. As explained in the next section, direct
deterrence aims to prevent attacks against the defender’s territory, not that of its allies. Due

3

The Guardian, “North Korea fires on South Korea – live coverage,” November 23, 2010,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/23/north-korea-condemned-south-korea (accessed on
March 27, 2019).

4

The White House, “Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Reinfeldt of Sweden in Joint Press
Conference,” September 04, 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/09/04/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-reinfeldt-sweden-joint-press- (accessed
on October 1, 2018).

2

to the high interest at stake, the “endowment effect,”5 and the human propensity to “loss
aversion”6; the defender is more likely to follow through on the threat after its deterrence
failed. Hence, in all likelihood, the direct deterrent threat will be considered credible by the
defender’s potential challenger. Its failure, in this regard, should be an anomaly. However,
there has been ninety-seven deterrence encounters among great powers from 1816 to 1984,
thirty-four of them were direct deterrence cases, and fourteen direct deterrent attempts (about
forty-one percent) failed.7 The sheer number of failures illustrates a reoccurring pattern as
opposed to an exception, which warrants our close attention.
According to the Rational and Cognitive Deterrence literature, direct deterrent
threats should be considered the most credible to potential challengers and thus successful.
Its failure, in this context, would make the defender greatly perplexed and confused. For
example, as described in Chapter 5, President John F. Kennedy said it was “a goddamn
mystery” to him that Moscow deployed nuclear missiles in Cuba despite his clear deterrent
threats. Does it mean that the Soviet Union was ready to start a nuclear war? Without a
proper guide of valid theories, it would be tremendously difficult for policymakers of the
defender to navigate the right path under this extreme stress. This dissertation precisely

5

Janice Gross Stein, “Rational Deterrence against ‘Irrational’ Adversaries? No Common Knowledge,” in
T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and JamesJ. Wirtz eds., Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age
(Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 2009), p.67.

6

Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk”
Econometrica 47, no.2 (1979): pp. 263-291.

7

Paul Huth, Christopher Gelpi, and D. Scott Bennett, “The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes:
Testing Deterrence Theory and Structural Realism,” American Political Science Review 87 (1993): pp.
609-623.

3

seeks to address this puzzle of direct deterrence failure and to suggest alternative theories
that would potentially assist in devising effective security policies.

2. Limitations in the Deterrence Literature

Deterrence theory is a security perspective that posits the prevention of aggression,
invasion, and violence by denial or threats of punishment. 8 Successful deterrence, thus,
requires the defensive capability that could physically frustrate any external challenge to the
sovereign integrity of a nation-state or offensive power to retaliate and impose unacceptable
cost against attempts to make changes in the status quo. The emergence of deterrence studies
parallels the development of atomic bombs as nuclear wars cannot be won and should be
averted.9 The horrors of a potential U.S.-Soviet showdown and subsequent nuclear holocaust
infuse urgency and a keen interest in policy circles, academia, and the general public. The
“four waves”10 of deterrence literature advanced our understanding of the conditions for
successful operation of the deterrence strategy.
The level of theoretical and scientific maturation of deterrence literature advances a
robust knowledge basis for four types of deterrent threats: “direct deterrence (protecting the

8

Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1961), pp. 14-16.

9

Bernard Brodie et al., The Absolute Weapon (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), p.76; Robert Jervis, The
Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (New York: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 4-8.

10

Robert Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” World Politics 31, no. 2 (1979): pp. 289-324; Jeffrey W.
Knopf, “The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research,” Contemporary Security Policy 31, no.1 (2010): pp.
1-33.

4

territorial and political integrity of a defender);” “extended deterrence (defending allies’
sovereign integrity);” “general deterrence (dissuading a potential crisis from occurring);” and
“immediate deterrence (preventing the degeneration of an actual international crisis into
open warfare).” These four prototypes of deterrence form four types of deterrence in actual
cases: direct-general, direct-immediate, extended-general, and extended-immediate
deterrence.11 The scholarship, however, still shows the following shortcomings.
First, deterrence is a study of non-events, and it is almost impossible to identify the
population of general deterrence success. Deterrence is a defender’s strategy to prevent its
opponent from doing something, and the potential challenger might decide not to disrupt the
status quo “for reasons independent of deterrent threats.”12 This uncertainty poses serious
challenges to the validity of deterrence studies as it could lead to “false negatives” (excluding
actual cases of deterrence success) or “false positives” (including spurious success cases).13
It renders deterrence dynamics only clearly observable in the aftermath of failure.
Subsequently, attempts to test deterrence theories against empirical cases during the third
wave14 focused on immediate deterrence cases.15 However, the “selection effect”16 reveals

11

Paul Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates,” Annual
Review of Political Science 2, no. 1 (1999), p. 27.

12

Frank P. Harvey, The Future's Back: Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability after the
Cold War (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997), p. 33.

13

Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “General Deterrence Between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing
Models,” American Political Science Review 87, no. 1 (1993), p. 62.

14

Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” p. 302.

15

Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict,” p. 27.

16

James D. Morrow, “Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis
Bargaining,” American Journal of Political Science 33, no.4 (1989): pp. 941-72; James D. Fearon,
“Selection Effects and Deterrence,” International Interactions 28 (2002), pp. 5-29.

5

that the causal effects of independent variables derived from general deterrence cases cannot
be expected to bring out the same result in the immediate deterrence situation. Studying
conditions for immediate deterrence success, in this context, does not help us understand the
factors that lead to general deterrence success.
There have been efforts to solve this problem by turning to “enduring rivalries,”17
“politically active dyads,” and “sample of defense pacts.”18 They suggest interesting ways
to identify the population of deterrence success, the cases of “dogs that did not bark.” As
they all admit, however, even these creative methods have not fully solved the problem,
and their selection still includes “false negative” or “false positive” deterrence cases.
Studies of general deterrence, in this regard, still await more creative ways to solve this
problem.
Second, while it is understandable that third wave deterrence studies can only focus
on conditions of successful immediate deterrence policy, they fail to recognize that this
approach falsely assumes that states would respond to the general deterrence failure with
additional deterrent attempts. 19 In fact, the defender holds at least three options: (1)
punishing the challenger extensively by the retaliatory use of force; (2) initiating a
bargaining process by making a subsequent threat (the Immediate-Deterrent or DefensiveCompellent threat), turning to non-violent military measures or economic sanctions, and

17

Huth and Russett, “General Deterrence Between Enduring Rivals”; Harvey, The Future's Back.

18

Jesse C. Johnson, Brett Ashley Leeds, and Ahra Wu, “Capability, Credibility, and Extended General
Deterrence,” International Interactions 41, no. 2 (2015): pp. 309–36.

19

For example, Danilovic identifies 153 cases of general deterrence failures among major powers but 105
cases (68.63 percent) did not escalate into immediate deterrence cases. Danilovic, When the Stakes Are
High, p. 61
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offering inducements; or (3) backing down and acquiescing to significant changes in the
status quo. The issue of what makes a defender choose a certain course of action after
deterrence failure receives scant attention in the literature.
Third, scholarly works on deterrence failure are severely lopsided towards a
particular type of failure. That is extended deterrence failure. This type of deterrence failure
might be a lot more frequent than direct deterrence failure. However, direct deterrence is
not only the prototype deterrence dynamics, but also its failure often causes pivotal
international crises such as the 1936 Rhineland crisis, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the
Sino-Soviet Border Dispute, the Yom Kippur War, the Falklands War, the 1999 Kargil
Crisis, and the 2010 Yeonpyeong crisis. For example, when Pyongyang initiated artillery
attacks on Yeonpyeong Island on November 23, 2010, it was crucially important for
policymakers in Seoul to know which policy option would lead to the optimal result:
deterrence restoration at a minimum cost. Deterrence theory, however, continuously fails
to provide viable policy recommendations concerning this important real-world problem.
Fourth, there is a sharp divide in deterrence studies between Rational Deterrence20
and Psychological/Cognitive Deterrence camps.21 There has not been a serious attempt to
learn from both approaches simultaneously. They both suggest compelling coding rules

20

John Orme, “Deterrence Failures: A Second Look,” International Security 11, no. 4 (1987): pp. 96-124;
Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980,” World
Politics 36, no. 4 (1984): pp. 496-526; Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “Deterrence Failure and Crisis
Escalation”; Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “Testing Deterrence Theory.”

21

Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1981); Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology
and Deterrence (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985); Richard Ned Lebow and Janice
Gross Stein, “Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter,” World Politics 41, no. 2 (1989):
pp. 208-224; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent
Variable,” World Politics 42, no.3 (1990): pp. 336-369.
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and reliable datasets 22 , and it is difficult to conclude that any stance is falsified. This
difficulty in identifying the valid proposition might be because, in reality, different
decision-makers are divergently rational. 23 Some people are “hedgehogs” who rarely
update their thinking; while others are “foxes” who are “open to competing arguments.”24
If so, it is more indispensable to formulate a comprehensive model that can be used to
analyze diverse types of policymakers that are not equally rational.
Fifth, the question of whether possession of nuclear weapons is conducive or
irrelevant to deterrence success is not fully answered yet. We do not have enough empirical
data to test these theories. The sanction of dropping nuclear weapons occurred only once in
human history. Of course, this can be strong evidence that nuclear weapons have a
tremendous deterrent effect. It could be indeed a “nuclear revolution”25 after all as it almost
has terminated systemic or general wars among great powers. Theoretically speaking,
nuclear proliferation should not be a bad thing.26 Inversely, however, this might imply that
nuclear deterrence cannot be credible as it has continued to be off the table. As Boulding
emphasizes, “If [deterrence] were really stable […] it would cease to deter.”27 Empirically,
nuclear powers frequently failed to deter their adversaries in Berlin, on the Korean Peninsula,

22

Harvey, The Future’s Back, p. 38.

23

Lebow and Stein, “Rational Deterrence Theory,” p. 208

24

Stein, “Rational Deterrence against ‘Irrational’ Adversaries,” pp. 64-65.

25

Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution; Rober Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search
for Credibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

26

Kenneth N. Waltz, “More May Be Better,” in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of
Nuclear Weapons: a Debate Renewed (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), pp. 3-45.

27

Kenneth Boulding, “Confession of Roots,” International Studies Notes 12 (1986), p. 32.
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during the Arab-Israel wars, and in the Falklands. 28 Statistical findings also support the
irrelevance of nuclear weapons in deterrence success.29
Sixth, the deterrence literature suffers greatly from conceptual complications.
There remains a troublesome and defective conceptual ambiguity between immediate
deterrence and defensive compellence. A deterrer’s subsequent set of threats in the
aftermath of a general deterrence failure to stop or undo the challenge is identified as an
immediate deterrent threat by some scholars but a (defensive) compellent threat by others.30
This confusing use of multiple concepts to identify the same international process needs to
be addressed, repaired, and refined further.

3. Research Questions

This study seeks to answer the following research question to address those six gaps
in the literature. What should the defender do when its direct-general deterrence fails?
Whether the fact that the threat involves conventional or nuclear weapons would make any
difference? This research proposes to shed light on this central, but overlooked, question,
by focusing on (1) causes for a challenger to defy the defender’s direct deterrent threat, (2)

28

Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, pp. 28-29.

29

Huth and Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work?”; Huth and Russett, “Deterrence Failure and Crisis
Escalation.” Recent studies also reveal that nuclear weapons have no statistically significant impact on
compellence success. Todd S. Sechser and Mathew Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive
Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), pp. 72-95.

30

Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Patrick M.
Morgan, Deterrence: a conceptual analysis (Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications, 1983); Alexander
George and William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Oxford: Westview Press, 1994).
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conditions for the defender’s certain policy choice in the aftermath of the deterrence failure,
(3) short- and long-term outcomes of each policy option and (4) whether introduction of
nuclear weapons would change the prototype direct deterrence dynamics.

Question 1: Why does the challenger defy the defender’s direct deterrent threat?

The cause of the direct-general deterrence failure needs to be identified first to
devise appropriate countermeasures against the challenger’s defiance. The gravest
challenge in answering this question is the above-mentioned problem of identifying the
population of deterrence success. Considering that addressing the issue is extremely
difficult, this dissertation selects only deterrence failure cases. As this selection introduces
another problem of a non-varying dependent variable, this research identifies the different
degree of deterrence failure. The degree of failure is defined by unpacking the challenger’s
strategy of defiance against the defender’s deterrent threat into its specific policies: gradual
escalation, hedging, and rapid escalation. These types of defiance are defined based on the
degree of aggressiveness in the challenger’s strategic movement. Specifically, gradual
escalation implies its use of non-military (i.e., verbal/political/economic) measures in
challenging the status quo, hedging means its use of military force in a non-violent way,
and rapid escalation indicates the challenger’s violent use of military force.
Classifying challenger’s unitary strategy of defiance into its three different subtypes is especially important for studying direct deterrence failure. As threat credibility is
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generally considered as a sufficient condition for deterrence success,31 there is a tendency
in the literature to demonstrate “the fallacy of equating the credibility of the threat with its
effectiveness.” 32 In other words, given than significantly high interest is at stake for a
defender in the direct deterrence situation, its threat should be considered credible and
subsequently most likely successful according to the deterrence literature. The failure of
direct-general deterrence, in this regard, seems puzzling and difficult to be reasoned out by
the Rational Deterrence perspective, as explained in detail in Chapter 2.
One simple answer to this problem is that the challenger is a determined aggressor
that maintains a “very low assessment of the value of the status quo.”33 Making a capable
threat impossible in this case, as the challenger’s preference order is rigid and it relentlessly
prefers defying the status quo to acquiescing with it, whatever the defender does to preserve
it.34 Under this condition, deterrence is bound to fail however credible it may be. This
approach suggests a black-and-white picture: direct-general deterrence always succeeds,
and it only fails when the challenger is extremely resolute to revise the status quo. If so,
the defender has only two choices after direct-general deterrence failure: peace by
submission or war by standing firm.
In case this all-or-nothing situation is the true reality that the defender faces all the
time, then we do not need alternative theories or additional studies like this dissertation,

31

Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict,” p. 29.

32

Jack S. Levy, “When Do Deterrent Threats Work?” British Journal of Political Science 18, no. 4, (1988),
p. 500.

33

Ibid., p. 500.

34

Zagare, and Kilogue, Perfect Deterrence, pp. 81-82.
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and policymakers can choose either the path of humiliation or destruction. However, the
paucity of research on this issue of direct-general deterrence failure hardly makes it
possible for us to jump to such conclusions. As argued in Chapter 2, this dissertation’s
feasibility of punishment model illustrates that direct deterrence could fail not only because
the challenger is a determined aggressor rather than the defender’s threat is not credible
despite its high interest at stake. This threat incredibility may result from the lack of
military and political feasibility to follow through on the threat. To test this hypothesis, we
need to redefine the non-varying dependent variable of deterrence failure into three ordinal
variables and observe the impact of variance in the independent variable on the value of
the dependent variable.

Question 2: Under what conditions does the defender choose a certain policy option?

Dependent variables for this question are countermeasures of the defender after
direct-general deterrence failure. As discussed earlier, numerous studies presume that the
defender would turn to an immediate deterrence strategy in the aftermath of general
deterrence failure. This project, however, points out that the defender can choose to
escalate or de-escalate the crisis by turning to divergent levels of punishment, which leads
to four ideal types of action: rapid escalation, hedging, gradual escalation, and deescalation. Similar to the challenger’s strategic options, defender’s choice of rapid
escalation indicates the defender’s use of military force to respond to the deterrence failure;
hedging means its use of military force in a non-violent way to employ it as a bargaining
chip; and gradual escalation implies its use of non-military measures. What is distinct about
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the defender’s strategy is that it can back down: de-escalation by choosing a non-action
path and surrendering what it possessed before.
Identifying factors that cause the defender to choose certain strategies after directgeneral deterrence failure is crucial in this study because it is closely related to the true
credibility of the defender’s deterrent threat. By definition, credible threats are “conditional
declaration of hostile intention” that is “worthy to be believed.”35 Thus, if a defender did
make a credible threat; it should follow through on its threat facing a challenger’s defiance
of it. In this regard, conditions for the defender to escalate the crisis after the general
deterrence failure can also be indicators for evaluating the true credibility of its threat. For
example, when the defender rapidly escalates the crisis by retaliating against the
challenger’s non-compliance to its deterrent threat, the former’s direct-general deterrent
threat was indeed a very credible one. If the defender gradually escalates the crisis by
imposing economic sanctions against the challenger and initiates a bargaining process by
making immediate deterrent or compellent threats, then the former’s threat was somewhat
credible. If the defender backs down, however, its threat was au fond non-credible.
However, before accepting this self-evident relationship between the defender’s
credibility level and its action in the aftermath of deterrence failure, the researcher should
be mindful of the action-reaction problem or “paradoxical logic of strategy.”36 For example,
even in a case that the defender is an authentically credible type, it may be refrained from
rapidly escalating the crisis given that the challenger chooses to defy the defender’s direct-

35

Online Etymology Dictionary, https://www.etymonline.com/word/credible#etymonline_v_29040;
https://www.etymonline.com/word/threat#etymonline_v_13258 (accessed on March 28. 2019).

36

Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2002), p. 18.
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general deterrent threat. The challenger’s action increases the possibility that it is a capable
and resolved aggressor and ready to fight a war for revising the status quo. This belief
updating of the defender should greatly affect its decision-making process. The challenger,
on the other hand, might choose to bluff and initiate a crisis even though it is not capable
or resolved to risk a war, anticipating that the defender would back down being influenced
by this belief updating or action-reaction effect. This action-reaction problem is a serious
challenge in establishing linear causal models for answering the second question (possibly
even the first question), which should be addressed properly through a careful research
design.

Question 3: What are the ramifications of each policy choice?

The reformulation of the defender’s choice into four strategies (rapid escalation,
hedging, gradual escalation, and de-escalation) is conducive on both the overcoming
rigidness in the previous deterrence theories’ binary model and the tracing of outcomes of
each policy choice. The most significant factor that influences the decision-making process
after the deterrence failure would be what happens next when crisis actors take a certain
course of action. Revealing the ramification of each choice, thus, is crucial in addressing
the ultimate question of this dissertation: What should the defender do when direct-general
deterrence fails?
In answering the third question, this dissertation study traces both short-term and
long-term outcomes of the defender’s policy choices. The short-term ramification is closely
related to how the crisis terminated, and there can be two types of termination: (1) intensity

14

of violence (from no-violence to full-scale war) and (2) content of the result (victory of the
defender, compromise, stalemate, and defeat of the defender). Both types of crisis
outcomes are significantly important in answering the third question as the policy choice
of decision-makers should care not only whether the choice would lead to war but also who
would be victorious in the crisis. However, the winner of the crisis would be decided by
complex factors such as military balance, economic strength, national morale, tactics in the
battlefield, and even pure luck especially when the crisis ended up with war. As the
previous strategic moves of the challenger and the defender hardly decide these factors,
this dissertation solely focuses on the first aspect of short-term outcome: intensity of
violence.
Concerning the long-term outcome, this research focuses on the following aspect
after the termination of the crisis: deterrence collapse (another crisis occurred among the
principal actors) or deterrence restoration (no additional crises occurred). This outcome
also could be determined by various unsystematic factors. However, this issue is directly
related to the matter of threat credibility. The deterrence literature actively debates on the
long-term impact of a defender’s reputation for standing firm, and this project analyzes this
long-term ramification of the defender’s policy choice as well.
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Question 4: What kind of impact does the possession of nuclear weapons have on the shortand long-term outcomes of direct deterrence?
Due to their appalling destructive capability, the literature on international crisis
has considered nuclear weapons as “the ultimate security guarantor.”

37Nuclear

weapons,

thus, will add a definitive calming effect and buttress stability of deterrence. The
revolutionist school – a group of scholars who believe nuclear weapons have
revolutionized deterrence dynamics – emphasizes that development of nuclear weapons
has concurred with the absence of direct nuclear war between two superpowers throughout
the Cold War.
However, in the eyes of Rational Choice theory, the condition of “mutually assured
destruction” (MAD)

38makes

a defender’s deterrent threat hardly credible. Since the

nuclear war has a somewhat “negative infinite utility,” an outcome without nuclear war for
sure should be always more preferable to “any lottery that gives any nonzero probability
of nuclear war.”

39Subsequently,

unless it is an extreme national security problem of

survival (i.e., the opponent’s imminent nuclear attack on defender’s densely populated
cities), a rational defender should back down whenever a challenger attempts to revise the
status quo under MAD.40
37

Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2007), p. 51.
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This means that both sides in a conflict secure the second-strike capability and are capable of maintaining
the retaliatory power to completely destroy the other after absorbing its adversary’s initial nuclear attack.
This “mutual vulnerability” is the crux of nuclear revolution. Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear
Revolution, p. 14.

39

James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p.
31.
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Some argue that nuclear deterrence still can be credible under MAD considering the automatic, universal,
immediate instinct for revenge. The retaliatory action after receiving attacks from the challenger would
lead the defender to “feel good.” This emotional satisfaction can make nuclear deterrence very credible
even in a case that decision is not supported by cost-benefit analysis. Rose McDermott, Anthony C.
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This fundamental credibility problem of nuclear deterrence is manifested by the
“stability-instability paradox” 41 in cases of conventional wars between two nuclear powers
(i.e., Sino-Soviet border clashes and the Kargil War), and proxy wars in Korea and Vietnam.
Nuclear weapons might have little impact on preventing limited/minor armed conflicts or
indirect wars. As mentioned earlier, quantitative studies also find the statistically nonsignificant causal effect of nuclear weapons in extended deterrence and compellence
success.
Some argue that possession of nuclear weapons might matter in the direct
deterrence situations, especially when the nuclear balance is non-MAD: nuclear disparity
or asymmetry.42 However, as the Falklands War and the Yom Kippur War show, nuclear
weapons did even fail to deter armed conflicts between nuclear and non-nuclear powers.
Recent studies on “nuclear taboo” 43 and “self-deterrence” 44 suggest an interesting
explanation to this anomaly that, under nuclear asymmetry, nuclear retaliation is politically
and normatively very costly, which makes nuclear weapons continuously off the table

Lopez, and Peter K. Hatemi, “Blunt Not the Heart, Enrage It: The Psychology of Revenge and
Deterrence,” Texas National Security Review 1, no.1 (2017): pp. 69-88.
41

Glenn H. Snyder, “The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror,” in Paul Seabury ed., The Balance
of Power (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965): pp. 184-201.

42

Sechser and Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy, p. 72. Here, the nuclear disparity
implies that both sides in a conflict possess nuclear weapons yet one maintains the second strike
capability while the other does not. The nuclear asymmetry means nuclear superiority or monopoly:
while one side is a nuclear power, the other is not.
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Nina Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo,” International Security 29,
no. 4 (2005), pp. 5-49; Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-use of
Nuclear Weapons Since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

44
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of Global Policy Analysis 71, issue 1 (2016): pp. 20-40.
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during crises. In this regard, nuclear war possibly has not occurred not because of the
ultimate deterrent effect of nuclear weapons but of their inapplicability. The possession of
nuclear weapons, thus, might not matter much in deterrence dynamics. This possibility
warrants our close attention that whether the possession of the weapons has any impact on
policymakers’ decision-making after direct-general deterrence failure.

4. Research Design

This dissertation project utilizes a mixed-methods approach, incorporating
regression analysis and process tracing. Arguably, a mixed-method research design that
combines quantitative and qualitative methods is a stronger form of inquiry than the singlemethod approach.45 The mixed-method approach not only helps demonstrate the average
causal effects of variables but also illustrates the necessary and sufficient conditions for the
occurrence of dependent variables.46 This study, thus, first tests the research hypotheses
against the population of direct deterrence failure, which will be followed by two fulllength (the 1936 Rhineland Crisis and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis) and three mini casestudies, namely, the 1969 Sino-USSR Border Conflict, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the
1982 Falklands War.

45

Sidney Tarrow, “Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide,” in by Henry E. Brady and David Collier
eds., Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers. 2010), pp. 101-110.

46

James Mahoney, “Toward a Unified Theory of Causality,” Comparative Political Studies 41, no.4-5
(2008): pp. 412-436.
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4.1

Statistical Analysis: Logistic and Ordered Logistic Regression

First, a statistical analysis is performed to capture the average causal impact of the
two independent variables (feasibility of punishment and possession of nuclear weapons)
on dependent variables (challenger’s policy, defender’s policy, and short- and long-term
crisis outcomes) in the population of direct deterrence failure. 47 One hundred ninety-two
cases of direct deterrence failure are identified from the “International Crisis Behavior”
project’s actor level dataset (ICB2, Ver. 12).48 The number of observations is a lot greater
than previous studies because cases of invasion and territorial disputes are coded as direct
deterrence failure in this project as long as there were implicit actions (i.e. establishments
of defensive garrisons along the border) of the defender to maintain the status quo.
The analysis turns to logistic and ordered logistic regression techniques as
dependent variables are either binary (deterrence restoration vs. deterrence collapse) or
ordinal (non-action, non-military escalation, non-violent military escalation, violent
escalation). This project runs multiple regression models to control the impact of
confounding variables such as the probability of victory, interests at stake, and audience
cost. For addressing the above-mentioned action-reaction problem between the policy
choices of challenger and defender, the “two-stage logistic regression model”49 is used for

47

These hypotheses are discussed in detail in the following chapter.

48

Michael Brecher, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Kyle Beardsley, Patrick James and David Quinn, International
Crisis Behavior Data (ICB), Version 12 (2017), http://sites.duke.edu/icbdata/data-collections/.

49

Mijung Kim, “Two-stage logistic regression model,” Expert Systems with Applications 36 (2009): pp.
6,727-6,734
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testing hypotheses for the third question. The variables used in this analysis are as presented
in Table 1. 50 Chapter 3 explains those indicators used for measuring each variable.

Table 1: Variables for the Regression Analysis51
Independent
Variables

Dependent Variables

Research
Question 1

Research
Question 2

Challenger’s policy
choice (Rapid escalation,

H1: Defender’s
feasibility to follow
through #

(1) Military feasibility* ;
(2) Political feasibility †, ‡

Hedging, Gradual
escalation) #

R1: Challenger’s level
of resolve #

(1) Probability of victory*;
(2) Interest at stake †

Defender’s policy
choice after the failure

H2: Defender’s
feasibility to follow
through #

(1) Military feasibility*;
(2) Political feasibility†, ‡

(Rapid escalation,
Hedging, Gradual
escalation, De-escalation) #

R2: Defender’s level of
resolve #

(1) Probability of victory
(COW CINC)*; (2)
Interest at stake (“the
object of gravest threat”)†

H3-1 and R3-1: Policy
choice of the defender #

Rapid escalation, Hedging,
Gradual escalation, Deescalation

H3-2 and R3-2: Policy
choice of the defender #

Rapid escalation, Hedging,
Gradual escalation, Deescalation

Short-term outcomes
(“intensity of violence”)#, †

Research
Question 3

Long-term outcomes
(“escalation or reduction of
tension”)†,‡

Research
Question 4

Indicators

Challenger’s policy
choice, Defender’s
policy choice, Shortterm, and Long-term
outcomes

H4: Level of Nuclear
capability (“nuclear
capability”) #
R4: Possession of
nuclear weapons (Yes
vs. No) †, ‡

Degree of advancement in
nuclear capability #
Possession of nuclear
weapons†, ‡

50

Each symbol signifies as follows; (1) †: nominal variables, (2) ‡: binary variables, (3) #: ordinal variables,
(4) *: interval variables.

51

If not stated otherwise, all values of variables used in this statistical analysis come from Brecher et al.,
ICB Version 12.
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4.2

Case Studies: Process-tracing

Case studies and process-tracing method will be used to test the causal impact of
the belief updating variable and to determine the most decisive factor among explanatory
variables in deciding short- and long-term outcomes of the five selected crises. This
research selects them from the population of the direct deterrence failure dataset. The
process-tracing method involves four empirical tests52 to identify a causal mechanism: (1)
“straw in the wind,” (2) “hoop,” (3) “smoking gun,” and (4) “doubly decisive.”53 The method
usually works as a “method of elimination,” 54 and the process tracing technique tries to
eliminate as many alternative/rival explanations as possible by turning to four different tests:
straw-in-the-wind, hoop, smoking gun, and doubly decisive ones. These tests, especially the
hoop test, will help this study to address the potential confounding effects of third variables.
The proposed research will conduct two full-length and three mini case studies that
involve divergent policy choices of the deterrer for the sake of maximizing the

52

First, passing the straw in the wind test implies that the hypothesis is relevant to explain the phenomenon
but it is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish causation with the variables used. Second, the hoop
test is related to necessary but not sufficient conditions for the causation. Passing this test affirms the
relevance of the variable in causal mechanism but does not confirm the hypothesis. Failing to pass the
test, however, leads to rejection of the explanatory model. Third, the smoking gun test is for identifying
sufficient but not necessary conditions: the factor is indeed the cause for that phenomenon but there
might be other variables that can explain this. Passing this test confirms the hypothesis but failing to do
so does not result in the elimination of it. Lastly, passing the doubly decisive test indicates that the
variable is both necessary and sufficient condition for causation: the factor is the cause and it is
impossible to explain the event without it. It is very unlikely to find evidence that can pass the doubly
decisive test in social science. Andrew Bennett, “Process Tracing and Causal Inference,” in Henry E.
Brady and David Collier eds., Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards (Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010): pp. 207-20.
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823-830; James Mahoney, “The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences,” Sociological
Methods and Research 41, no.4 (2012): pp. 570-597.
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representativeness of the population.55 The first two full-length case studies include (1) the
1936 Rhineland Crisis (France’s policy choice of de-escalation56 against Germany; both
France and Germany were non-nuclear powers), and (2) the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis (the
U.S.’s decision to hedge against the Soviet challenge by enacting a naval blockade and
suggesting a missile trade; the U.S. and the USSR were under the condition of MAD). The
three abbreviated case studies analyze (1) the Sino-USSR Border Conflict in 1969 (the
Soviet choice of taking rapid escalation path against China; nuclear disparity favoring the
Moscow), (2) the Yom Kippur War in 1973 (Israel’s move to take rapid escalation route
against Egypt and Syria; nuclear asymmetry – Israel as a nuclear power vs. non-nuclear
Arab powers), and (3) the 1982 Falklands War (Britain’s policy choice of gradual
escalation path against Argentina; nuclear asymmetry – United Kingdom as a nuclear
power vs. non-nuclear Argentina).
The reason behind conducting mini-case studies for the latter three crises is that
while unclassified primary sources can be easily accessible for the Rhineland and the
Cuban Missile Crises, it is quite challenging to acquire the equivalent level of archival data

55

This selection strategy will be also conducive to the test validity of research hypotheses as it allows the
dependent and independent variable to vary which is significantly important for (1) establishing a causal
model while avoiding a selection bias and (2) increasing the generality of the model. Gary King, Robert
O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 129-139.

56

After German remilitarization of the Rhineland, the French government did appeal to its allies and the
League of Nations, and technically; this is not a case of de-escalation but that of gradual escalation. The
ICB dataset also identifies that major response of the defender was a “political act” (coded as 3), not “no
response-inaction.” However, the case study analyzes this crisis as a de-escalation path because: (1) the
French government’s first choice of action is “no isolated action,” which is close to inaction than
political action; and (2) the crisis was terminated with non-action of any parties involved after all.
Chapter 4 discusses this in detail.
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for the other cases. The three cases, thus, mainly function as testing grounds for rejecting
certain causal models rather than confirming them.

5. Organization of the Dissertation

In the following chapter (Chapter 2), the dissertation discusses the current status of
Rational and Cognitive Deterrence literature and its limitations. A new theory is suggested
to address the gap in the literature by emphasizing two factors: the feasibility of punishment
and belief updating. Research and rival hypotheses are formulated based on explanatory
variables suggested by the deterrence literature and the new theory with regard to the
question of (1) causes of direct deterrence failure, (2) conditions for a policy choice after
the failure, (3) the short-term outcomes of each policy choice, and (4) long-term
significance of reputation in the aftermath of crisis termination.
Chapter 3 tests the validity of research and rival hypotheses against the population
of the direct deterrence failure. This statistical analysis demonstrates general trends in
direct deterrence dynamics and reveals the average causal impact of individual independent
variables (feasibility of punishment, nuclear capability, and defender’s policy choice)
suggested by deterrence literature and this project. The belief updating variable is omitted
from the regression models because the standard regression analysis hardly captures the
dynamic properly. 57 This chapter concludes with reporting the result of the regression
analysis and discussing its theoretical implications.
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From chapter 4 to 6, five cases of the direct deterrence failure are discussed to
reexamine the causal effects of independent variables demonstrated by the regression
models and to test the impact of belief updating. Chapter 4 organizes evidence found from
the study of the first selected case, the Rhineland Crisis, using the process tracing technique.
This crisis is a case of de-escalation where the defender chooses the inaction option and
does not punish the challenger. The chapter also discusses the implication of the qualitative
evidence for evaluating the validity of theoretical models of this project.
Chapter 5 examines the second case, the Cuban Missile Crisis, where the strategy
of hedging was a chosen policy in the aftermath of direct-general deterrence failure. This
chapter reports the survived explanatory models from the hoop and the smoking gun tests
and identifies the necessary and sufficient conditions for the policy choice of Washington’s
hedging strategy, more specifically, the combination of non-violent military measures
(blockade) and de-escalation (surrendering missile bases in Turkey) paths.
In chapter 6, this study describes the Sino-USSR Border Dispute, the Yom Kippur
War, and the Falklands War cases by identifying the sequential development of the events.
Due to the difficulty in collecting declassified primary sources for these three cases,
research and rival hypotheses are tested against actual behaviors of challengers and
defenders during the crises using the process-tracing technique. It is impossible, thus, to
single out the cause for the challenger or defender’s choice during the crises. Subsequently,
the hoop test, rather than the smoking gun test, is used as the primary tool in this chapter
to identify the possible rationale of policymakers behind their choices of rapid or gradual
escalation in these three cases.
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Chapter 7 reviews and summarizes the key findings of the dissertation. After
discussing the theoretical implications of the study, this chapter explains how this project
adds to the existing literature on deterrence failure. Also, the chapter suggests specific
policy recommendations formulated based on the result of this study and then concludes
by examining the limitations of the dissertation project.
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CHAPTER II
A NEW THEORY OF DIRECT DETERRENCE FAILURE

Direct deterrence failure is a perplexing event. Among different types of deterrence58,
direct deterrence threat is considered the most credible as it aims at “preventing an armed
attack against a country’s territory,”59 not against that of its allies. Due to the high interest
at stake, 60 “endowment effect,” 61 and the human propensity to “loss aversion,” 62 both
Rational and Cognitive deterrence studies predict that the defender is most likely to resolve
to follow through on the direct deterrent threat if it is challenged. Hence, in all likelihood,
the direct deterrent threat will be considered credible by the defender’s potential
challengers. If so, the threat would work in most cases as threat credibility is generally
considered a sufficient condition for deterrence success.63 When, then, can this particular
type of deterrence fail? What should the defender do if it fails? Would the involvement of
conventional or nuclear weapons make any difference?
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In this chapter, I aim to suggest a theoretical framework that can be used to explain
the cause of direct deterrence failure, policy choices of the defender in the aftermath of the
failure, and the outcome of these choices. First, the chapter introduces rational and
cognitive deterrence theories and discusses their implications. Next, it identifies limitations
in these theories and presents alternative models that can address these problems. The third
part of this chapter asks what kind of impact the possession of nuclear weapons has on
direct deterrent outcomes. Lastly, rival and research hypotheses are formulated based on
this discussion. These hypotheses will be tested against the empirical data in the following
chapters.

1. The Rational and Cognitive Deterrence Literature

Deterrence literature is quite extensive. It is not an exaggeration to say that the
emergence of strategic studies in IR corresponds with the advancement in deterrence
research.64 However, regarding deterrence failure, most works are limited to the study and
analysis of extended deterrence failure and the conditions for successful immediate
deterrence threats. The first possible reason behind this apparent disinterest in direct
deterrence failure is that, during the Cold War era, failure was considered the endpoint for
strategic exchanges: nuclear war and the annihilation of the human race. More importantly,
according to rational and cognitive deterrence studies, direct deterrence would hardly fail
due to its inherently high level of credibility. Its failure, thus, is an anomaly and possible
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only when the challenger is extremely dissatisfied with the status quo and determined to
revise it. This section reviews the rationale behind this explanation provided by both
rational and cognitive deterrence theories.

1.1

The Origin of Failure: When Does Direct Deterrence Fail?

There are two major dimensions in the deterrence literature: Rational and Cognitive
perspectives. Although both approaches argue that direct deterrence failure would be a rare
event, the mechanisms they provide behind this uniform prediction are different. The
Rational Deterrence perspective provides three general models65 for deterrence success and
failure: (1) the Classical Rational Deterrence, (2) the Costly Signaling, and (3) the Inherent
Credibility models. They share one fundamental assumption: The defender’s deterrent
threat is most likely to succeed when the opponent considers it credible. Nonetheless,
divergence emerges through the definition of threat credibility among each model.
First, the Classical Rational Deterrence model66 argues that deterrence fails due to
not meeting one or more of the four prerequisites: (1) clear definition of undesirable behavior,
(2) explicit commitment and signaling, (3) capability to defend the commitment and (4)
resolve to implement the punishment in case adversaries fail to comply. While some scholars
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argue that deterrence can fail by not satisfying a single element of four prerequisites,67 others
emphasize that a deterrent threat would most likely succeed when it is considered credible
by the target state.68 This threat credibility is secured “if the defender possesses the military
capabilities to inflict substantial costs on a challenger in armed conflict and if the challenger
believes that the defender is resolved to use its available military forces.”69
Between the capability to impose enormous pain and the resolve to use that
capability, the first and the second waves of deterrence literature 70 focus more on the
importance of the former, especially the short-term military capability, for the success of
deterrence strategy.71 The recent trend, however, inclines towards the significant role of
the resolve (i.e. “balance of interest”) in making a successful deterrent threat.72
For example, Harvey73 finds that, according to his analysis of the three datasets74
using Boolean truth table, “a lack of resolve is independently sufficient for failure in 100
percent of relevant cases” whereas its presence “was found to be independently necessary
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for success in 100 percent of the relevant cases.” Morgan also points out that whereas the
cost of retaliation is real, the cost of not responding is hypothetical. This burden of
escalation could prevent the deterrer from carrying out retaliatory measures that it
committed itself to conduct. What matters the most, thus, is the strong will to follow
through on the threat and escalate the crisis, rather than the capability to inflict sufficient
suffering on the challenger.75
This general trend within Classical Rational Deterrence literature is greatly
strengthened by the proliferation of deterrence studies applying game theory. The bargaining
literature of deterrence suggests the Costly Signaling model. It also attributes deterrence
failure to the non-credibility of threats. 76 This approach, however, criticizes the classical
model for conflating two completely separable issues – capability and credibility –and
subsequently has caused much confusion. Although the capability is the necessary condition
for deterrence success, capability, and credibility are two very different concepts that need
to be analyzed separately.77
Zagare and Kilgour78, for instance, point out that credibility is the issue of rationality:
a state’s preference for executing threats over backing down. Capability, however, is related
to the aspect of physical ability (1) to follow through on the threat, and (2) to inflict enough
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pain to make the target state prefer the status quo to an armed conflict. Similarly, Slantchev
argues that “a threat is credible if the actor is willing to carry it out.” 79 Based on these
clarifications, they drop the capability dimension in defining the concept of threat credibility.
Threats can be “credible without necessarily being capable”80 in this regard.
This reduction of the concept of threat credibility to the degree of defenders’ resolve
makes this model turn its attention to estimating and influencing the target’s intention.81
Deterrence will be successful when the defender demonstrates that it prefers conflict to
retreat by “burning bridges” or “sinking costs.” Empirically, however, leaders have been
quite reluctant to pursue these tactics either because (1) they limit the freedom of action82
or (2) they involve a cost that had to be paid regardless of the outcome.83
In this context, the Costly Signaling model suggests the “tying hands” strategy as
the most efficient, effective, and viable option. 84 The strategy indicates a maneuver to
create costs that “would be paid ex-post” if the defender fails to follow through on its
threats85, or an act of increasing “the expected payoff from war relative to the expected
payoff from capitulation.”86 States can meet this requirement (1) by increasing the cost of
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backing down (i.e. rendering audience costs) and subsequently decreasing the capitulation
payoff, or (2) by decreasing the cost of war or increasing the probability of victory in war
and thus increasing the war payoff.
The third model, Inherent Credibility, 87 however, expresses doubts about the
relevance of tying hands strategy in deterrence success. If the interest at stake is low for
the defender, any manipulative tactics, however sophisticated they may be, would not help
its deterrent threat to be regarded as credible. Based on their eleven case studies of major
U.S. deterrence efforts between 1948 and 1963, George and Smoke argue that “the task of
achieving credibility is secondary to and dependent upon a more fundamental question
regarding the nature and valuation of interests.”88
Danilovic demonstrates statistic evidence which supports the claim that “the
national interest, shaping the inherent credibility of threats, sets the limits to the impact of
the other two factors on the opponent, i.e., a deterrer’s capacity to carry out its threat and
manipulative strategies it uses to communicate a strong resolve.” 89 In other words, the
interest at stake “shapes the opponent’s perception of the deterrer’s resolve.” There is no
way to enhance the credibility of a deterrent threat if it is to protect low interest at stake,
and thus inherently incredible.
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The competing approach to these three models in the Rational Deterrence
perspective is the Cognitive Deterrence perspective 90 which suggests the Impaired
Rationality model. 91 This model emphasizes the role of misperception or lapse of
rationality. Based on evidence from laboratory experiments, Jervis identifies key cognitive
defects of humans, such as overconfidence in their cognitive capability, incapability to see
value trade-offs in their decision, assimilation of new information to their preexisting
beliefs, and “defensive avoidance.”

92

All of these common deficiencies in human

cognition can make causal models developed by the Rational Deterrence perspective
irrelevant in some cases. For example, policy-makers may intentionally dismiss all
indications of an adversary’s resolve by employing denial, selection, or any other
psychological techniques if “they feel compelled to act.”93
Stein also highlights that people have a preference for simplicity, aversion to ambiguity,
“cognitive dissonance,” fundamental defect in probabilistic thinking, the propensity to loss
aversion, and are vulnerable to “endowment” and “framing” effects. 94 While Rational
Deterrence theory treats them as some deviations that would not pose serious threats in
formulating a general model, she argues that “these deviations are so pervasive and so
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systematic that it is a mistake to consider rational models of deterrence as empirically valid.”95
More importantly, the nature of the policy-maker also plays a role, and they are neither equally
rational nor similar in their cognitive styles. Some are “hedgehogs” who like to infer from their
knowledge on a specific domain to understand other areas and discount evidence that is not
consistent with their theory. Others are “foxes” who are skeptical of deductive reasoning, open
to alternative explanations, and averse to extending a specific knowledge to other domains.96
These human cognitive deficiencies make an attempt to generalize decision-makers’
strategic thinking in deterrence dynamics almost futile. What matters, according to the
Cognitive deterrence perspective, is to grasp “the other side’s values, beliefs, and
perceptions and to understand the motivated and unmotivated biases.” 97 Besides, it is
crucial to understand the process of preference formulation and reformulation during the
crisis and domestic political consequences of policy choices that complicate expected
utility calculation of both defender and challenger. 98 Every deterrence failure, in other
words, is most likely a sui generis event.
Due to this methodological, possibly epistemological, cleavage between the two
competing approaches in deterrence literature, formulating a comprehensive model that
combines both rational and cognitive deterrence perspectives is quite difficult, if not
impossible. Nonetheless, it is important to make efforts to learn from both bodies of
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literature in establishing a theory of direct deterrence failure. Fortunately, both perspectives
suggest a similar prediction about what happens next when direct deterrence fails. The
similarity allows us to have a more sophisticated framework by synthesizing the two
approaches.
The four models of deterrence success/failure proposed by rational and cognitive
deterrence studies purport that a direct deterrence threat should be very credible and thus
most likely to succeed. First, whatever the interest at stake is, such as territorial integrity,
compliance with a treaty, or a specific action of the opponent, it should be directly related
to the defender’s national security in the direct deterrence situation. On the other hand,
regardless of which rhetoric the challenger may turn to, it has lived without the strategic
asset at stake before initiating a crisis. In this regard, the balance of interest favors the
defender, and the defender would be more likely to prevail in the end.
Second, because of the significant importance of the crisis at stake, the defender
should pay the enormous audience cost if it retreats from its deterrent commitment. Third,
according to Prospect Theory, people will become more risk-acceptant in choices involving
sure losses but risk-averse when it is related to sure gains.99 The defender, in this regard,
should be risk-acceptant when direct deterrence fails as it is anticipating or experiencing
significant loss. Fourth, the “endowment effect”100 and the logic of “vengeance”101 also
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predict that the defender would strongly resist challenger’s attempt to deprive of what the
former currently possesses.
Therefore, the defender would most likely follow through on the direct deterrence
threat when it is challenged either due to its rational calculation of expected utility or
irrational impetus of loss aversion or vengeance. If so, for a challenge to defy the defender’s
direct deterrent threat, the former should be as resolved and capable as the latter. The
challenger can be so for a good reason (i.e. high interest at stake due to irredentism, high
probability of victory in war, low war cost, or high audience cost) or due to its cognitive
defects (i.e. framing the issue as a loss-aversion, motivated reasoning, or strong hostility).
It suggests a linear prediction that when a challenger becomes extremely resolved and
capable, it would choose aggressive policies even when such a policy will surely make the
defender retaliate militarily, and subsequently, a war should ensue. Deterrence is bound to
fail in this case as the challenger is merely seeking a casus belli.

1.2

Conditions for Choices: What Will the Defender Do in the Aftermath of the
Failure?

As mentioned earlier, there are not many works focusing on conditions for policy
choices of a defender after deterrence failure. A few notable exceptions are Huth and
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Russett,102 Wu,103 and Danilovic.104 They work on extended deterrence cases and follow
the linear prediction of Rational and Cognitive Deterrence theories: the more credible the
deterrer is, the more likely it will respond to the failure with crisis escalation and, ultimately,
a war. The defender will become more resolute when a short-term balance of forces favors
the defender, its expected utility of war exceeds the capitulation payoff, and if there is high
interest at stake due to alliance ties and other possible arrangements in extended deterrence
situations. If we apply this theory to direct deterrence cases, the defender’s action in the
aftermath of direct deterrence failure would most likely to be solely determined by its
military capability as the interest at stake is assumed to be high.
Accordingly, the defender might not hastily jump into a route of punishing the
challenger when the short-term balance of forces is disadvantageous to it. It would be quite
difficult for the defender to do nothing facing the failure considering high interest at stake,
yet it is possible to make an additional deterrent threat (i.e. stop defying me otherwise I
will punish you more severely) and postpone the imposition of punishment to prevent
further deterioration of its strategic position.
There is a conceptual ambiguity in the literature in the way in which we define the
defender’s move. According to the most widely accepted definition provided by Schelling,
deterrence is “a threat intended to keep [the opponent] from starting something” and
compellence as “a threat intended to make an adversary do something.” 105 If so, the
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defender’s follow-up threats to stop further challenge after initial deterrence failure (or
general deterrence failure) is deterrence or compellence?
Some scholars identify them as “immediate deterrence”106 while others define them
“(defensive) compellence.” 107 These uses of different terms for indicating the same
phenomenon is because the demand to stop what the target is already embarking on is an
act of reversing the status quo. The intent of this threat is defensive while the content of it
is offensive. It would be more accurate, thus, to see that followed rounds of bargaining
process after deterrence failure as a mixture of deterrent and compellent strategy or a choice
of a line segment on the continuum of coercive diplomacy.
In this context, the causal models provided by Compellence literature 108 are
relevant in explaining the behaviors of a defender after deterrence failure. It is possible to
assume that states will be more incentivized to respond to direct-general deterrence failure
with follow-up compellent threats when they are expected to be successful.
Unfortunately, compared to deterrence literature, studies on compellence have not
formulated a systematic theory of compellence success. The limitation in Compellence
literature is because, dissimilar to deterrence; each compellent threat involves specific
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types of demand and assurance, which makes it difficult to be generalized.109 Different
studies provide divergent lists of favorable conditions for compellence success. George and
Simmons suggest one of the most comprehensive lists. The list includes eight conditions:
(1) clarity of the object, (2) strength of motivation, (3) asymmetry of motivation (by
demanding only the vital interests to protect or offering inducement), (4) sense of urgency,
(5) strong leadership, (6) adequate domestic and international support, (7) unacceptability
of threatened escalation, and (8) clarity concerning the precise terms of settlement of the
crisis.110
Other studies tend to emphasize the causal impact of a couple of factors among the
eight rather than adding more variables to the list. For example, Schaub underscores that
“relative balance of interest” (variable # 3 in the George and Simmons’ list) and “relative
military capabilities,” especially “forces that can be brought to bear quickly on the
geographic nexus of the dispute” (variable #7),111 are the two most important independent
variables. Art finds that “escalatory fears” (#7) and “motivational asymmetries” (#3) are
the two critical ingredients for compellence success.112 Sechser and Fuhrmann emphasize
the impact of the compeller’s “relative military strength” (#7), asymmetry of “crisis stakes”
(#3), and “balance of war cost” (#7, but more specified).113
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These key independent variables for compellence success are remarkably similar
to those suggested by Rational Deterrence literature. The three Rational Deterrence models
emphasize the importance of five variables for deterrence success: “military capability”
that can increase the “probability of victory” in case of a war, “interest at stake,” “war cost,”
and “audience/reputation cost.” Although studies on compellence do not have a consensus
on the list of variables that are conducive to compellence success, most of them agree with
the two most important factors: “relative military capability” and “balance of interest.”
Both Rational Deterrence and Compellence literature acknowledge the importance of
threat credibility for deterrence and compellence success.
Rational Deterrence and Compellence theories, thus, suggest a linear model in
predicting the defender’s policy choice after the deterrence failure: the more credible the
defender is, the more likely it will punish the challenger. Given that balance of interest
favors the defender and subsequently, it pays higher audience costs in direct deterrence
situations, the defender is likely to be more resolved than the challenger. Cognitive
Deterrence perspective also suggests human psychological defects and inherent cognitive
predisposition such as loss-aversion, endowment effect, and logic of vengeance that would
generally make the defender very resolved when direct deterrence fails.
In this regard, all Rational and Cognitive Deterrence perspectives and Compellence
literature merge in predicting the defender’s policy choice in the aftermath of direct
deterrence failure. The defender will most likely not back down but will escalate the crisis
through either directly attacking the challenger militarily or impose non-violent
punishments while making additional threats with graver penalties to prevent its further
defiance. Assuming that both the interest at stake and the audience cost are pretty high for
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the defender in the direct deterrence context, the defender’s degree of escalation will be
decided by the two factors: (1) the war cost the defender should pay; and (2) the defender’s
probability of victory in war.

1.3

Policy Outcomes: What Happens Next When the Defender Chooses a
Certain Policy?

Concerning the short-term outcome of direct deterrence failure, both Rational and
Cognitive Deterrence theories predict escalation of a crisis into war. Given that the
defender is more likely a resolute crisis actor, the direct deterrence failure is possible only
when the challenger is also a determined aggressor. Once deterrence fails, the defender is
most likely to follow through on the threat. Since both sides are strong-willed to escalate
the crisis, the direct deterrence failure will, in most cases, escalate to war.
In terms of long-term outcome, would this defender’s decision to stand firm against
the challenger’s attempt to revise the status quo grant the former a reputation of strength?
Although reputation has been the central element of deterrence theory since Schelling first
argued the “interdependence of commitments,” it is “the least developed component” of
the theory114 due to insufficient evidence to support the claim. Both rational and cognitive
deterrence perspectives, thus, suggest divergent predictions and inconclusive answers.
Schelling points out that deterrence depends on the adversary’s expectation about
the defender’s future moves, and because of this, threats are interdependent: “we have to
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react here because, if we did not, they would not believe us when we say that we will react
there.”115 Threats, thus, are connected spatially and temporally: “Few parts of the world
are intrinsically worth the risk of serious war by themselves, […] but defending them or
running risks to protect them may preserve one’s commitments to action in other parts of
the world and at later times.” 116 Due to its strong internal logic and clear policy
implications, this theory has guided U.S. foreign policy – namely, containment strategy –
throughout the Cold War and even today.117
The approach to assume the existence of a strong “interdependence of
commitments,” however, has been criticized by numerous scholars mainly because it fails
to present strong empirical evidence to support the claim besides deductive logic. They
argue that reputation does not exert a consistent impact over universal cases of deterrence,
and threat credibility is highly dependent on a specific context of the strategic exchanges.118
Reputation, thus, does not matter much and target states are not likely to infer the credibility
of a deterrer’s threats from its past behavior. Huth includes works of Maxwell,119 George
and Smoke,120 and Jervis121 within this group, but if we use this label to indicate a stance
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that criticizes Schelling’s argument in general, we can add studies of Hopf,122, Mercer,123
(1996) and Press124 to the list.
Hopf finds that thirty-eight Soviet losses and gains against the United States in the
Third World from 1965 to 1990 had not influenced much on Moscow’s expectation about
Washington’s future moves in Europe or East Asia. Mercer argues that reputation is not a
“property concept” (a dispositional feature) but a “relational concept,” and shows through
his three case studies that different leaders have different explanations about the same act
of a state and subsequently past behaviors do not form a consistent reputation for a state’s
resolution or irresolution. Press examines the appeasement policy during the interwar
period, the Berlin crises, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, and points out that countries assess
the credibility of other states’ threats by calculating the current interest at stake and the
balance of power, not by inferring from their past behaviors. This Hopf-Mercer-Press
consensus predicts that reputation would not have a systematic causal impact. If it is true,
then a defender’s past behavior of punishing its challenger even risking a war in direct
deterrence situation would not help the former to restore the deterrence and prevent other
challenges from occurring in the future.
Although this Hopf-Mercer-Press consensus makes a strong argument against the
relevance of reputation to the credibility of future deterrent threats, some countering
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empirical findings make this debate interesting. For example, Huth and Russett125 find that
while a reputation for strong resolve indeed matters little, past irresolute behaviors do invite
more provocations and have a negative and statistically significant impact on the future
crises. Recent works further refute that reputation can be transferable for similar enough
cases (i.e. proximity in time, same potential challenger, same region/issue-area/regime, etc.)
and will exert a significant impact on its future behaviors and that of others when the
interest at stake is high. 126 Therefore, it is still premature to reject the significance of
reputation in deterrence dynamics from the Rational Deterrence perspective.
Cognitive deterrence theory also suggests inconclusive predictions. Schelling’s
theory of “interdependence of commitments” is equivalent to Jervis’ term, the “domino belief”
as it implies that “a defeat or retreat on one issue or one area of the world is likely to produce
[…] further demands on the state by its adversaries and defections from its allies.” 127
Policymakers regard retreats from their commitments as falling dominos because they
establish precedents from which others would draw inferences.
According to the Cognitive perspective, the domino belief would most likely
become strong when (1) international system is favorable for the belief (i.e. offense is more
advantageous than defense, superpowers’ becoming sensitive to their reputation due to
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mutual possession of second-strike capability, and bipolarity), (2) specific situation
encourages the idea (i.e. failure to protect crucial, interconnected, or legitimate interests),
and (3) decision-makers’ belief in the hostile nature (i.e. insatiable expansionist) of their
opponents.128
Jervis, however, adds further complexity to this dynamic by introducing two
paradoxes. First, actors will be incentivized to demonstrate to their opponents that the
domino is not falling after experiencing defeats. A defeated state, such as the United States
after the fiasco of the Bay of Pigs invasion, would become “particularly unyielding” in the
next confrontation, the Cuban Missile Crisis, to restore its reputation. Second, contrariwise,
in case the defender pays too much cost to prevent the fall of a domino, as the U.S. did
during the Vietnam War, the potential aggressor, the Soviet Union, might doubt that the
former is likely to embark on a similar path in the future.129 These paradoxes show that
domino beliefs can produce both self-defeating and self-fulfilling prophecies. If these
contradictory tendencies dominate the post-crisis dynamics, reputation will not bring out
any systematic consequences, and everything will depend on a sui generis inference that
each state makes.
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2. A New Model: Feasibility of Punishment and Belief Updating

Although rational and cognitive deterrence theories suggest coherent and
persuasive logic and provide plausible predictions about the policy choices of defenders in
the direct deterrence situation and their short-term outcomes, there are some clear
limitations in their models. This section examines its weaknesses and suggests an
alternative model.

2.1

Alternative Definition of Threat Credibility: Is Direct Deterrent Threat
Born to Be Credible?

It is difficult to argue against the deterrence literature’s claim that securing threat
credibility is a nearly sufficient condition for deterrence success. How could a challenger
decide to defy a defender’s deterrent threat and escalate the crisis while believing that the
defender will most likely punish its action severely and violently? Except for the case that
the challenger is extremely resolved and seeking merely a casus belli, which should be rare
in real-world politics, a credible deterrent threat would most likely buttress the stability
and defend the status quo. This study, thus, agrees with the Rational Deterrence perspective
that the key issue is to identify the condition when the deterrent threat would be considered
credible. However, the dissertation doubts the validity of the previous models’ definition
of threat credibility due to the reason that follows.
As the Costly Signaling model rightly points out, the offensive capability to impose
an unacceptable cost to the challenger is not necessarily related to the notion of credibility.
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Rather, this is the issue of making capable threats: whether changing the opponent’s
preference order is possible. However, it is difficult to fully agree with the Signaling
model’s approach that equates the strong resolve to execute the threat with the credibility
of the threat. It is even more difficult to agree with the Inherent Credibility model that
considers high interest at stake as a sufficient condition for making a credible threat
because it is only one element among many factors in deterrence situation that decides the
level of resolve.
The limit of audience propositions is a classic example that reveals the weakness of
this position. Since Fearon introduced the concept of audience cost,130 numerous scholars
have questioned the validity of the claim.131 Hypotheses based on the audience cost theory
often fail to survive empirical tests.132 There can be many explanations for this, but one
important implication is that, in most cases, credible signaling of strong resolve does not
linearly bring about a higher level of credibility.
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Therefore, we need a more rigorous definition of the term threat credibility. Goertz’s
conceptual pyramid that consists of three levels – the basic level, the secondary level, and
the indicator/data level 133 – provides a useful framework that can help us to address this
problem. First, the “basic level” of the concept (that is, threat credibility) has continuous
variations in its degree: zero to full. By employing the “missing attributes” approach, we can
formulate the “diminished subtypes” of it.134 In other words, based on how many secondarylevel attributes the concept has, missing each attribute will lead it to move a step from its
positive pole (a credible threat) to the negative pole (a bluffing).
The “secondary level,” the attributes of threat credibility, is crucial in this regard.
One obvious necessary condition for credibility that the literature has continuously overlook
is the feasibility of punishment. The very first work that acknowledges this variable is Zagare
and Kilgour’s book. They argue that the “capability to execute a threat” is a necessary
condition for making a credible threat. 135 In other words, if the threatener is physically
constrained to deliver any detriment specified in the consequent part of its threat, the degree
of its credibility should go down to zero. In analogy, this is similar to the situation when a
robber or a cop, who suffers from a fractured index finger and, thus, is physically incapable
of pulling the trigger, pointing a gun at you and screams menacingly: “Give me your wallet!”
or “Freeze!” If the receiver knows this condition, then his threat would be incredible however
aggressive intention and destructive power in his possession.
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This analogy attests that (1) the military capability to reach the opponent’s territory
and deliver the offensive power to inflict described costs, (2) the political ability to
implement the punitive measures against its opponent overcoming domestic and
international opposition, and the normative strength to legitimize the imposition of
significant suffering to the challenger, are the threshold of making a credible threat.
Surprisingly, though, Zagare and Kilgour stop here and do not examine further the causal
impact of this feasibility variable as if it were an uninteresting or unimportant variable.136
Moreover, subsequent studies in the deterrence/compellence literature have not discussed
it either.137 This project seeks to address the gap in the literature by thinking the elements of
threat credibility.
Logically, challengers would deem a defender’s threat credible only when the
defender maintains not only the capability to impose punishments but also the resolve to
implement it. The state’s willingness to carry out the threat depends on two factors: costbenefit calculation and emotional impetus.138 The tying-hands strategy can credibly signal
the defender’s strong resolve to the challenger because carrying out the threat is a costeffective business due to the low payoff of backing down (high audience cost) or high payoff
of war (high interest at stake, high probability of winning the war, or low war cost). Besides,
136

Roseanne McManus, Statements of Resolve: Achieving Coercive Credibility in International Conflict
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 23.

137

McManus’s work is the sole exception. She acknowledges this loophole in the literature and emphasizes
the need for developing a better understanding of ‘what the ability to follow through consists of and how
various observable factors can influence it.’ McManus defines the ability to follow through on statements
of resolve as an ‘absence of major obstacles and unacceptable risks.’ The relevant factors include (1)
military strength, (2) hawkish domestic veto players that would not stand in the leader’s way to execute
threats, and (3) security in office. Ibid., pp. 22-42.

138

In bargaining models, these two types of calculations should be jointly considered in the name of
rationality.

49

strong “internal forces,” such as hostility, can make a state willing to punish the challenger
even in the case that the cost of implementation is too high to be supported by rational costbenefit analysis.139 When the aggregate benefit outweighs the total cost or strong emotional
impetus demands vengeance, the defender will have sufficient willingness to deliver the
punishments.
In many cases of international crises, however, simply building a substantial level of
offensive capability often imposes tremendous threats to others. The “security dilemma”140
is a classic example that demonstrates this point. Offensive Realism also argues that the
combination of anarchy, some offensive military capabilities of other states, and uncertainty
about the intention of other states is a sufficient condition for a rational state to pursue
regional hegemony for its survival. 141 According to these perspectives, the absence of a
state’s willingness to follow through on the threat would not diminish its credibility
significantly as long as it is feasible for a defender to deliver the punishment.
In this context, the feasibility of punishment is the necessary condition for threat
credibility, but arguably, a high level of resolve is neither a necessary nor sufficient
condition for it. The level of resolve only matters when the feasibility condition is satisfied.
This identification of sufficient and necessary conditions for the term leads to the
continuum of threat credibility that consists of three types: credible, semi-credible, and
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non-credible threats. Having both feasibility and resolve leads to the full credibility of the
threat. Missing resolve would make a threat semi-credible. Missing feasibility, however,
makes a threat non-credible.
Lastly, the “indicator level” includes the following elements for each attribute. First,
regarding the indicators for the feasibility of punishment variable, it is possible to start with
McManus’ model: military strength, hawkish domestic veto players, and security in office. Her
model, however, presents some limitations. First, since she tests her model only against a single
crisis actor, the United States, the observable factors used in her research (especially factors
such as “hawkish veto players” and “security in office”) are not designed for analyzing cases
of authoritarian regimes. We need more relaxed indicators for measuring the threatener’s
political feasibility to punish given that there are various types of political regimes besides
representative democracy like the U.S. Second, her way of using the military capability
variable is not specified enough to be tested against other deterrence/compellence models.
Military strength could have an impact on (1) ability to inflict an enormous cost on the
challenger, (2) probability of victory in war, and (3) war cost. Notably, the last two are
important independent variables in the Costly Signaling deterrence model for calculating
rationality of punishing the adversary. To establish a new model that can compete with other
models suggested in the literature, we need to define military feasibility more precisely.
In this context, this dissertation argues that the defender can secure the feasibility of
implementing punishments when it meets two conditions: (1) power projection capabilities to
overcome geographic obstacles (i.e. oceans, large rivers, and mountains) that exist between the
defender and its potential challengers, and the challenger’s defensive capability that could
neutralize the defender’s punitive offense; and (2) absence of strong domestic/international

51

political oppositions (i.e. dovish veto players, low approval rating, severe and chronic antigovernment demonstrations, or unsupportive alliance partners) and normative obstructive
environment (i.e. policies violating international law or against the decision of the United
Nations, non-use principle of weapons of mass destruction) that could impede or delay the
policy execution.
Second, the defender attains a high level of resolve in either situation. First, the costbenefit analysis supports carrying out the threat (i.e., the interest at stake is high; the
probability of victory in case of a war is high; the war cost is low, or the
audience/reputational cost for backing down is high). Second, the level of antagonism
between the threatener and its adversary is exceedingly high (i.e., the existence of serious
war/conflict history or cultural/ethnic hostility) and it defeats or distorts the standard costbenefit analysis by making it feel so good to retaliate against the opponent however
devastating cost it accompanies. Figure 1 summarizes the discussion thus far.
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Figure 1: The Three-Level Diagram for the Concept of Credible Threat

What is the theoretical implication of this new definition of threat credibility? It
highlights that the challenger would consider even the most resolved defender’s threat noncredible if it is physically infeasible to implement the punishment due to lack of power
projection capability or strong political/normative oppositions. In other words, high resolve
does never compensate for relatively low feasibility. Even though it is true and common
knowledge that a defender is resolved to follow through on its direct deterrent threat if the
deterrence fails, this should not always make the threat credible as Rational and Cognitive
Deterrence theories predict. If its potential challenger believes that the defender fails to
secure feasibility to implement the punishment, direct deterrence threat can be regarded as
non-credible and fail even when the challenger is not a determined aggressor but a mere
opportunist.
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2.2

When a Linear Prediction Fails: the Belief Updating Model and the
Paradoxical Logic of Action-and-Reaction

As explained in the previous section, four models in the deterrence literature
suggest a linear prediction: the more credible the deterrer is, the more likely it will respond
to the failure with crisis escalation.
The “selection effect”142 makes this simple reasoning problematic. It signifies that
rational actors “select themselves into crises”143 according to their prior beliefs about their
opponents. If a challenger challenged the status quo even though it had acknowledged that
the defender’s general deterrent threat was credible, this implies that the challenger should
be strongly motivated to risk armed conflict for the interest at stake. Subsequently, the
follow-up deterrent threat (or immediate deterrence) to prevent further aggravation of crisis
is likely to fail again. Subsequently, “hypotheses that are valid for general deterrence”
appear “exactly reversed if we look at cases of immediate deterrence.”144 A similar point
is also made by Luttwak, who suggests the notion of “paradoxical logic of strategy” that
underscores the action-reaction problem in the strategic calculation that fails linear
prediction. 145 An attempt to use the same independent variables of general deterrence
theory to predict the outcome of the immediate deterrent threat, assuming that the same
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causal relationship should continue in an immediate deterrence situation, is wrong in this
regard.
What is, then, the implication of this “selection effect” and “paradoxical logic” of
action and reaction for the defender’s policy choice after direct deterrence failure? It seems
self-evident that a credible (or capable and resolved) defender should escalate the crisis
when the challenger defies its credible deterrent threat. The defender, however, may be
refrained from doing so as the challenger’s action to defy the credible deterrent threat
increases the probability that the challenger is a determined aggressor that is ready to fight
a war for the strategic interest at stake. This Bayesian inference or belief updating by the
defender should greatly affect its decision-making process and might even cause it to
change its type from a resolved defender to an irresolute one. This belief updating model
rejects linear prediction of the Rational Deterrence perspective and predicts that direct
deterrence failure is most likely to encourage the defender to be more cautious and less
bellicose.
Nonetheless, Cognitive Deterrence literature makes a counter-argument to this
prediction. If the defender understands the mechanism of the selection effect or the actionreaction problem, then the “paradoxical logic” twists the linear strategic thinking as
explained earlier. That is, the credible defender does not hastily jump to escalate the crisis
due to its updated belief that the challenger might be an extremely resolved type given that
the latter challenged the former’s credible threat. Unfortunately, inherent limitations in
human cognition impede people to do well in this probability calculation.146 Also, everyone
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treats new information differently, and the direction and degree of updating depend on the
strength of his/her initial belief.147 It is highly likely that the defender is not aware of this
action-reaction mechanism or strongly influence by its initial belief, and makes choices
based on a simple calculation of comparing their level of resolve and capability with those
of their opponents without updating their belief about their opponents’ type based on their
previous actions.
In this context, for some policymakers who update their belief based on the
challenger’s action in the previous stage of the crisis, they would update their type
accordingly. However, the linear causal models would still explain and predict correctly
the policy choice of others who do not understand this action-reaction mechanism. It is,
thus, still premature to reject that those independent variables developed by four models in
the deterrence literature will be irrelevant in determining the behaviors of the defender after
the deterrence failure due to the selection effect. This issue requires further studies of the
empirics.

2.3

Feasibility of Punishment, Belief Updating, and Policy Outcomes

Unlike Rational and Cognitive Deterrence theories, the feasibility of punishment
model raises the possibility that direct deterrence can fail even when the challenger is not
an extremely resolute aggressor. An opportunistic challenger can defy a resolved
defender’s direct deterrent threat when the latter is believed to lack feasibility to implement
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the punishment. If the defender indeed fails to secure this feasibility, it would have to back
down even if it is strong-willed to punish the challenger. Also, the belief updating model
predicts that the defender is more likely not to punish the challenger violently due to its
Bayesian inference that the challenger is most likely a determined challenger given that it
defies the defender’s credible deterrent threat. Concerning the short-term outcome of direct
deterrence failure, both the feasibility and belief-updating models predict that the failure
will not be likely to escalate into an armed conflict between the defender and the challenger.
Concerning the long-term outcome of the failure, however, the two models suggest
divergent predictions. As mentioned earlier, the Hopf-Mercer-Press consensus asserts that
challengers would not draw inference from the previous actions of the defender. The
feasibility model concurs with this position and predicts that challengers would continue to
examine how feasible it is for the defender to implement punishment rather than extrapolate
the latter’s move based on its moves in history.
Notwithstanding, it is critical to consider that most direct deterrence cases involve
enduring rivalries. 148 Under this condition of sustained tension and conflict will make
direct deterrence failures “similar enough cases” 149 and shape a strategic environment
where domino belief dominates because of crucial and interconnected interests at stake and
the mutual antipathy between the defender and the challenger. 150 In this case, the
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defender’s policy choice of non-action or backing down will establish a negative precedent
and invite more provocations in the future.
The belief updating model supports this direction of reasoning. If direct deterrence
cases involve the same players, one player’s strategic move in the previous information set
is a signal to its opponent, and the latter should update its belief about the former. Therefore,
the defender’s policy choice of de-escalation is most likely to cause deterrence collapse
because the action leads the challenger to update its belief about the defender’s type.

3. Impact of Introducing Nuclear Weapons

Due to their destructive power, students of IR have considered nuclear weapons as
unconventional weapons that have an idiosyncratic logic about their potential and actual
use, which is very different from that of conventional weapons. What happens if the
defender or the challenger possesses nuclear weapons in direct deterrence situation? What
are the implications of it for the success/failure of the direct deterrent threat, policy choices
in the aftermath of the failure, and the short- and long-term ramifications of each choice?
This section examines competing views in the nuclear deterrence literature – Revolutionist
vs. Pessimist, and discusses why the feasibility of punishment model supports the Pessimist
perspective.
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3.1

Nuclear Weapons in Deterrence: Revolutionist vs. Pessimist Perspectives

Since the invention and the first use of nuclear weapons in 1945, there have been
two competing views in the literature in regards to their implications. One is the
Revolutionist perspective,151 a dominant approach in the literature, which argues nuclear
weapons changed the world once and for all. The other is Pessimists who believe that these
weapons either only reinforce traditional elements in strategy 152 or are infeasible or
redundant forces that would not affect much the outcome of coercive diplomacy.153 The
key difference between the two perspectives comes from a disagreement over (1) what
nuclear weapons can do (more specifically, whether nuclear war can be won); and (2)
whether a nuclear threat can be credible (or whether states use nuclear weapons in
confrontation).
Concerning the first disagreement, the Revolutionist perspective argues that due to
their unprecedented capability to inflict harm upon the adversary quickly and dreadfully,154
nuclear weapons have made military victory no longer possible. As long as the defender
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and the challenger maintain “second-strike capability,” 155 any military offense could
escalate to exchange of nuclear bombs between the conflicting dyad, which should bring
about mutual annihilation and a nuclear holocaust. Defense becomes irrelevant because
there is not much hope that technological development would make deterrence by denial
ever possible in nuclear age156 and penetration of only a small quantity of nuclear weapons
should bring sufficient devastation to the society.157
Under this condition, both military balance (including the nuclear balance) and
prospect for the successful military campaign become meaningless. What matters is not
nuclear superiority, but nuclear danger since having more nuclear weapons or options will
not help to terminate a war. 158 Subsequently, strategic thinking of policymakers in the
nuclear era will no longer suffer from miscalculation and an illusion of victory which often
led states to engage in an unnecessary war.159 As if looking into a “crystal ball,”160 the
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outcome of nuclear confrontation is easy to be foreseen. This unmistakable prospect of
mutual vulnerability is the crux of the nuclear revolution. Both challengers and defenders
should be extremely vigilant and prudent as if treading on eggs. Subsequently, nuclear
weapons will bring about peace, the preservation of the status quo, and the infrequency of
crises.161
Some early Pessimists disagree and contend that nuclear war can be won even under
the mutual possession of second-strike capability or Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).
They believe that states would most likely be restrained from using weapons against
adversary’s cities 162 and one side should be able to end up ahead even in nuclear
confrontation if there is a sufficient margin of nuclear capability. 163 Considering the
destructive power of hydrogen bombs and calamitous political repercussions of absorbing
an initial nuclear attack, however, it is quite difficult to agree with this view. 164 This
absurdity in continuing the nuclear fight after absorbing the adversary’s first nuclear strike
is why the revolutionist perspective is the dominant stance in the deterrence literature, and
this dissertation study also sides with the revolutionists on the first issue. Nuclear war
cannot be winnable, and this fact has brought a revolutionary change in the way of strategic
thinking.
Surprisingly, however, the prediction of the revolutionist school that nuclear
weapons contribute peace and stability, more specifically, deterrence success, often fails
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to survive empirical testing.165 For example, George and Smoke show that U.S. general
deterrent threats have repeatedly failed regardless of its nuclear capability. 166 Huth and
Russett reveal that the causal impact of the nuclear weapons capability variable is not
statistically significant in determining outcomes of extended deterrence.167 They confirm
this finding again in their later study on extended-immediate deterrence cases.168 Betts’s
study on East-West crises also finds that nuclear weapons have not demonstrated a uniform
impact on the outcome of blackmail strategy for deterring the Soviet or Chinese military
actions.169 Geller finds that nuclear weapons do not discourage crisis escalation.170 These
empirical findings are at odds with the convincing argument of the revolutionist approach.
A part of the reason for this anomaly is possibly the inherent difficulties in achieving
success in extended deterrence situations. As this type of deterrence aims to protect the
defender’s allies, not its territory, challengers might always tend to discount the credibility
of an extended deterrent threat. However, cases of direct deterrence failure even when the
defender possesses the strong nuclear capability, namely the 1969 Sino-USSR Border
Dispute, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the 1982 Falklands War, refute this argument.
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A more fundamental reason behind this dissonance between theory and empirical
trends is related to the second issue mentioned earlier: can nuclear deterrent threats be
credible? If the defender was facing an imminent nuclear attack against its major cities,
then it could make a credible deterrent threat that involves massive nuclear retaliation. But
what about all the other less significant issues, such as a security of small island remote
from the defender’s main territory, compliance with a security regime, or continuation of
a certain security policy? For similar reasons, security experts harshly criticized the
doctrine of Massive Retaliation when the U.S. government adopted it in the 1950s. As the
punishment is far too great for the peripheral nature of the provocation in most cases, the
threat is hardly credible, so it should be ineffective.
The Costly Signaling model contends even further that nuclear retaliation is rarely
if ever rational in all circumstances, not only when interest at stake is marginal but even
when it is for protecting the vital interest of the defender such as its national survival. This
intrinsic irrationality of the second strike is especially true under MAD as the retaliatory
attack would surely lead to mutual annihilation.171 Jervis points out the absurdity of nuclear
retaliation after absorbing nuclear attack using Eisenhower’s words: “the only thing worse
than losing a global war was winning one.”172 Then, how could a nuclear deterrent threat
be credible when following through on the threat would inevitably bring about its
destruction? As McDermott et al. rightly argue, the nuclear threat can be credible only
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when it “rests on a biological and psychological foundation of revenge, which feels so good
that it overrides the cost-benefit analysis.”173
The Revolutionist scholars suggest a couple of ways to solve this credibility
problem of nuclear deterrence under MAD by (1) incurring “autonomous risk” through
“threats that leave something to chance” 174 or (2) employing “limited retaliation” that
keeps the adversary “left with something more to lose.”175 Historically, the United States
and the Soviet Union tried to meet this credibility challenge by (1) establishing a reputation
of resolve through actively defending insignificant interests (i.e. Vietnam and Afghanistan);
(2) increasing risk of autonomous escalation (i.e. nuclear alerts and delegation of the
authority to launch nuclear attack to local commanders); (3) building unnecessary weapons
to demonstrate nuclear superiority; and (4) increasing defense expenditure.176
The empirical data mentioned above, however, was collected while Washington
and Moscow actively pursued all these efforts. In other words, whether the actors in crises
possess nuclear weapons did not matter much in deciding the deterrence outcome in spite
of all those efforts and significant investment to make the deterrence work. This irrelevance
of nuclear weapons in deterrence outcomes despite the extraordinary measures should be
profoundly puzzling trends for revolutionists. How could we explain these trends in the
empirical data that shows limited impact of nuclear weapons on deterrence success or
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maintenance of the status quo even though they certainly simplified the strategic
calculation of crisis actors thanks to their “crystal ball effect”?

3.2

Nuclear Pessimists and the Feasibility of Punishment Model

More qualified Pessimist arguments provide interesting theories that help us to
answer this question. First is Snyder’s famous paradox of “strategic stability-tactical
instability.” 177 As fighting at high-level violence involving nuclear exchange is almost
impossible under MAD, turning to lower levels of assault could become safer and more
feasible. MAD could encourage risk-taking behaviors and initiation of crises because “each
side’s nuclear weapons cancel out the influence of the other’s.”178
According to Jervis, although the logic itself is “impeccable,” this idea is “flawed”
and “unrealistic.”179 He emphasizes that escalation can occur even when “no one wants it
to” and “people have been killed playing Chicken.” In this world of uncertainty, thus, a
slim possibility of nuclear war, even if it is considered extremely unlikely, should be
sufficient to constrain any opportunistic actors.
One obvious counterargument to this, however, is that some risk-acceptant policymakers might decide to play this high-risk game betting on the retreat of their opponents.
In a strategic situation, a successful “course of action cannot persist indefinitely”180 and
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deterrence would cease to work if it “were really stable.”181 Why should leaders like Adolf
Hitler, Saddam Hussein, or Kim Jong-il be worried about nuclear holocaust when it seems
almost certain that their democratic opponents lack any gut to go the full distance and their
adamant provocations would surely consolidate domestic support for their regimes?
Paradoxically, enormous strategic stability established by the nuclear revolution might
incentivize these audacious leaders to revise the status quo at the tactical level without
crossing the nuclear threshold.
Second, the logic of “preventive war” could make nuclear dynamics unstable in
non-MAD situation and balance of conventional forces, rather than that of nuclear weapons,
would become much more significant during this time of instability. Superior nuclear
power possibly seeks to destroy the nascent nuclear arsenal of an emerging power,
especially when the former misperceive that the latter’s nuclear attack is imminent and
unavoidable.182 As this preventive attack would most likely involve conventional weapons
capable of surgical strikes, conventional forces explain crisis outcomes better than nuclear
capability. 183 This argument parallels with Sechser and Fuhrmann’s point that nuclear
weapons are redundant in many cases.
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conventional forces that could serve much more controlled and sophisticated purposes than
nuclear bombs.
Third, nuclear powers would be “self-deterred” because of enormous economic,
political, normative costs involving the use of the horrible bombs. 185 Due to their
unprecedented capability to wipe out non-combatants instantly and disproportionally,186
the use of nuclear weapons easily violates all kinds of international norms, namely Just
War principles, the UN Charter, and Nuremberg principles.187 This gruesome nature of the
weapons led the international community to stigmatize their use as a taboo. 188
Subsequently, using the weapons could lead to political isolation, loss in foreign
investment, domestic backlash, a coalition of balancing force, and even nuclear attacks by
others.189 The reputational concerns created by “tradition of non-use,” “morality of nuclear
weapons use,” and “legal concepts” refrain nuclear powers from turning to the weapons
for the sake of restoring deterrence.190
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These explanations provided by the Pessimist camp, especially the logic of selfdeterrence, are supported by the feasibility model that this project suggests. The model
predicts that challengers might consider not only the most resolute deterrent threat (i.e.,
direct deterrent threat) but also the threat supported by the most dreadful offensive power
(i.e. nuclear weapons) non-credible if it is infeasible to deliver this tremendous and
authentic punishment upon the challenger. Nuclear deterrent threats, thus, should be
backed by the defender’s military, political, and normative capability to follow through.
First, although Revolutionists do not pay much attention to the level of nuclear
capability or the type of nuclear balance in the conflicting dyad, whether the deterrer
secures and maintains a reliable nuclear strike capability is essential for the credibility of
the nuclear threat. Possessing nuclear bombs does not mean anything if the defender lacks
power projection capability that penetrates the challenger’s defense and delivers the
asseverated harms. This military feasibility of nuclear punishment is the first precondition
that the defender should meet to make a credible nuclear threat.
Second, Snyder’s stability-instability paradox, the preventive war logic, and the
proposition of self-deterrence are closely related to the idea of political/normative
feasibility of nuclear punishment. The stability-instability paradox indicates that the overly
destructive power of nuclear weapons is not appropriate for punishing minor challenges
attempted below the threshold of national survival. The preventive war logic also
demonstrates the unfitness of nuclear weapons for serving the purpose of a surgical strike
on nascent nuclear facilities of the challenger. The self-deterrence proposition makes an
even more striking argument that nuclear weapons are nearly unusable in any
circumstances considering the daunting political, economic, and normative costs the actual
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use of them incurs. As taboo is extremely strong normative hurdle, use of nuclear weapons
would be hardly justified except for retaliation against adversary’s nuclear strike.
These explanations turn to the point that nuclear weapons are inappropriate for
serving as a tool for the specific degree of punishment that the defender pursues. You
cannot give the death sentence for theft. It is difficult to find the appropriate level of
defiance that deserves nuclear punishment. Even if it is militarily feasible to sanction the
challenger with nuclear weapons, its inherent nature of overkill makes them politically and
normatively not a very feasible tool for punishment in this regard. Therefore, the backbone
of deterrence success is more feasible capabilities like conventional weapons, not nuclear
bombs.191
Table 2 summarizes the theoretical implications of competing perspectives on
direct deterrence failure discussed so far.
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Table 2: Competing Theories of Direct Deterrence Failure
Previous Theories
Issue

Theory
Rational Deterrence

Cause of Direct
Deterrence Failure
Cognitive Deterrence

Policy Choices of the Rational Deterrence
Defender
Cognitive Deterrence
Rational Deterrence
Short-term Outcome
Cognitive Deterrence
Rational Deterrence
Long-term Outcome
Cognitive Deterrence
Possession of nuclear Revolutionist
weapons
Pessimist
New Theories
Issue
Theory
Cause of Direct
Feasibility of Punishment
Deterrence Failure
Policy Choices of the
Belief Updating
Defender
Short-term Outcome Feasibility of Punishment
Long-term Outcome Belief Updating
Possession of nuclear
Feasibility of Punishment
weapons

Implications
#1. A direct deterrent threat is inherently credible due to high interest at stake and high audience cost of backing down which
should make the defender resolve to follow through on the threat if it is challenged.
#2. The direct deterrence failure is possible only when the challenger is as much resolved as the defender.
#1. A direct deterrent threat is most likely credible due to endowment effect, human propensity to loss aversion, and emotional
impetus of vengeance which should make the defender resolve to follow through on the threat if it is challenged.
#2. The direct deterrence failure is possible when the challenger is determined to revise the status quo (due to framing the issue
following the logic of loss aversion or motivated reasoning).
#1. The defender is resolved in direct deterrence situation, so it will not likely to de-escalate the crisis.
#2. The degree of escalation depends on war cost and probability of victory.
The defender is resolved in direct deterrence situation, so it will not likely to de-escalate the crisis.
As both the defender and the challenger are resolved, crisis escalation will most likely lead to war.
As both the defender and the challenger are resolved, crisis escalation will most likely lead to war.
#1. In general, the past behavior of the defender (or reputation) will not have a systematic impact on its future credibility.
#2. Reputation might matter for similar enough cases or when the interest at stake is high.
#1. Domino beliefs can produce both self-defeating and self-fulfilling prophecies (not systematic impact).
#2. Domino belief would become strong when the offense has an advantage over the defense, under MAD, if interest at stake is
high, or with the existence of hostile perception about the opponent.
Nuclear weapons buttress direct deterrence stability (make deterrence failure and/or crisis escalation not likely).
Nuclear weapons would not matter much due to the inherent incredibility of nuclear punishment.
Implications
Even the most resolved deterrent threat can be considered as non-credible and fail if it is infeasible for the defender to
implement punishments.
Given that the challenger defied the defender’s credible deterrent threat, the defender would update its image about the
challenger as a determined aggressor and be refrained from escalating the crisis.
As the defender more likely choose less aggressive policies due to its updated belief about the challenger, direct deterrence
failure would most likely not lead to war.
The Defender’s de-escalation after deterrence failure will make the challenger update its belief about the defender and invite
more provocations in the future.
Nuclear punishment involves enormous economic, political, normative cost, and thus it is not feasible. Subsequently, a nuclear
deterrent threat is not credible and will fail.

4. Research Hypotheses and Predictions

Based on the theoretical discussion thus far as to Rational/Cognitive Deterrence
theories, nuclear Revolutionist/Pessimist, and the two new models – feasibility of
punishment and belief updating – we can formulate following rival and research hypotheses
that can be tested against the empirics. They suggest tentative answers for the four research
questions: Why does the challenger defy the defender’s direct deterrent threat? Under what
conditions does the defender choose a certain policy option? What are the ramifications of
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each policy choice? What kind of impact does the possession of nuclear weapons have on
the outcome of direct deterrence? Answers for these questions help us to formulate desirable
policies for the defender when it faces direct deterrence failure.

4.1

Direct Deterrence Failure: Policy Choice of the Challenger

As pointed out in Chapter 1, deterrence is a study of non-events, and it is almost
impossible to identify the population of deterrence success. The absence of a challenge
against a defender’s deterrent threat can be caused by factors that have nothing to do with
the credibility of the threat. Once we select only the cases of deterrence failure to overcome
this “false positive” problem,192 then we face another challenge: the dependent variable
does not vary.
One way to solve this problem is by switching the non-varying dependent variable
(defender’s direct deterrence failure) to challenger’s policy choices in defying the deterrent
threat. This reformulation will allow the success/failure binary variable to transform into
an ordinal variable that has different degrees of failure. The challenger’s choice over three
ideal types of crisis escalation defines the degree of deterrence failure: rapid escalation
(violent use of military force), hedging (non-violent use of military force possibly along
with political measures to moderate the aggressiveness), and gradual escalation (use of
non-violent measures). As values of the dependent variable vary with this reformulation,
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empirical testing of causal models becomes possible without expanding the research scope
to include deterrence success cases.
Even though they suggest divergent causal paths, all four models provided by
Rational and Cognitive Deterrence theories predict that the defender is determined to
follow through on the threat in direct deterrence situation. The challenger’s choice of crisis
escalation against this credible threat, thus, should be caused by its high level of resolve:
the challenger is as much resolute as the defender to take hold of what is at stake over the
crisis. Due to high interest at stake, high probability of victory, low war cost, and high
audience cost, the challenger is determined to revise the status quo. Deterrence is bound to
fail in this case. The challenger is merely seeking a casus belli. This linear prediction is the
rival hypothesis provided by the Rational and Cognitive Deterrence literature that this
study tries to refute.

Rival Hypothesis 1: If the challenger is more resolved to revise the status quo,
it will choose the more aggressive policies.

Granted, this possibility for the challenger’s high level of resolve can be a cause of
deterrence failure. This dissertation, however, doubts the validity in the assumption of an
extremely resolute challenger. War is a costly business, and it would be truly difficult to seek
a revision of the status quo voluntarily risking formidable destruction unless the leadership
of the challenger thirsts for blood. War can never be Pareto-efficient. 193 A more likely

193

James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): pp.
379-414.

72

scenario is that the challenger is an opportunist who has no intention to initiate a war over
the interest at stake but decides to defy the deterrer’s threat due to its non-credibility.194
This point does not imply that the causal models suggested by Rational and
Cognitive deterrence theories are wrong. The dissertation agrees with the literature that the
defender should be highly resolute in the direct deterrence situation. As the feasibility of
punishment model predicts, however, this dissertation argues that the defender’s deterrent
threat can be regarded non-credible even if the defender is authentically determined. The
punishment against defiance would seem non-credible when it is physically infeasible for
the defender to follow through on the threat due to limitations in its power projection
capability (military feasibility) or strong political/normative opposition (political feasibility)
to the implementation of the punishment. As this feasibility is a necessary condition for
making a credible threat, it will most likely be used as an “information shortcut”195 by both
the challenger and the defender to estimate their opponents’ true types. The Independent
Variable, therefore, is the defender’s feasibility of threat implementation, and the
Dependent Variable is the challenger’s policy choice.
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Research Hypothesis 1: If it is more infeasible for the defender to implement
punishment, the challenger will choose the more aggressive policies.

4.2

Policy Choice of the Defender after Direct Deterrence Failure

The previous chapter points out conceptual ambiguity in analyzing the policy choice
of the defender after deterrence failure. This dissertation, thus, regards deterrence as a
specific type of threat strategy and defines the threat strategy as a continuum centered on
different types of demands that the deterrer or compeller articulates concerning the status
quo (Figure 2). First, the most aggressive type of threat is “offensive compellence.” It seeks
the immediate revision of the status quo and demands the opponent to act when it may be
reluctant to do so. Second, a lesser form of assertive threat is “defensive compellence.” It
attempts to restore the status quo before the challenge and demands the adversary to “undo”
the changes that it has made. The third is “offensive deterrence” that makes an assertive threat
for managing the crisis by preventing further escalations. This threat demands the opponent
to “stop” at once the progress of its aggressive action. Lastly, the most defensive strategy,
“defensive deterrence,” pursues stability and demands from potential challengers to avoid
attempts to change the status quo.
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Figure 2: Four Types of Threat

Two clarifications about these four types of threats are in order. First, the threat is not
the actual implementation of force but the potential use of it. The difference between the
two is that, while the former aims to achieve the policy goal forcefully, the latter makes an
effort to induce its opponent. For example, defense aims to resist and subsequently to
frustrate the enemy’s attempt to obtain its goals. Deterrence, however, pursues to dissuade
the adversary from proceeding in its course of action by signaling to the potential
challenger that such action would (1) certainly fail due to superior defense capability of the
deterrer; or (2) bring great suffering to the challenger as the deterrer will punish its action
enormously.
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Second, there are equivalent terms in the literature that imply four types of threats: (1)
“blackmail strategy,”196 (2) “coercive diplomacy,”197 (3) “immediate deterrence,”198 and (4)
“general deterrence.”199 The earlier discussion in this chapter uses these terms. However,
from this point on the new names for the four types of threats will be used not only for the
sake of greater conceptual clarity and coherence but also to demonstrate more lucidly the
continuous nature of these threats.
In the previous discussion, the degree of the challenger’s aggressiveness defines its
ideal types of policy choices. Similarly, defender’s countermeasures can also be
categorized into four types based on the level of punishment and the direction 200 of
strategic movement: rapid escalation (violent use of military force to respond to the failure),
hedging (non-violent use of military force possibly combined with political measures),
gradual escalation (use of non-violent measures), and de-escalation (non-action by
surrendering what it possesses).
Rational and Cognitive deterrence as well as the Compellence literature, suggest a
linear model in predicting the defender’s policy choice after deterrence failure: the more
credible the defender is, the more likely it will punish the challenger heavily. The literature
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assumes defender’s high level of resolve because: (1) balance of interest favors the
defender, (2) the defender should pay higher audience cost, (3) the tendency of loss
aversion and the endowment effect will make the defender become a risk-acceptant type,
and (4) the logic of revenge would dominate strategic thinking of the defender. The
defender, thus, will not take the de-escalation route. The literature predicts that the two
factors decide the degree of escalation; (1) the war cost and (2) the probability of victory
in war. As these two variables are highly correlated and influenced by a single factor (the
power gap between the two), the following chapters focus on testing only the causal impact
of the power gap variable.

Rival Hypothesis 2-1: If the defender becomes more resolved in the deterrence
situation, the defender is less likely to take no action.

Rival Hypothesis 2-2: If the defender becomes more resolved in the deterrence
situation, the defender is likely to take more aggressive policies.

The belief updating model argues against this linear model. Given the challenger
decided to revise the status quo despite the defender’s credible defensive deterrent threat, it
is more probable that the challenger is a determined aggressor. Anticipated that the
challenger is ready to fight a war, the defender might be willing to update its type and
surrender some of its strategic assets to avoid the war especially when it is playing a weak
hand. In other words, if the defender understands the mechanism of “selection effect,” it
would become more inclined to take less aggressive policies.
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Second, the feasibility of punishment model predicts that the deterrer might be
forced to back down when it is physically not feasible to retaliate against the challenger
due to the military, political, and normative hurdles that impede the policy execution. In
sum, the Independent Variables are (1) the updated belief that the challenger is a
determined aggressor due to the defender’s Bayesian thinking and (2) the defender’s
feasibility to punish. The Dependent Variable is the defender’s policy choice after the
failure of direct defensive deterrence.

Research Hypothesis 2-1: If the defender updates its belief and perceives that
the challenger is a determined aggressor, it will not likely take violent measures.

Research Hypothesis 2-2: As it becomes more infeasible for the defender to
implement punishment, the defender will choose less aggressive policies.

4.3

Short- and Long-term Policy Outcomes

Concerning the short-term outcome of direct defensive deterrence failure, Rational
and Cognitive deterrence perspectives suggest a uniform picture: (1) direct deterrence
failure is only possible when the challenger is determined to risk a war; and (2) the defender
would most likely escalate the crisis after the failure. As both challenger and defender are
resolute to escalate the crisis, war should break out when deterrence fails.
On the other hand, this research underscores two points. First, even an opportunistic
challenger may decide to defy the defender’s direct defensive deterrent threat when it is
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infeasible for the defender to implement the punishment. Second, the defender might
choose to de-escalate the crisis if it lacks the feasibility to punish or when it updates its
belief about the challenger’s type based on the fact the latter defies the former’s credible
deterrent threat. These two dynamics working in the aftermath of the direct defensive
deterrence failure will encourage both sides to avoid aggressive policies when crisis gets
escalated, and war will be less likely to break out after direct defensive deterrence failure.
The Independent Variable is, thus, the defender’s policy choice and the Dependent
Variable is the short-term outcome of direct defensive deterrence failure.

Rival Hypothesis 3-1: If the defender becomes more resolved in deterrence
situation, the failure of its deterrent threat will most likely end in war.

Research Hypothesis 3-1: If it becomes more infeasible for the defender to
implement punishment and the defender updates its belief about the challenger
as a resolute defier, the failure of its deterrent threat will less likely end in war.

For the long-term effects of each policy choice of the defender, Hopf-Mercer-Press
consensus predicts that reputation would not matter much, and the defender’s policy choice
would not have any systematic impact on the occurrence of future crises. This dissertation’s
feasibility model also makes similar anticipation and argues that deterrence restoration
depends on the defender’s feasibility to follow through on the threat rather than its policy
choices during the previous crises. It is important to note, however, that most of the direct
defensive deterrence cases involve enduring rivalries. In this regard, a recent rebuttal to the
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Hopf-Mercer-Press consensus deserves out close attention in formulating hypotheses. The
reputation will matter in estimating the defender’s threat credibility if it involves the same
challenger, the consistent issue, or crucial interest at stake. The belief updating model
supports this prediction. The challenger would update its belief about the defender if the
latter decided to de-escalate after the deterrence failure. The defender’s retreat, thus, would
most likely invite more challenges in the future. The Independent Variable, thus, is the
defender’s

policy choice,

and

the

Dependent

Variable

is

more

or

fewer

provocations/conflicts in the future.

Rival Hypothesis 3-2: Regardless of which policy choice the deterrer makes
after the direct defensive deterrence failure, it will not be likely to invite more
provocations in the future.

Research Hypothesis 3-2: If the deterrer chooses less aggressive policies after
the direct defensive deterrence failure, it will invite more provocations in the
future.

4.4

Possession of Nuclear Weapons and Policy Choices of Challenger,
Defender, and Their Ramifications

The Revolutionist perspective argues that possession of nuclear weapons will
dramatically change the direct deterrence dynamics. First, direct deterrence would hardly
fail if the defender possesses nuclear weapons. However resolved the challenger may be,
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it should refrain from defying the defender’s deterrent threat or at least from taking a rapid
escalation route, due to the possibility that the action might lead to the defender’s nuclear
retaliation. This basic causal model should work both under MAD, and asymmetric nuclear
balance as the slim chance of punishment involving nuclear weapons is sufficient to
activate the “crystal ball effect.”
Second, the same logic will affect the defender’s strategic thinking when it
deliberates on its response to direct defensive deterrence failure. As the war cost is
enormous and victory is impossible as long as the challenger retains some nuclear
capability that can reach the defender’s territory, it would be extremely difficult for the
defender to choose the rapid escalation path regardless of what type of nuclear balance
exists in the dyad.
Third, as both sides would forgo escalation paths, the crisis either will not occur at
all or terminate quickly without war. With regard to the long-term outcome, both the
challenger and the defender would make every effort to maintain the credibility of nuclear
deterrence like the U.S. and the Soviet Union did during the Cold War era, and subsequently,
nuclear weapons would promote peace, stability, and infrequency of crises not only in the
short-run but also in the long-run.

Rival Hypothesis 4-1: When the defender possesses nuclear weapons
(regardless of the type of nuclear balance within the dyad), the challenger will
not likely take a violent policy in its attempt to revise the status quo.
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Rival Hypothesis 4-2: When the challenger possesses nuclear weapons
(regardless of the type of nuclear balance), the defender will not likely take a
violent policy in punishing the challenger.

Rival Hypothesis 4-3: When the crisis actors possess nuclear weapons
(regardless of the type of nuclear balance), the crisis will likely be terminated
quickly without war, and the occurrence of additional crises becomes highly
unlikely.

This dissertation argues that nuclear weapons do not contribute much to deterrence
success in most cases on two grounds. First, possession of nuclear weapons per se does not
bring any changes in strategic calculations until the crisis actors secure full power
projection capabilities, such as missiles and strategic bombers, which can deliver this
enormous destruction to the challenger. This military feasibility of nuclear punishment is
the threshold for making credible deterrent threats involving nuclear punishment.
Second, nuclear weapons are hardly usable because nuclear weapons’ intrinsic
nature of overkill makes their use nearly impossible to be justified politically and
normatively in most cases. Under Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), the impossibility
of fighting at a high level may encourage attempting provocations of low-level violence.
As it is not justifiable to give the death sentence for theft, the defender would hardly be
able to punish challenger’s minor assaults with nuclear weapons. If a significant nuclear
imbalance exists in the dyad, the more advantageous side would be tempted to destroy the
nuclear arsenal of its potential enemy following the logic of preventive war. But when it
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does so, the former would turn to conventional weapons rather than nuclear weapons to
seek a surgical strike for minimizing the political and military repercussions of such an
attack. Lastly, the asymmetric nuclear balance would strengthen the logic of self-deterrence,
as nuclear power should pay enormous economic, political, normative costs if it uses
nuclear bombs against non-nuclear states.
Therefore, nuclear weapons would hardly change the direct deterrence dynamics as
it is highly unlikely that the defender would use the weapons. The ultimate infeasibility of
implementing nuclear punishment makes nuclear deterrence non-credible in most cases. In
other words, for nuclear weapons to become a relevant factor in deterrence failure situations,
crisis actors need to address the weapons’ inherent infeasibility problem. The following three
cases would meet this condition. First, the crisis actors secure full power projection capability
to deliver the weapons. Second, the crisis actors have destroyed or are about to destroy
densely populated cities of their opponents. Third, the defender or the challenger is isolated
from the international community (i.e. North Korea) and has no reason to be self-deterred.
The Independent Variable, thus, is the crisis actors’ military feasibility to implement nuclear
punishment, the degree of aggressiveness in the crisis actors’ policy choices, and the crisis
actors’ degree of openness to the international community. The Dependent Variable is the
challenger’s policy choice, the defender’s policy choice, and the short- and the long-term
outcome of the crisis.

Research Hypothesis 4-1: If the crisis actors do not secure full nuclear
capability with reliable power projection capabilities, the possession of nuclear
weapons will not likely have any systematic impact on the challenger’s policy
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choice, the defender’s policy choice nor on the short- and the long-term
outcome of the crisis.

Research Hypothesis 4-2: If the crisis actors do not choose to incur a great
number of civilian casualties by avoiding raiding on major cities of their
opponents, the possession of nuclear weapons will not likely have any
systematic impact on the challenger’s policy choice, the defender’s policy
choice, nor on the short- and the long-term outcome of the crisis.

Research Hypothesis 4-3: If the crisis actors are more open to the international
community, the possession of nuclear weapons would less likely have an
impact on the challenger’s policy choice, the defender’s policy choice nor on
the short- and the long-term outcome of the crisis.
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CHAPTER III
STATISTICAL TRENDS

In the previous chapter, this project establishes a new theory on direct defensive
deterrence failure and challenges rival theories such as the Rational and the Cognitive
Deterrence perspectives. The rival models argue that: (1) direct defensive deterrence failure
would occur only when the challenger is a determined aggressor; (2) the defender would
most likely respond to the challenge with a severe punishment; (3) the crisis would, thus,
escalate into a war between the two; and (4) the defender’s deterrence would be restored if
it defeats the challenger. On the contrary, the feasibility of punishment model suggests that:
(1) direct defensive deterrence failure would, in most cases, have been caused by the
defender’s infeasibility to punish the challenger’s attempt to revise the status quo; (2) the
defender would be restrained from taking aggressive policies in responding to the challenge;
(3) the crisis would not escalate into an armed conflict; and (4) the defender’s deterrence
would collapse if it fails to address this infeasibility problem.
This project first tests rival and research hypotheses formulated in Chapter 2 against
the population of direct defensive deterrence failure. This statistical analysis aims to
demonstrate general trends in the deterrence dynamics by capturing the average causal
impact of the independent variables201 on the dependent variables202 in those cases of direct
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Independent variables include probability of victory, interest at stake, military and political feasibility of
punishment, nuclear capability, aggressiveness in the crisis actors’ policy choices, and the crisis actors’
openness to the international community.

202

Dependent variables include the challenger’s policy, the defender’s policy, and the short- and the longterm crisis outcomes.
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defensive deterrence failure.203 The main technique used in the analysis of statistical trends
includes logistic and ordered logistic regressions since the dependent variables are either
binary or ordinal. It also includes a two-stage logistic regression model used to address the
issue of endogeneity that arises with some of the independent variables (i.e. aggressiveness
in the crisis actors’ policy choices).
The first section of this chapter explains how 192 cases of direct deterrence failure
are derived from the ICB2 dataset (Ver. 12) and defines the variables used in the statistical
analysis. The subsequent section reports the results of the regression analyses and suggests
evidence for the relevance of the military and the political feasibility variables in explaining
the dynamics of the aftermath of direct defensive deterrence failures. The last section
discusses the implication of the findings from the regression analysis.

1. Direct Defensive Deterrence Data

1-1.

Direct Defensive Deterrence Cases, 1918-2015

The dissertation constructs an original dataset of direct defensive deterrence failure
drawing from the ICB2 dataset. The ICB2 dataset is the actor-level data of the “International
Crisis Behavior” project. It defines a foreign policy and an international crisis as “an increase
in intensity of disruptive interactions […] between two or more states” caused by “a threat

203

As mentioned earlier, the belief updating model is not tested in this statistical analysis due to the
difficulty in reflecting the Bayesian updating in a standard regression models. The predictions
established by this belief updating model will be tested against five selected cases from Chapter 4 to
Chapter 6.
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to one or more basic values, along with an awareness of finite time for response to the value
threat, and a heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities [emphasis in the
original text].”204 This dataset provides information on the complete process of crises from
their outset to the termination and their aftermath. Besides, the ICB2 data presents summary
of each crisis that describes the context and development of it, which is essential for
identifying the population of direct defensive deterrence failure.
As discussed in Chapter 2, direct defensive deterrence aims to protect the defender’s
territory and people, and demands from potential challengers not to make any changes to the
status quo that could jeopardize the defender’s national security. There are three conditions
of direct-defensive-deterrence-failure crisis: (1) both the challenger and the defender are
state actors; (2) the defender is seeking territorial integrity and security of its citizens rather
than those of its allies; and (3) the crisis is triggered by the challenger’s willful noncompliance with the defender’s demand not to revise the status quo. This coding rule
excludes (1) the cases involving non-state actors; (2) extended deterrence cases where the
defender tries to protect its allies; (3) followed-up crises that occurred in conjunction with
other previous conflicts; and (4) crises provoked by unintended spiral of violence in the
border area.
This exclusion is necessary because, first, it is not only rare to find empirical data on
non-state actors but also they might follow distinctive and sui generis logic in choosing their
options, which is difficult to generalize. Second, the calculation of third party players should
be qualitatively different from those actors whose national security is at stake. Third,
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Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
2000), pp. 3-4.
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inclusion of the follow-up crises in the dataset would likely increase the impact of the
“selection effect.”205 Lastly, by definition, a crisis not initiated by a willful decision of the
challenger should not be considered a deterrence failure.
This dissertation, however, assumes that the direct-defensive-deterrence-failure
crises should include both cases where the defender makes its demands implicitly and
explicitly. For example, if the defender makes the deterrent threat verbally (i.e. “Don’t do x”)
and the challenger defies the defender, then it is a case of explicit deterrence failure. The
1936 Rhineland Crisis and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis were classic examples of this type
of failure. When the defender makes the threat non-verbally (i.e. mobilization of forces,
reinforcing the standing army) and the challenger makes an aggressive move regardless, it is
an implicit failure. We can think of the 1979 Yom Kippur War, the 1982 Falkland War, and
the 2010 Yeonpyeong Crisis as an implicit type of deterrence failure. This dissertation treats
both types of failure as the same cases of direct defensive deterrence failure.
The dissertation project assumes that what makes direct defensive deterrence
interesting and unique is not the way it occurred but the significance of the interest at stake.
By aggregating implicit and explicit failures together, this project includes all cases of
invasion and most territorial disputes in the population of direct defensive deterrence failure.
Some other cases of the challenger’s non-compliance with the defender’s demand are
identified as the deterrence failure crisis only when it is related to serious national security
challenges (i.e., the 1991 Yugoslavia Crisis, the 2002 North Korean Nuclear Crisis).
Accordingly, the number of observations in this statistical analysis does not include crises
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such as the sinking of U.S. destroyer Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964 or the killing of
two U.S. soldiers during the Poplar Tree crisis in 1976.
With using these coding rules, this study identifies 192 cases of direct defensive
deterrence failure from 1918 to 2015. The unit of analysis is an international crisis of
deterrence failure. The rationale behind this choice is that sometimes the information on a
challenger in a crisis dyad is missing in the ICB2 dataset. By its coding rule, the dataset
does not include the challenger as an actor in case the challenger does not perceive “a threat
to one or more basic values” during the crisis. For example, cases of the 1936
Remilitarization of the Rhineland, the 1940 Fall of West Europe, and the 1941 Barbarossa
crises in the ICB2 dataset do not include Germany as one of their crisis actors because its
opponents failed to pose a threat to the basic values of Berlin. It is; thus, better to use the
deterrence failure crisis as the unit of analysis rather than to use the dyad data in the ICB2
to avoid issues of missing values.
In this dissertation’s deterrence failure dataset, each crisis includes information on
both the defender and the challenger. When there are more than one challenger or defenders
in a crisis, I included all of the different combinations of the dyad to reflect the crisis actors’
values accurately. For example, for the 1967 Cyprus II crisis and the 1973 October-Yom
Kippur war, the direct defensive deterrence dataset respectively encompasses the TurkeyGreece and the Turkey-Cyprus, as well as the Israel-Syria and the Israel-Egypt dyads as
separate observations.
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1-2.

Defining the Dependent and the Independent Variables

This project has four dependent variables. The first variable is the CHALLENGER’S
POLICY CHOICE (variable name: CHAPOL). It measures the degree of aggressiveness in
the challenger’s policy choice to defy the defender. This variable is drawn from the
“TRIGGER TO FOREIGN POLICY CRISIS” variable (variable name: TRIGGR) in the
ICB2 dataset. It is the “trigger or precipitating cause of a foreign policy crisis refers to the
specific act, event or situational change which leads decision-makers to perceive a threat.”206
While this original variable has nine values from one (“verbal act”) to nine (“Violent act”), I
trichotomize the variable to test the prediction of this project’s theories: one (“non-military
measures”), two (“indirect military and non-violent military measures”), and three (“violent
military measures”).
The second dependent variable is the DEFENDER’S POLICY CHOICE (variable
name: DEFPOL). Similar to the challenger’s policy choice, it gauges the aggressiveness in
the defender’s reaction to the challenge. It is drawn from the ICB2 dataset’s “MAJOR
RESPONSE TO CRISIS TRIGGER” (variable name: MAJRES) and recoded as an ordinal
variable that has four values: one (“inaction”), two (“non-violent actions”), three (“nonviolent military action”), and four (“violent actions”). For the third and fourth dependent
variables, the short- and the long-term outcomes, I use ICB2 dataset’s “INTENSITY OF
VIOLENCE” (variable name: SEVVIO) and “ESCALATION OR REDUCTION OF
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Michael Brecher, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Kyle Beardsley, Patrick James and David Quinn, International
Crisis Behavior Data Codebook, Version 12 (August 23, 2017),
http://people.duke.edu/~kcb38/ICB/ICB2Codebook-v12.pdf, pp.4-5.
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TENSION” (variable name: OUTESR) variables. The “INTENSITY” variable has four
values from “no violence” to “full-scale war,” which indicates the maximum degree of
violence the crisis actors employed throughout the crisis. The “TENSION” variable is a
binary one that assesses the influence of crisis outcome on the level of tension in the
aftermath of the crisis termination: either “tension escalation” (reoccurrence of crises among
the principal adversaries within five years) or “tension reduction” (non-reoccurrence of those
within five years). As these variables fit well with the project’s third and fourth dependent
variables, I do not make any adjustments.
The dissertation constructs independent variables to test rival and research
hypotheses established in Chapter 2. The feasibility of punishment is the main variable for
this project. This feasibility variable has two dimensions: military and political feasibilities.
As defined in the previous chapter, MILITARY FEASIBILITY is the power projection
capabilities to overcome geographic obstacles and the challenger’s defensive capability that
could neutralize the defender’s punitive offense. Although there is a published work that
makes an enormous effort to rigorously measure this state’s ability to project force over
distance, the dataset used in this research is not accessible.207 To accurately measure this
projection capability, it requires detailed information on each crisis actor’s naval and air
power such as battleships, aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, and long-range strategic
bombers/missiles from 1918 to 2015.
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Lee, Michael J., and William R. Thompson, “Major Powers vs. Global Powers: A New Measure of
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Due to the time and funding constraints, this dissertation selects the “IRON AND
STEEL PRODUCTION” variable (variable name: IRST) in the COW National Material
Capabilities dataset (Version 5.0)
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as a proxy index for measuring MILITARY

FEASIBILITY. First, the IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTION index is widely used to
measure the industrial strength of states, which is essential for those crisis actors to develop
the projection capability. Second, there is good reason to believe that a state’s production of
iron and steel is highly correlated with its naval and air powers considering that most
materials needed for building the relevant weapon systems are iron and steel.
To test hypotheses on the impact of nuclear weapons on deterrence failure situations,
we need to measure the MILITARY FEASIBILITY OF NUCLEAR PUNISHMENT. The
analysis turns to ICB2 data’s “NUCLEAR CAPABILITY OF CRISIS ACTOR” variable
(variable name: NUCLEAR)209 for measuring the variable. The NUCLEAR CAPABILITY
is recoded as two binary variables. The first variable (variable name: DNUCLEAR_BI,
CHNUCLEAR_BI) measures whether the crisis actor has or does not have nuclear weapons.
The

second

binary

variable

(variable

name:

DNUCLEAR_MILFEA,

CHNUCLEAR_MILFEA) is coded one if the crisis actor is a developed nuclear power
securing the second strike capability, and zero otherwise. As the possession of the second
strike capability indicates that the actor can deliver its nuclear weapons to its adversary, this
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David J. Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and
Major Power War, 1820-1965.” in Bruce Russett (ed) Peace, War, and Numbers, Beverly Hills: Sage,
pp. 19-48. The variable name DIRST implies defender’s IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTION while
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International Crisis Behavior Data Codebook, p. 41. The variable names DNUCLEAR and
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binary variable is a proxy index for MILITARY FEASIBILITY OF NUCLEAR
PUNISHMENT.
The second dimension of the feasibility variable is POLITICAL FEASIBILITY. A
positive value in this variable implies absence of strong domestic/international political
oppositions and normative obstructive environment that could impede or delay the policy
execution. As it is difficult for a large-N study to accurately capture the political and
normative debates and processes occurring in each country during the crisis, I create a proxy
index to measure POLITICAL FEASIBILITY. This index is based on six relevant variables
in the ICB2 dataset: (1) “DURATION OF POLITICAL REGIME” (variable name:
DURREG),210 (2) “ECONOMIC STATUS OF ACTOR” (variable name: ECONDT),211 (3)
“REGIME REPRESSION” (variable name: REGREP), 212 (4) “SOCIETAL UNREST”
(variable name: SOCUNR),213 (5) “MASS VIOLENCE” (variable name: MASSVL),214 and
(6) “GOVERNMENT INSTABILITY” (variable name: GVINST).215 First, I recode these six
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This variable measures the “number of years from the last change of regime until the date of the crisis is
reported.” International Crisis Behavior Data Codebook, pp. 39-40.
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48

214
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International Crisis Behavior Data Codebook, pp. 48-49.
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variables to dichotomous ones: coded zero if the problem gets decreased or is maintained at
a normal level, and one otherwise. Then, these binary variables aggregated into a composite
index (variable name: POLFEA). The scores of this index are treated as if interval variables.
This project uses World Bank’s “TRADE (% OF GDP)” index (variable name:
ECOPEN)216 to assess the POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF NUCLEAR PUNISHMENT.
The assumption made for adopting this index for measuring POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF
NUCLEAR PUNISHMENT is that if the crisis actor’s economy is more dependent on the
global market, it would be politically more difficult to use nuclear sanctions. As the use of
WMD is a taboo in the international community, an export-oriented economy should fear the
backlash of nuclear punishment such as political isolation, loss in foreign investment, and
economic sanctions led by the UN.217
The control variables are included in the analysis to test rival hypotheses centered
on the resolve of crisis actors. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Rational Deterrence
literature calculates the expected utility of escalating the crisis to measure the crisis actors’
level of resolve. The level of their resolve, thus, is a function of the INTEREST AT STAKE,
the PROBABILITY OF VICTORY in case of a war, the WAR COST, and the
AUDIENCE/REPUTATIONAL COST for backing down. Indices for measuring these
variables are: (1) “ISSUE OF CRISIS” (variable name: ISSUE) in the ICB2, 218 (2)
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Beckley’s power index of “GDP × GDP PER CAPITA”219 (variable name: PGAP_BECK),
and (3) the ICB2’s “POLITICAL REGIME OF CRISIS ACTOR” variable (variable name:
REGTYP).220
The first ISSUE variable identifies “the most important initial issue area of the crisis
as perceived by the crisis actor,” which includes the values from one (“military-security”) to
four (“cultural-status”). I dichotomize this variable by coding one if it is a matter of militarysecurity and zero otherwise. This variable is a good index for measuring the level of
INTEREST AT STAKE for crisis actors during the crisis. Secondly, Beckley’s GDP × GDP
PER CAPITA index is used to measure the power gap between the defender and the
challenger in each crisis. It is an indicator of these crisis actors’ PROBABILITY OF
VICTORY and their WAR COSTS. Lastly, I recode REGIME variable in the ICB2 dataset
and create a binary variable (variable name: REGTYP): one (“democratic regime”) and two
(“authoritarian regime”). The rationale behind using this variable for measuring the
AUDIENCE COST is Fearon’s theory that the democratic regime pays higher audience costs
than the authoritarian regime in general. 221 The next section reports the result of regression
analysis using the variables explained in this section.
Before moving on to the statistical analysis, it is important to mention two things.
First, the control variables used here do not necessarily include factors that the Cognitive
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Deterrence theory emphasizes. The Cognitive approach suggests a different logic in
explaining the crisis actors’ level of resolve, such as the human tendency of loss aversion,
the endowment effect, and the logic of vengeance. However, it has proven difficult to find
indices for measuring these factors in the accessible datasets. The following regression
analyses, thus, zero in on independent variables suggested by the Rational Deterrence
approach, and accordingly, these analyses do not test the Cognitive Deterrence theory.
Second, as mentioned earlier, the next section does not examine the belief updating model
either because the Bayesian updating process is difficult to capture by a standard statistical
analysis.

2. Empirical Analysis

2-1.

The Challenger’s Policy Choice

Out of 192 international crises with direct defensive deterrence failure, challengers
chose “non-military measures” in 37 cases (19%), “indirect military and non-violent military
measures” in 50 cases (26%), and “violent military measures” in 105 cases (55%) to revise
the status quo defying those defenders’ deterrent threats. Given that the majority of
deterrence failure crises were initiated by the challenger’s policy choice of violent measures,
the prediction of rival hypothesis and the Rational/Cognitive Deterrence theory seems right:
The direct deterrence fails when the challenger is a determined aggressor. While the research
hypothesis and the feasibility of punishment model do not reject this possibility, they point
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out that the more frequent cause of failure is that it was not feasible for the defender to punish
the challenger.
I employ ordered logistic regression models to test these hypotheses. Table 3 presents
the results. First, I examine the impact of the defender’s military and political feasibility on
the challenger’s degree of aggressiveness in defying the former’s direct defensive deterrent
threat. According to the statistical analysis, the defender’s military and political feasibility to
punish the challenger is statistically significant and negatively correlated with the
aggressiveness in the challenger’s policy choice when considered alone (Model 1a). When
tested in a fully specified model (Model 1b), only MILITARY FEASIBILITY is statistically
significant. 222 The challenger’s level of resolve, however, is partially supported by the
analysis and the only statistically significant variable is ISSUE when it shifts from “militarysecurity” to “All the other” (Model 1c).
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The p value for the POLITICAL FEASIBILITY is 0.052.
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Table 3: Origins of the Challenger’s Policy Choice, 1918-2015
Variables
Military Feasibility
(Defender)
Political Feasibility
(Defender)

Model 1a

Model 1b

-0.0000189**
(0.00000727)

-0.0000296**
(0.0000109)

-0.207*
(0.105)

-0.269
(0.138)

Model 1c

Probability of Victory &
War Costs
(Defender)

1.593
(1.958)

-1.471
(1.508)

Interest at Stake
(Defender & Challenger)

1.006
(0.594)

1.501**
(0.503)

Audience Cost
(Challenger)

0.451
(0.470)

0.141
(0.398)

Number of Observations

153

97

127

Probability > Chi-Square

0.0001***

0.0005***

0.0105**

0.0568

0.1097

0.0432

2

Pseudo R

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; All tests are two-tailed.

2-2.

The Defender’s Policy Choice

For the defender’s policy choice in the aftermath of direct defensive deterrence
failure, the defender chose violent military measures in most of the cases (81 out of 192
cases: 42.19%). The defender took non-violent military measures in 53 cases (27.60%) and
non-violent political and economic measures in 57 cases (29.69%). The defender chose not
to react to the challenger’s defiance only once (0.52%) according to the data. The
defender’s penchant for aggressive reaction seems to correspond well with the prediction
of rival hypothesis and the Rational/Cognitive Deterrence theories. Again, this prediction
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does not contradict the research hypothesis based on the feasibility model.223 What the rival
and research hypotheses disagree on is the sufficient condition for a strong reaction by the
defender. While the Rational and Cognitive Deterrence perspectives argue that the
defender prefers to severely punish the challenger due to its high level of resolve, the
feasibility model points out that the defender is allowed to take aggressive measures only
when it secures military and political abilities to follow through on its threat.
I again employ the ordered logistic regression model to test these hypotheses as the
dependent variable is ordinal. Table 4 reports the result of this regression analysis. The
statistical analysis shows that the defender’s military and political feasibility to punish the
challenger have no statistically significant impact on the defender’s degree of aggressiveness
in punishing the challenger when they are considered alone (Model 2a) and tested in a fully
specified model (Model 2b). The challenger’s level of resolve also has no statistically
significant impact on the defender’s policy choice (Model 2c). Furthermore, the p values for
all three models are too high, and thus none of independent variables included in them should
be considered to have a causal impact on the dependent variable.
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This prediction, however, goes against the belief updating model. Yet, as the model is not tested in the
statistical analysis, this chapter does not discuss it.

99

Table 4: Origins of the Defender’s Policy Choice, 1918-2015
Variables

Model 2a

Model 2b

Military Feasibility
(Defender)

-0.00000124
(0.00000584)

-0.00000482
(0.00000642)

Political Feasibility
(Defender)

-0.126
(0.0973)

-0.176
(0.106)

Model 2c

Probability of Victory
& War Costs
(Defender)

1.099
(1.497)

0.397
(1.275)

Interest at Stake
(Defender)

0.911
(0.512)

0.285
(0.433)

Audience Cost
(Defender)

-0.459
(0.358)

-0.0196
(0.293)

153

153

192

Probability > ChiSquare

0.3250

0.1836

0.9039

Pseudo R2

0.0065

0.0219

0.0013

Number of
Observations

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001; All tests are two-tailed.

This intriguing trend demonstrates that neither the Rational Deterrence nor the
feasibility models can adequately explain the origin of the defender’s policy choices. One
possible explanation for this is that, as the belief updating model argues, the level of
aggressiveness that the challenger demonstrated earlier greatly has influenced on the
defender’s policy choice. We can test this possibility by employing a two-stage logistic
regression model (Model 2d). This model includes (1) the defender’s MILITARY and
POLITICAL FEASIBILITY to punish the challenger’s attempt to revise the status quo, (2)
the defender’s resolve to do so (the defender’s PROBABILITY OF VICTORY & WAR
COSTS, INTEREST AT STAKE, and AUDIENCE COST), and (3) the CHALLENGER’S
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POLICY CHOICE as independent variables. It also treats the CHALLENGER’S POLICY
CHOICE as an endogenous variable influenced by the challenger’s level of resolve.
Table 5 reports the result. In Model 2d, the CHALLENGER’S POLICY CHOICE
and the defender’s MILITARY FEASIBILITY variables are statistically significant and
positively correlated with the defender’s choice. The significant factors that have an impact
on the challenger’s policy choice are the defender’s MILITARY FEASIBILITY and its
AUDIENCE COSTS. The defender’s PRODUCTION OF IRON AND STEEL is negatively
correlated with the challenger’s policy choice, while the defender’s REGIME TYPE is
positively correlated with the challenger’s choice.
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Table 5: (Two-Stage Logistic Regression Model) Origins of the Defender’s Policy
Choice, 1918-2015
Variables

Model 2d

Variables (cont.)

Model 2d (cont.)

Defender’s Policy Choice
Challenger’s Policy Choice

1.549***
(0.188)

Challenger’s Policy Choice

Military Feasibility
(Defender)

0.0000110*
(0.00000495)

Military Feasibility
(Defender)

Political Feasibility

0.0219
(0.153)

Political Feasibility
(Defender)

Probability of Victory &
War Costs
(Defender)

-1.102
(1.204)

Probability of Victory &
War Costs
(Defender)

Interest at Stake
(Defender and Challenger)

-0.411
(0.413)

Interest at Stake
(Defender and Challenger)

(Defender)

Audience Cost
(Defender)

-0.737
(0.477)
Constant

-0.00000794*
(0.00000335)
-0.0632
(0.0496)
0.520
(0.778)
0.353
(0.227)

Audience Cost
(Defender)

0.347*
(0.175)

Audience Cost
(Challenger)

0.0957
(0.179)

-2.494**
(0.845)

Constant

Number of Observations

97

Probability > Chi-Square

0.0000***

Wald Chi-Square test

1.825***
(0.494)

138.71

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001; All tests are two-tailed.
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2-3.

The Short-term Outcome

According to the direct defensive deterrence failure dataset, the majority of crises
(86 out of 192; 44.79%) terminated without any violence. In 30 crises (15.63%), the
defender and the challenger experienced “minor clashes.” The 36 deterrence failures
(18.75%) led to “serious clashes,” and 40 cases (20.83%) ended with a “full-scale war”
between the two crisis actors. This dominant trend of peaceful crisis termination is
fascinating, considering that the most frequent policy choices both the defender and the
challenger made as their initial moves were “violent military measures.” This contradiction
implies that either the defender or the challenger, or both of them, backed down and chose
a de-escalation path after they chose an aggressive route in the early stage of the crisis.
This short-term outcome of deterrence failure goes against the prediction of rival
hypothesis and the Rational and Cognitive Deterrence theories. By definition, taking the
de-escalation path indicates the crisis actor’s level of resolve is low. How could they be
resolute actors and simultaneously choose to retreat? One possible way to make sense of
this contradiction is by introducing the notion of feasibility. Even if they genuinely desire
to maintain their aggressive course of action, they could not do so when they lack military
and political abilities to implement their escalation policies.224
An ordered logistic regression model is used to test this hypothesis, and Table 6
shows the result. The statistical analysis reveals that the DEFENDER’S POLITICAL

224

Another way to explain this is that the crisis actors changed their types from resolute to irresolute ones
due to their updated belief about their opponents’ types. The possibility is not discussed in this chapter as
the belief updating model is not tested in the statistical analysis.
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FEASIBILITY to punish the challenger has a statistically significant impact on and
negatively correlated with the short-term outcome of deterrence failure crises when it is
considered with the DEFENDER’S MILITARY FEASIBILITY (Model 3a), when tested in
a fully specified model (Model 3b), and when included in trimmed models (Models 3d and
3e). In Model 3b, those variables of the INTEREST AT STAKE and the challenger’s
AUDIENCE COST (the challenger’s regime type) also have statistically significant impact
on the short-term crisis outcome.
The challenger’s level of resolve has a statistically significant impact on the shortterm (Model 3c) as well. Relevant factors in explaining the short-term outcome of deterrence
failure crises in Model 3c include the DEFENDER’S PROBABILITY OF VICTORY &
WAR COSTS (the defender’s power share in the aggregated power of the dyad) and the
challenger’s AUDIENCE COST. However, the power gap and the challenger’s regime type
variables lose their significance when they are nested within trimmed models (Models 3d
and 3e). The only two variables that always maintain their significance in all five models are
INTEREST AT STAKE and POLITICAL FEASIBILITY.
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Table 6: Origins of the Short-term Outcome of the Deterrence Failure, 1918-2015
Variables

Model 3a

Model 3b

Military Feasibility
(Defender)

-0.00000804
(0.00000750)

-0.0000136
(0.0000106)

Political Feasibility
(Defender)

-0.263**
(0.0969)

-0.307*
(0.135)

Model 3c

Model 3d

Model 3e

-0.343**

-0.422***

(0.123)

(0.114)

Probability of
Victory &
War Costs
(Defender)

-1.460
(2.393)

-5.293**
(1.903)

-3.321
(2.075)

Interest at Stake
(Defender and
Challenger)

1.463*
(0.739)

0.436
(0.525)

1.454*
(0.734)

1.505*
(0.729)

Audience Cost
(Defender)

-0.459
(0.358)

-0.0196
(0.293)

Audience Cost
(Challenger)

1.136*
(0.503)

1.066**
(0.413)

0.965*
(0.471)

0.763
(0.448)

153

97

127

105

105

0.0018**

0.0007***

0.0004***

0.0001***

0.0001***

0.0334

0.0931

0.0602

0.0897

0.0801

Number of
Observations
Probability > ChiSquare
Pseudo R2

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001; All tests are two-tailed.
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2-4.

The Long-term Outcome

As for the long-term outcome of the deterrence failure crisis, the principal
adversaries of the 93 crises (48.44%) did not experience another crisis during the
subsequent five-year period while crises between them recurred in 88 cases (45.83%). The
remaining 11 crises (5.73%) occurred too recently to measure whether the tension gets
increased or decreased after the crisis. The dataset, thus, shows that the possibility of
resulting in deterrence collapse or experiencing another crisis with the same crisis actors
within five years after the termination of the deterrence failure crisis is about 45 percent,
slightly less than 50 percents.
This trend matches well with the rival and research hypotheses’ prediction. Both
the old theories (the Rational and the Cognitive Deterrence theories) and the new theories
(the feasibility of punishment and the belief updating models) of deterrence make divergent
predictions regarding the long-term outcome of the direct defensive deterrence failure.
Some of them argue that the past and the crisis actors’ reputation for standing firm does
not matter much for future crises (i.e. the Hopf-Mercer-Press consensus, Cognitive
Deterrence theories, and the feasibility of punishment model). The others claim that their
reputation would have a significant impact on the calculation of potential crisis actors if
they involve the same actors/issues or when the interest at stake is high.
To confirm which theory provides a better explanation, I first dichotomize the
ESCALATION OR REDUCTION OF TENSION variable and employ the logistic
regression model. However, I could not find any variables that have statistically significant
causal impacts when the DEFENDER’S POLICY CHOICE and the CONTENT OF
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CRISIS OUTCOME are considered in the model. This result could imply simply that the
defender’s policy choice during the direct defensive deterrent failure has no systematic
impact on future crises. However, as shown in the earlier regression analysis of the
defender’s policy choice, it might be because the model does not consider it that the
DEFENDER’S POLICY CHOICE variable is endogenous.
A two-stage logistic regression model (Model 4), thus, is established in this regard.
This model includes the DEFENDER’S POLICY CHOICE, the CHALLENGER’S
POLICY CHOICE, and the CONTENT OF CRISIS OUTCOME as independent variables,
and treats both the DEFENDER’S POLICY CHOICE and the CHALLENGER’S POLICY
CHOICE as endogenous variables. These endogenous variables are influenced by (1) the
defender’s feasibility to follow through (its MILITARY and POLITICAL FEASIBILITY),
(2) the defender’s level of resolve (the defender’s PROBABILITY OF VICTORY & WAR
COSTS, INTEREST AT STAKE, and AUDIENCE COST), and (3) the challenger’s
resolve (the challenger’s PROBABILITY OF VICTORY & WAR COSTS, INTEREST
AT STAKE, and AUDIENCE COST).
Table 7 reports the result of the regression analysis. Even with the two-stage logistic
regression model, policy choices of the defender and the challenger have no significant
impact on the long-term outcome of the crisis. The analysis, thus, fails to reject the null
hypothesis that the defender’s policy choice during the deterrence failure crisis, or its
reputation for standing firm, has no systematic impact on future crises. The only relevant
variable is CONTENT OF CRISIS OUTCOME when the crisis terminated with
“STALEMATE,” or no clear outcome. This result is not very interesting as it is
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commonsensical for the crisis actors to have additional crises when the previous crisis did
not come to a conclusion and the issue over which they had a conflict remained unresolved.
Table 7: (Two-Stage Logistic Regression Model) Origins of the Long-term Outcome
of the Deterrence Failure, 1918-2015
Variables

Model 4

Variables (cont.)

Model 4
(cont.)

Variables (cont.)

Model 4
(cont.)

Long-term Outcome
Defender’s
Policy Choice

-0.519
(0.505)

Challenger’s
Policy Choice

-0.215
(0.374)

Content of
Crisis
Outcome
compromise
stalemate
defeat

0.129
(0.357)
0.813*
(0.349)
0.0721
(0.475)

Defender’s policy choice

Content of Crisis
Outcome
compromise
stalemate
defeat

Military
Feasibility
(Defender)

Military Feasibility
(Defender)

Political
Feasibility
(Defender)

DEFENDER’S
Political Feasibility

Probability of
Victory &
War Costs
(Defender)

Probability of
Victory &
War Costs
(Defender)

Interest at
Stake
(Defender and
Challenger)

Interest at Stake
(Defender and
Challenger)

Audience Cost
(Defender)

Audience Cost
(Defender)

Audience Cost
(Challenger)

Audience Cost
(Challenger)

Constant

1.767
(1.456)

Challenger’s policy choice

Content of Crisis
Outcome
compromise

-0.190
(0.212)
0.172
(0.212)
-0.138
(0.284)

stalemate
defeat

-0.00000530
(0.00000354)

DEFENDER’S
Political Feasibility

-0.0795
(0.0516)

Probability of
Victory &
War Costs
(Defender)

-0.654
(0.903)

Interest at Stake
(Defender and
Challenger)

0.308
(0.250)

Audience Cost
(Defender)

-0.455*
(0.193)
0.106
(0.194)

Constant

Military Feasibility
(Defender)

Audience Cost
(Challenger)

3.855***
(0.572)

Constant

Number of Observations

96

Probability > Chi-Square

0.043*

Wald Chi-Square test

11.46

0.0131
(0.196)
0.0246
(0.197)
0.303
(0.262)
0.00000859
**
(0.00000331
)
-0.0602
(0.0489)
0.983
(0.820)

0.362
(0.228)
0.348
(0.181)
0.0752
(0.179)
1.541**
(0.542)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001; All tests are two-tailed.
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2-5.

The Impact of Nuclear Weapons

The final set of tests is related to the impact of nuclear weapons on the four dependent
variables mentioned above. As discussed in the previous chapter, the nuclear revolutionist
approach argues that the introduction of nuclear weapons into the calculation of the crisis
actors would bring the “crystal ball effect” and contributes to maintenance of status quo as
well as suppresses the magnitude of escalation during the crisis. The nuclear pessimists,
however, claim the increasing irrelevance of nuclear weapons in the international crisis
because of the stability-instability paradox, the logic of preventive war and the lack of
practicality in using the weapons, and the logic of self-deterrence mainly activated by the
nuclear taboo in the international community. This project’s feasibility of punishment model
sides with the nuclear pessimists as it is difficult to secure military and political feasibility of
nuclear punishment in responding to most of the challenger’s defiance against the defender’s
deterrent threat.
First, I employ ordered logistic regression models to test whether the defender’s
possession of nuclear weapons has any impact on the challenger’s policy choice. Table 8
presents the results. According to the statistical analysis, the DEFENDER’S NUCLEAR
MILITARY FEASIBILITY is statistically significant and negatively correlated with the
aggressiveness in the challenger’s policy choice when it is considered with the
DEFENDER’S POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS and the DEFENDER’S
MILITARY FEASIBILITY OF NUCLEAR PUNISHMENT (Model 5a). When tested in a
fully specified model, the DEFENDER’S POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF NUCLEAR
PUNISHMENT, the DEFENDER’S MILITARY FEASIBILITY, and the DEFENDER’S
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MILITARY FEASIBILITY and the DEFENDER’S PROBABILITY OF VICTORY &
WAR COSTS have statistically significant impact on the challenger’s policy choice (Model
5b). Meanwhile, the only significant variable in the model for the challenger’s policy choice
without considering the nuclear weapons variable (Model 5c) is the DEFENDER’S
MILITARY FEASIBILITY.
Table 8: Defender’s Nuclear Capability and the Challenger’s Policy Choice, 19182015
Variables

Model 5a

Model 5b

Possession of Nuclear Weapons
(Defender)

-0.212
(0.551)

0.491
(0.804)

Nuclear Military Feasibility
(Defender)

-2.647**
(0.941)

-17.47
(1160.8)

Nuclear Political Feasibility
(Defender)

0.666
(0.543)

2.284*
(0.939)

-3.284**
(1.237)

-0.0000460*
(0.0000212)

-0.0000296**
(0.0000109)

-0.406
(0.219)

-0.269
(0.138)

Probability of Victory &
War Costs
(Defender)

5.304*
(2.602)

1.593
(1.958)

Interest at Stake
(Defender and Challenger)

0.186
(0.715)

1.006
(0.594)

Audience Cost
(Challenger)

0.353
(0.581)

0.451
(0.470)

Military Feasibility
(Defender)
Political Feasibility
(Defender)

Model 5c

Number of Observations

115

69

97

Probability > Chi-Square

0.0001***

0.0000***

0.0005***

0.084

0.276

0.110

Pseudo R2

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; All tests are two-tailed.

Second, as I expected a similar problem would occur in testing the impact of the
challenger’s nuclear capability on the defender’s policy choice; the analysis turns to the two-
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stage logistic regression model assuming the influence of the challenger’s policy choice on
the dependent variable. This model’s independent variables include: (1) the
CHALLENGER’S POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, (2) the CHALLENGER’S
MILITARY and POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF NUCLEAR PUNISHMENT, and (3) the
CHALLENGER’S POLICY CHOICE. The CHALLENGER’S POLICY CHOICE is treated
as an endogenous factor influenced by the DEFENDER’S POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, the DEFENDER’S MILITARY and POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF
NUCLEAR

PUNISHMENT,

the

DEFENDER’S

MILITARY

and

POLITICAL

FEASIBILITY, the DEFENDER’S PROBABILITY OF VICTORY & WAR COSTS, the
INTEREST AT STAKE, and the CHALLENGER’S AUDIENCE COST.
Table 9 shows the result of this two-stage logistic regression model (Model 6). The
regression analysis reveals that the CHALLENGER’S POLICY CHOICE is the only
statistically significant variable and is positively correlated with the defender’s policy choice.
The two statistically significant variables influence this challenger's policy choice: the
DEFENDER’S MILITARY and POLITICAL FEASIBILITY TO IMPLEMENT
NUCLEAR PUNISHMENT. The challenger’s nuclear capability does not influence the
defender's policy choice. In the end, it is defender’s military and political ability to implement
nuclear punishment against the challenger’s defiance that decides the defender’s policy
choice after deterrence failure.
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Table 9: (Two-Stage Logistic Regression Model) the Challenger’s Nuclear
Capability and the Defender’s Policy Choice, 1918-2015
Variables

Model 6 (cont.)

Model 6

Variables (cont.)

1.039**
(0.391)

Challenger’s Policy Choice

Defender’s Policy choice
Challenger’s Policy Choice
Possession of Nuclear
Weapons
(Challenger)

-0.0153
(0.607)

Nuclear Military Feasibility
(Challenger)

0.550
(0.879)

Nuclear Political Feasibility
(Challenger)

-0.355
(0.596)

Possession of Nuclear
Weapons
(Defender)
Nuclear Military Feasibility
(Defender)
Nuclear Political Feasibility
(Defender)
Military Feasibility
(Defender)

Possession of Nuclear
Weapons
(Challenger)
Nuclear Military Feasibility
(Challenger)
Nuclear Political Feasibility
(Challenger)
Possession of Nuclear
Weapons
(Defender)
Nuclear Military Feasibility
(Defender)
Nuclear Political Feasibility
(Defender)
Military Feasibility
(Defender)

-

0.403
(0.396)
-0.470
(0.605)
-0.471
(0.294)
0.381
(0.359)
-1.435**
(0.483)
1.377**
(0.452)
-0.00000317
(0.00000814)

Political Feasibility
(Defender)

-

Political Feasibility
(Defender)

-0.116
(0.0679)

Probability of Victory &
War Costs
(Defender)

-

Probability of Victory &
War Costs
(Defender)

1.853
(1.275)

Interest at Stake
(Defender and Challenger)

-

Interest at Stake
(Defender and Challenger)

-0.0475
(0.263)

Audience Cost
(Challenger)

-

Audience Cost
(Challenger)

0.196
(0.227)

Constant

-2.520**
(0.819)

Constant

Number of Observations

1.195
(0.900)

42

Wald Chi-Square test

10.90

Probability > Chi-Square

0.0278*

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p< 0.001; All tests are two-tailed.
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Third, as for the causes of the short-term outcome of the direct defensive deterrence
failure, I employ ordered logistic regression models to test the impact of the nuclear
capability of the defender and the challenger on the short-term outcome. Table 10 reports the
results. The data reveals that both the DEFENDER’S and the CHALLENGER’S
POSSESSION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS and their NUCLEAR MILITARY
FEASIBILITY are statistically significant when considered with the POLITICAL
FEASIBILITY OF NUCLEAR PUNISHMENT of the defender and the challenger (Model
7a). In a more trimmed model, the DEFENDER’S POSSESSION OF THE NUCLEAR
WEAPONS,

the

DEFENDER’S

MILITARY

FEASIBILITY

of

NUCLEAR

PUNISHMENT and the DEFENDER’S POLITICAL FEASIBILITY are significant (Model
7b). When tested in a fully specified model, however, only the DEFENDER’S
POSSESSION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS variable remains to be significant (Model
7c). Meanwhile, as mentioned earlier, significant variables for the short-term outcome
without considering the nuclear weapons factor are the DEFENDER’S POLITICAL
FEASIBILITY, INTEREST AT STAKE, and the CHALLENGER’S AUDIENCE COST
variables (Model 7d).
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Table 10: Crisis Actors’ Nuclear Capability and the Short-term Outcome, 1918-2015
Variables

Model 7a

Model 7b

Model 7c

Possession of Nuclear Weapons
(Defender)

3.251**
(1.260)

3.317*
(1.317)

3.851*
(1.756)

Nuclear Military Feasibility
(Defender)

-3.172*
(1.574)

-3.955*
(1.787)

-2.290
(2.461)

Nuclear Political Feasibility
(Defender)

0.922
(0.871)

1.725
(0.991)

1.587
(1.312)

Possession of Nuclear Weapons
(Challenger)

-2.631*
(1.288)

-2.503
(1.340)

-1.355
(1.836)

Nuclear Military Feasibility
(Challenger)

3.893**
(1.480)

2.798
(1.595)

3.535
(2.483)

Nuclear Political Feasibility
(Challenger)

-0.214
(0.791)

-0.772
(0.874)

-1.176
(0.979)

Military Feasibility
(Defender)

Model 7d

-0.000125
(0.000108)

-0.0000136
(0.0000106)

-0.0963
(0.254)

-0.307*
(0.135)

2.627
(5.522)

-1.460
(2.393)

1.964
(1.429)

1.463*
(0.739)

Audience Cost
(Challenger)

1.382
(1.108)

1.136*
(0.503)

Audience Cost
(Defender)

0.908
(0.841)

-0.184
(0.479)

Political Feasibility
(Defender)

-0.464*
(0.227)

Probability of Victory &
War Costs
(Defender)
Interest at Stake
(Defender and Challenger)

1.643
(1.197)

Number of Observations

52

47

42

97

Probability > Chi-Square

0.0382*

0.0087***

0.0181*

0.0007***

0.099

0.168

0.232

0.093

Pseudo R2

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; All tests are two-tailed.

Lastly, Tables 11 and 12 provide the results of the two-stage logistic regression
analyses for the deterrence failure’s long-term outcome. The first regression model (Model
8a, Table 11) includes the DEFENDER’S POLICY CHOICE, the CHALLENGER’S
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POLICY CHOICE, and the CONTENT OF CRISIS OUTCOME as independent variables,
and treats both the DEFENDER’S POLICY CHOICE and the CHALLENGER’S POLICY
CHOICE as endogenous variables. The crisis actors’ nuclear capability (their
POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DEFENDER’S NUCLEAR MILITARY
FEASIBILITY, and the DEFENDER’S NUCLEAR POLITICAL FEASIBILITY) has
impact on these endogenous variables.
The second model (Model 8b, Table 12) also has the DEFENDER’S POLICY
CHOICE, the CHALLENGER’S POLICY CHOICE, and the CONTENT OF CRISIS
OUTCOME as independent variables. This model, however, fully specifies the factors that
could affect the policy choices of the defender and the challenger. These factors comprise
(1) crisis actors’ nuclear capability, (2) the defender’s feasibility to follow through (its
MILITARY and POLITICAL FEASIBILITY), (3) the defender’s level of resolve (the
defender’s PROBABILITY OF VICTORY & WAR COSTS, INTEREST AT STAKE, and
AUDIENCE COST), and (4) the challenger’s resolve (the challenger’s PROBABILITY
OF VICTORY & WAR COSTS, INTEREST AT STAKE, and AUDIENCE COST).
When only nuclear capabilities are considered, as shown in Table 9, the
DEFENDER’S and the CHALLENGER’S POLICY CHOICES are statistically significant,
and they both are negatively correlated with the long-term outcome. The crisis termination
with the “STALEMATE” outcome also has a significant impact on the long-term outcome
as discussed earlier. The challenger’s policy choice is influenced by the DEFENDER’S
POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS and its MILITARY FEASIBILITY TO
IMPLEMENT NUCLEAR PUNISHMENT. The defender’s policy choice is affected by
the STALEMATE outcome, the DEFENDER’S POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR
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WEAPONS and the CHALLENGER’S MILITARY FEASIBILITY TO IMPLEMENT
NUCLEAR PUNISHMENT.
In the fully specified model (Table 12), however, neither the defender nor the
challenger’s policy choices have any impact on the long-term outcome. Furthermore, the pvalue for the model itself is too high. Given that this model as a whole fails to reject the null
hypothesis, any variables that are statistically significant in the model should not be
interpreted as they have any real causal impact.
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Table 11: (Two-Stage Logistic Regression Model) Crisis Actors’ Nuclear Capability
and the Long-term Outcome, 1918-2015 (Model 8a)
Variables

Model 8a

Variables
(cont.)

Model 8a
(cont.)

Variables
(cont.)

Model 8a
(cont.)

Long-term Outcome
Defender’s
Policy Choice

-1.375*
(0.599)

Challenger’s
Policy Choice

-1.305*
(0.508)

Content of Crisis
Outcome
compromise
stalemate
defeat

0.0252
(0.449)
0.996*
(0.409)
0.786
(0.700)

Defender’s Policy Choice

Content of Crisis
Outcome
compromise
stalemate
defeat

0.0952
(0.175)
0.420*
(0.168)
0.480*
(0.225)

Challenger’s Policy Choice

Content of Crisis
Outcome
compromise
stalemate
defeat

-0.0763
(0.189)
0.219
(0.182)
0.134
(0.244)

Possession of
Nuclear
Weapons
(Defender)

Possession of
Nuclear
Weapons
(Defender)

0.472*
(0.218)

Possession of
Nuclear
Weapons
(Defender)

-0.443*
(0.221)

Nuclear Military
Feasibility
(Defender)

Nuclear Military
Feasibility
(Defender)

-0.372
(0.225)

Nuclear Military
Feasibility
(Defender)

0.412*
(0.202)

Nuclear Political
Feasibility
(Defender)

Nuclear Political
Feasibility
(Defender)

-0.0438
(0.156)

Nuclear Political
Feasibility
(Defender)

0.110
(0.162)

Possession of
Nuclear
Weapons
(Challenger)

Possession of
Nuclear
Weapons
(Challenger)

-0.345*
(0.157)

Possession of
Nuclear
Weapons
(Challenger)

0.368
(0.200)

Nuclear Military
Feasibility
(Challenger)

Nuclear Military
Feasibility
(Challenger)

0.466
(0.246)

Nuclear Military
Feasibility
(Challenger)

-0.326
(0.308)

Nuclear Political
Feasibility
(Challenger)

Nuclear Political
Feasibility
(Challenger)

-0.0184
(0.125)

Nuclear Political
Feasibility
(Challenger)

0.0778
(0.126)

Constant

0.101
(0.153)

Constant

0.292
(0.168)

Constant

0.513
(0.442)

Number of Observations
52
Probability > Chi-Square
0.0000***
Wald Chi-Square test
62.86
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; All tests are two-tailed.
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Table 12: (Two-Stage Logistic Regression Model) Crisis Actors’ Nuclear Capability
and the Long-term Outcome, 1918-2015 (Model 8b)
Variables

Model 8b

Variables
(cont.)

Model 8b
(cont.)

Variables
(cont.)

Model 8b
(cont.)

Long-term Outcome
Defender’s
Policy Choice

-0.388
(1.246)

Challenger’s
Policy Choice

0.241
(1.265)

Content of Crisis
Outcome
compromise
stalemate
defeat

-0.0737
(0.607)
0.668
(0.705)
-0.447
(0.952)

Defender’s Policy Choice

Content of Crisis
Outcome
compromise
stalemate
defeat

0.0360
(0.159)
0.233
(0.154)
0.325
(0.201)

Challenger’s Policy Choice

Content of Crisis
Outcome
compromise
stalemate
defeat

-0.145
(0.176)
0.0178
(0.170)
0.122
(0.222)

Possession of
Nuclear
Weapons
(Defender)

Possession of
Nuclear
Weapons
(Defender)

0.305
(0.203)

Possession of
Nuclear
Weapons
(Defender)

-0.279
(0.225)

Nuclear Military
Feasibility
(Defender)

Nuclear Military
Feasibility
(Defender)

-0.718*
(0.292)

Nuclear Military
Feasibility
(Defender)

0.0167
(0.327)

Nuclear Political
Feasibility
(Defender)

Nuclear Political
Feasibility
(Defender)

0.462*
(0.209)

Nuclear Political
Feasibility
(Defender)

0.804***
(0.228)

Possession of
Nuclear
Weapons
(Challenger)

Possession of
Nuclear
Weapons
(Challenger)

0.0396
(0.232)

Possession of
Nuclear
Weapons
(Challenger)

Nuclear Military
Feasibility
(Challenger)

Nuclear Military
Feasibility
(Challenger)

0.0225
(0.299)

Nuclear Military
Feasibility
(Challenger)

-1.044**
(0.337)

Nuclear Political
Feasibility
(Challenger)

Nuclear Political
Feasibility
(Challenger)

-0.254
(0.176)

Nuclear Political
Feasibility
(Challenger)

-0.234
(0.199)

Military
Feasibility
(Defender)

Military
Feasibility
(Defender)

0.000000833
(0.00000468)

Military
Feasibility
(Defender)

0.00000205
(0.00000513)

Political
Feasibility
(Defender)

Political
Feasibility
(Defender)

-0.0942
(0.0670)

Political
Feasibility
(Defender)

-0.0696
(0.0714)

Probability of
Victory & War
Costs
(Defender)

Probability of
Victory & War
Costs
(Defender)

Probability of
Victory & War
Costs
(Defender)

1.230*
(0.504)

Interest at Stake
(Defender and
Challenger)

Interest at Stake
(Defender and
Challenger)

Interest at Stake
(Defender and
Challenger)

-0.140
(0.287)

0.243
(0.260)
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0.544*
(0.259)

Audience Cost
(Defender)

Audience Cost
(Defender)

-0.417**
(0.131)

Audience Cost
(Defender)

0.0673
(0.145)

Audience Cost
(Challenger)

Audience Cost
(Challenger)

0.173
(0.138)

Audience Cost
(Challenger)

0.215
(0.152)

Constant

-0.478
(0.620)

Constant

0.401
(0.522)

Constant

0.395
(0.573)

Number of
42
Observations
Probability >
0.6443
Chi-Square
Wald Chi3.36
Square test
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01; All tests are two-tailed.

3. Discussion and Conclusion

In this chapter, the dissertation examines the impact of the defender’s military and
political feasibility to punish the challenger on the challenger’s policy, the defender’s policy,
the short- and the long-term outcome of the direct defensive deterrence failure. The ordered
logistic and two-stage logistic regression models find that this feasibility variable matters in
almost every stage of the deterrence failure. First, the defender’s military and political
feasibility to punish has a statistically significant impact on the challenger’s policy choice.
One unit increase in this feasibility variable always leads to a decrease in the challenger’s
level of aggressiveness.225 Although the political feasibility loses its significance when it is
tested in a fully specified model considering all the relevant variables that the rival hypothesis
suggests, the military feasibility holds its significance even after controlling for them. This

225

One unit increase of the military feasibility causes 0.00189 percent decrease and that of the political
feasibility leads to 18.68469 percent decrease in the challenger’s level of aggressiveness.
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result implies that the defender’s military feasibility to punish its potential challenger seeking
the revision of the status quo is one of the main factors that lead to deterrence failure.
Second, the defender’s military feasibility not only has a significant impact on the
challenger’s policy choice but also affects the former’s calculation. While one unit increase
of the military feasibility leads to a decrease in the challenger’s aggressiveness, that increase
brings about an increase in the defender’s aggressiveness in its policy choice. Third, the
defender’s political feasibility to punish its adversary is a statistically significant predictor
for the short-term outcome of the deterrence failure. One unit increase in the defender’s
political feasibility decreases the intensity of violence in the short-term outcome by 23.14604
percent. This finding holds even after it is tested with other control variables.226 Fourth, the
regression analyses do not find any significant variables that influence the long-term outcome
of the deterrence failure except for the contents of the crisis outcome. It was more likely to
experience other crises between the same crisis actors when the deterrence failure crisis had
terminated in stalemate without clear victors.
This significance of the feasibility variable holds after controlling the impact of the
nuclear capability variable. It is the defender’s military feasibility to implement nuclear
punishment, not the possession of the weapons itself, that decreases the challenger’s
aggressiveness in defying against the deterrent threat. When the defender’s economic
openness to the international community increases, which theoretically implies that its
political feasibility to implement nuclear punishment against the challenger has got
decreased, the challenger chose more violent policies. While the defender’s policy choice is
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In the fully specified model, it decreases the violence level of the short-term outcome by 26.44472
percent.
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not affected by the challenger’s nuclear capability, it is greatly influenced by the challenger’s
policy choice. This challenger’s policy choice, however, is mostly caused by the defender’s
military and political feasibility to use nuclear sanctions against the challenger. The
defender’s military feasibility of nuclear punishment continues to matter in deciding the
short-term outcome decreasing its intensity of violence. The analysis fails to find any relevant
factors that influence the long-term outcome of the deterrence failure even with the
consideration of the nuclear capability variable.
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CHAPTER IV
DE-ESCALATION: FRENCH RETREAT DURING THE 1936 RHINELAND CRISIS

The statistical analysis on the population of direct deterrence failure in the previous
chapter confirms that the feasibility of punishment is a relevant factor in explaining the
policy choices of the challenger and the defender as well as the short-term outcome of
deterrence failure crises. On the contrary to the previous Rational and Cognitive Deterrence
models’ prediction, the statistical analysis finds that war is not the most frequent short-term
outcome of the crises. The regression models also confirm that nuclear weapons become a
significant factor only when the defender secures the military and political feasibility to
implement them as a tool for punishment. As emphasized earlier, however, the regression
analyses do not test the impact of the belief updating variable throughout the deterrence
failure crisis, and those findings from the statistical analysis do not show how decisive the
feasibility variable is in causing the crisis actors to choose a certain policy
To address these shortcomings, Chapters 4, 5, and 6 turn to case studies and the
method of process-tracing. The technique helps researchers eliminate as many rival
hypotheses as possible 227 and determine the most relevant independent variable that
determines the value of the dependent variable in the selected case. The following three
chapters test the validity of the feasibility of punishment and the belief updating models
against five cases, namely, the 1936 Rhineland Crisis, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the
227

David Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing,” Political Science and Politics 44, No. 4 (2011): pp.
823-830. See also James Mahoney, “The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences,”
Sociological Methods and Research 41, No.4 (2012): pp. 570-59; and Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey
Checkel, Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytical Tool (Cambridge: Cambridge UP. Selections,
2014).
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1969 Sino-USSR Border Dispute, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the 1982 Falklands War.
As discussed beforehand, this project conducts mini-case studies for the latter three crises
due to unavailability of acquiring sufficient declassified primary sources.
All five case studies ask the same set of questions: (1) Why did the challenger
decide to defy the defender? (2) Why did the defender choose to respond in a particular
way? (3) How did the crisis end? (4) What happened after the crisis termination? (5) Did
possession of nuclear weapons (i.e. their potential/actual use) matter throughout the crisis?
In this chapter, the German and the French policymaking process during the Rhineland
Crisis are closely analyzed based on diplomatic documents and testimonies of political
elites in Berlin and Paris. As neither Germany nor France possessed any nuclear weapons
capabilities in 1936, this chapter focuses on answering the first four questions.

1. Causes of Failure: Why Did Germany Decide to Defy the Rhineland regime?

1-1.

Background of the Crisis: the Rhineland Regime

The Rhineland regime was an outcome of the compromise between resentful France
and the reluctant U.S. and Britain. It was France that suffered the most from the Great War.
Thirty-nine percent of all allied forces’ combat casualties and twenty-nine percent of the
total wounded came from France. 228 Decision-makers in Paris believed that crippling

228

James T. Emmerson, The Rhineland Crisis (London: Maurice Temple Smith, 1977), p. 19.
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Germany permanently229 was the only way to address the “German Question”230 and to
prevent another devastating war in Europe. Washington, however, wanted to solve the
problem by ending the malicious balance-of-power diplomacy and building a new system
of collective security. In this context, Wilson believed that “too much success or security
on the part of Allies will make a genuine peace settlement exceedingly difficult, if not
impossible.”231 London also believed that German revival was necessary to rebuild the
post-War European economy, and to check the emerging threat of Bolshevism from
Russia. 232 This tension between the two camps and the mutual compromise led to the
establishment of the Rhineland regime.
The regime installed a demilitarized zone that extended fifty kilometers to the East
and the West from the Rhine (Map 1). The fact that Rhine River was “the only natural barrier
to another invasion”233 was an important reason for setting this zone. The demilitarized zone
not only made the German military advance towards France or the Low Countries nearly
impossible, but it also left Germany’s west flank unprotected for France and the Little
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Entente countries to create a two-front war for Germany easily. 234 On account of these
specific security considerations behind the establishment of the Rhineland regime, it was
still a direct defensive deterrent attempt for Paris even though the Rhineland was still part
of German territory. In other words, for France, the demilitarized zone was the front line
that it had to protect in order to constrain the German expansion towards the east or the
west, whereas for Germany it was the shackle that needed to be removed first in order to
accomplish its strategic goal of securing Lebensraum, the living space for the German
people.235
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Map 1: The Rhineland Demilitarized Zone236

Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles prescribed a demilitarized zone in the
Rhineland, and article 44 stipulates that a violation of articles 42 and 43 will be considered
as a “hostile act against the Powers signatory of the present Treaty,” and disrupting “the
peace of the world.”237 This article meant that the violation of the treaty was the “equivalent
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to resort to war.”238 Article 44 was confirmed later by the five signatories of the Locarno
Treaty: Italy, Belgium, Britain, France, and Germany.239 The treaty allowed France to take
“immediate action” and receive military assistance from Italy, Belgium, and Britain in case
of a German “flagrant breach” of terms. The Rhineland regime, thus, was built on a threat of
war against Berlin to prevent Germany from challenging it.
However, Germany retained “the most technologically skilled population in Europe”
even after the War, and permanent disarmament of this mighty nation was as much a
fantasy as “the tooth fairy.”240 Since Hitler seized power in 1933, Germany concentrated
its national energy to build up its armed forces at an astonishing pace. In March 1935,
Hitler declared that Germany would reintroduce conscription, which was strictly banned
by the Versailles Treaty.
His next target was to restore full sovereignty over the Rhine. He wanted to
challenge the regime as the demilitarized zone was the “sole remaining major domestic
symbol of Germany’s second-class status.” 241 More importantly, Hitler calculated that
even though the German army would be “considerably stronger” in the spring of 1937,
Germany’s transient strategic superiority over others—France, Britain, and especially
Russia—would be diminished by 1937 because their adversaries had begun their
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rearmament programs in 1935. 242 Furthermore, it seemed clear that German economic
conditions would never be able to sustain the rapid rearmament program as planned.243
Considering its lack of raw materials and scarce level of foreign currency reserves, ad hoc
measures such as currency controls, barter arrangements, and production of synthetic
substitutes under the Four Year Plan would never be enough “to balance the demands made
by the arms buildup.”244 This possibility for unfavorable power shifts in the near future
provided a great motivation to challenge the Rhineland regime as soon as possible so that
Germany could absorb the strategic resources in the area, especially the coal and the
population to consolidate its military power.245
But Hitler’s ambition should have been deterred by the French threat of war that
was supported by other signatories of the Locarno Treaty. What did make him and his staff
members believe that they should challenge the regime despite the French deterrent threat?
Was it because Berlin was a determined aggressor and very resolved to revise the status
quo risking a war as Rational and Cognitive Deterrence models predict? Or, was it because
German policymakers were not ready to start a war but estimated that France would not
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react violently given the latter’s military, political, or normative infeasibility to punish
German defiance? `

1-2.

Who Was Responsible for the Choice to Remilitarize the Rhineland?

Before we move on and discuss the rationale behind Berlin’s decision to challenge
the Rhineland regime, it is necessary to identify who was responsible for this decision
among policymakers in Germany. According to Emmerson, it was barely four weeks
before the actual execution of the remilitarizing operation that Hitler started to discuss the
matter with his staff members openly.246 Weinberg points out that the actual consultation
with his advisers occurred around Christmas 1935 at the latest.247 Regardless of the actual
timing for initiation of the group discussion in Berlin, unclassified diplomatic records show
that a very handful number of political and military elites were involved in the decisionmaking process. They were the Führer Hitler, Commander in Chief (of the Luftwaffe, or
Air Force) Göring, Propaganda Minister Goebbels, Ambassador (Plenipotentiary at Large)
Ribbentrop, Foreign Minister Neurath, State Secretary Bülow, War Minister Blomberg,
Commander in Chief (of the Army) Fritsch, Ambassador (in Italy) Hassell, and
Ambassador (in France) Forster.248
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We now know that it was Hitler and Neurath249 who consistently upheld the policy
choice of the coup against the Rhineland regime betting on French inaction, or at best
economic sanctions. Ribbentrop was also supportive, but he was a yes-man, “enthusiastic
echo-chamber” and the alter ego to Hitler.250 Fritsch agreed with the plan under the condition
of not involving any hostilities 251 . Ambassadors Hassell and Forster’s role was mainly
limited to providing Hitler with up-to-date information on Rome and Paris. Meanwhile,
Göring was “terrified by the Chancellor’s decision”252 and Blomberg hesitated to support the
path and later on proposed partial withdrawal of troops in the demilitarized zone.253 In this
regard, it was Hitler who sat on the driver’s seat, and Neurath provided confidence to the
Führer sitting in the passenger seat throughout the crisis.
We should take note that, at the end of the day, it was Hitler who was in charge.
Testimonies of German political and military elites at the Nuremberg war crimes trial
repeatedly confirm Hitler’s extremely authoritative communication style. Since Hitler
became the head of state, debates in the cabinet were “stopped altogether.” The ministers
were “not allowed to feel that they were political ministers” and “large-scale political
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decisions were certainly made by him [Hitler] alone.”254 It was difficult for his staff to
suggest any opinion during the cabinet meetings as Hitler takes over “the entire discussion
and to exhaust the subject entirely from his point of view.”255 Coming back to the subject
again after his long sermon, of course, was a very onerous task. If an adviser wanted to
present a second opinion to Hitler, he should do so in private since opposing a superior in
rank was “unbearable” to the Führer.256 Most staff in the Reich Cabinet were not even
informed of the march towards the Rhineland until it happened. 257 For example, von
Manstein, Chief of the General Staff at the headquarters of Wehrkreis III, had been given
only afternoon time to complete the preparation order for the remilitarizing operation
which was supposed to happen the next morning.258
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1-3.

Hitler’s Rationale: Betting on French Non-violent Reactions

Considering that it was Hitler who was ultimately responsible for the German
decision to send troops to the demilitarized zone, it is important to determine what he knew
before making this decision and what information was crucial for him during the process
to understand the rationale behind his policy choice. As Hitler killed himself before the fall
of Berlin, he left neither memoirs nor testimonies at the Nuremberg trial. Fortunately,
Ambassador Hassell sent a report about his meeting with the Führer on the Rhineland issue
to Foreign Minister Neurath on February 14, 1936, to help the Minister compete with his
rivals by having the information on Hitler’s thinking ahead,259 and left memorandum to
record his second interview with Hitler on February 20, 1936. 260 Arguably, these two
documents are almost everything that we have now which can be used to analyze Hitler’s
reasoning behind his decision to send troops to the demilitarized zone on March 7, 1936.
On February 14, During the first interview between Ambassador Hassell and Hitler,
the Führer first said the French ratification of the Franco-Soviet Pact would provide
grounds for denouncing the Locarno Treaty and the Rhineland regime. He first believed
that the right timing for remilitarizing the Rhine would be around the spring of 1937 when
the German army would become substantially stronger, and Russo-Japanese conflict would
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add a further favorable context. Hitler, however, changed his mind and argued that the coup
against the regime should occur as soon as the Soviet Pact gets ratified even though
Germany was still weak and militarily “not yet ready.” His rationale behind this judgment
was as follows.
First, other parties, especially Russia, had embarked on the rearmament program,
and they would become stronger as well by 1937. Second, Russia currently has no intention
to have any conflict with the West; Great Britain is “in a bad state militarily” as well as
distracted by other problems; France is disturbed by serious domestic political issues. Third,
public opinion in Britain and France is also not very sympathetic to the Russian Pact, which
should be regarded as the German advantage. Based on these observations, he concluded
that dispatching troops to the demilitarized zone would not “be answered by military action
– though perhaps by economic sanctions.”261
The second discussion followed on February 20, 1936. In the morning, Hassell met
Italian Ambassador to Berlin Attolico and confirmed that Italy was prepared to break away
from the Locarno obligations. After this meeting, he went to Neurath, who again predicted
that other powers would not militarily retaliate against the German challenge. But the
Foreign Minister was concerned about the negative implications of the remilitarization for
German foreign relations, especially with Britain which was preparing for “working
agreement” among London, Berlin, and Paris. Hassell replied that he was also worried
about possible shifts in Rome’s position with regard to the Locarno Treaty given that Italy
was less likely to receive intensified economic sanctions led by Britain. Then both Hassell
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and Neurath visited the Führer around 12:15 PM and found that Ribbentrop was there as
well. In this meeting, Hitler replied to their concerns by emphasizing the below five points.
First, it is important to remember that the Rhineland regime could become “a sort
of inviolable institution” as time goes by. Second, Italy’s recent military success in Ethiopia
would harden London’s foreign policy against Rome. Third, Mussolini would not seek
compromise with Britain after his success in Ethiopia. Fourth, given that the two Fascist
states encircled by democratic regimes “tainted by Bolshevism,” passivity could not be the
right path in the long run and “attack […] was the better strategy.” Fifth, to address the
negative ramification of German coup for its relations with other states, it is important to
“deprive” Locarno powers of the possibility of acting against Berlin. Hitler, thus,
underscores the necessity of simultaneously offering series of peace treaties, such as reestablishment of demilitarized zone on both France/Belgium and German sides, ThreePower Western air pact, and long-term non-aggression pact with France.262
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1-4.

The Origin of the German Challenge: Testing Rival and Research

Hypotheses

Hitler’s nine points emphasized in Hassell’s reports provide crucial evidence that
allows us to test rival and research hypotheses of this project. As discussed in the previous
chapters, Rational and Cognitive Deterrence literature predicts that direct deterrence can
only fail when the challenger is as resolute as the defender. The factors decide the former’s
level of resolve are (1) probability of victory in war, (2) level of interest at stake, (3) war
cost, (4) audience/reputational costs for not challenging the status quo, and (5)
cultural/historical hostility. Direction and degree of these variables would determine the
challenger’s policy choice: the more resolved the challenger is the more aggressive policies
(from gradual escalation to rapid escalation) it would choose in defying the defender’s
direct deterrent threat. It seems possible, thus, to argue that the failure of the French direct
defensive deterrence against Germany in March 1936 was because Hitler was a determined
aggressor.
Specifically, first, Hitler calculated that an unfavorable power shift might occur in
spring of 1937 due to rearmament programs in Britain and Russia and he decided to
challenge the Rhineland regime in early 1936 when the power balance was still
advantageous to Germany to increase the probability of victory in a possible war. Second,
as the Führer emphasized that denouncing the regime was necessary for restoring full
sovereignty of Germany, the demilitarized zone was framed as “loss” than “gains” for
German people, which should have made the policy circle in Berlin more risk-acceptant.
Third, thanks to its rapid rearmament and military modernization programs, especially its
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mechanized ground forces and Air Force squadrons manufactured by the latest technology,
Hitler thought the Reich troops could quickly repel forces of Locarno Powers without
sacrificing too much German blood. Lastly, due to what happened during the interwar
period, such as the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, Germans hated the French.
Berlin, in this regard, was an extremely resolved challenger which was why France’s
credible deterrent threat failed.
Indeed, there is some truth in this argument. However, archive evidence does not
support this explanation of the rival hypothesis based on Rational and Cognitive Deterrence
theories, hence, the hypothesis fails to survive the smoking gun, the hoop, and the strawin-the-winds tests.
First, according to Hassell, Hitler precisely stated on February 14 that he decided
to move up the timing of the remilitarizing the Rhineland from the spring of 1937 to early
March 1936 because of two reasons: (1) 1937 would be more disadvantageous for Germany
in terms of relative military balance; and (2) Russia, Britain, and France was not prepared
to punish German violation in early 1936. 263 As the first reason fits well with the prediction
of the rival hypothesis, it seems that the explanation should pass the smoking gun test. In
addition to these two points, however, the Führer pointed out that Reich was still “not yet
ready” for a general war in Europe in 1936. Hitler, thus, was not very confident that
Germany could win a great war in Europe if it broke out in 1936. In other words, his
rationale inclined to the high likelihood of non-action of his adversaries rather than that of
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the German victory in a general war against Locarno Powers. The rival hypothesis, thus,
fails to pass the smoking gun test.
Second, a famous quote from Hitler suggests that the rival hypothesis fails to survive
the straw-in-the-wind test either. He said during his Berchtesgaden speech on February 12,
1938, that “when we entered the Rhineland with a handful of battalions, I risked a lot. If
France had marched then, we would have had to withdraw, perhaps about 60 kilometers;
even then we would have held them.” We should not take his remarks at face value as the
Führer always sought to impress his listeners by using hyperbole. But it is not difficult to
confirm that this remark tells some level of truth considering that Hitler hesitated at the last
moment before ordering his troops to march on the demilitarized zone by asking his adjutant
Colonel Hossbach to find out at what moment it would become impossible to call off the
operation.264
Lastly, if the rival hypothesis is valid, Germany must have a detailed war plan to
defeat French and other signatory powers’ forces. Four army corps and 13 infantry
divisions were alerted when Hitler sent his 19 infantry battalions and 13 artillery units to
the demilitarized zone, and he issued specific defensive schemes to three battalions among
– Aachen, Trier, and Saabrücken – in case French troops advanced to the zone.265 Navy fleets
and air force squadrons were also relocated in preparation for contingencies.266 Arguably,
however, this is far from a plan for a full-scale war against Locarno powers. It is merely a
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defensive plan for a possible contingency. The focus of the military planning, as explained
more in detail in the following paragraphs, is not on preparing for war but on carefully
designing the formation of troops to make them seem non-aggressive and symbolic. The rival
hypothesis, in this regard, fails to survive the hoop test and thus should be rejected.
On the contrary, the research hypothesis argues that direct deterrence can fail even
when the challenger is not a resolved aggressor, but the defender’s deterrent threat is regarded
non-credible because of the latter’s infeasibility to follow through on its threat. This problem
of infeasible punishment occurs when (1) geographic obstacles, (2) domestic regime
instability, (3) normative constraints, or (4) unsupportive alliance partners prevent the
defender from imposing punishments against the challenger. Hitler, thus, decided to defy the
Rhineland regime not because he could and would like to revise the status quo risking a war,
but it seemed highly likely that Germany could get away with punishments of France and
other signatories of the Locarno Treaty.
This argument passes the smoking gun test because, as discussed earlier, the central
reason for Hitler’s decision to renounce the Rhineland regime in early 1936 was his
expectation of non-actions in Russia, Britain, Italy, and France.267 What did Hitler know
about the strategic context that Germany was facing in February 1936? What did lead him to
predict that Locarno powers would not violently react to German violation of the treaty?
First, the Führer was aware of the weakness in the Soviet military power. 268 His
military attaché in the Soviet Union reported that tremendous works should be done,
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especially “in the spheres of the armaments industry and transport,” for Russia to have
some offensive capability. The Russian policy of peace and security, thus, was recognition
that “they are not yet capable of attack.” 269 This estimation about the Soviet military
readiness was not a sole personal opinion of the German military attaché in Moscow. Many
British political elites, including King George V, First Lord of the Admiralty Monsell, and
War Minister Cooper, also emphasized that Russia presented no military threat to Germany
as they were “poor in military matters” and could “at best be set in motion eastwards.”270
Second, it seemed obvious that Italy would no longer side with Stresa powers271 as
long as London tries to thwart Italian success in Ethiopia. Hitler vigorously sought to secure
the endorsement from Rome that the Locarno obligations would not bind Italy.
Ambassador Hassell did not fail him on this. Italians were most grateful for Germany’s
non-participation in the British-led economic sanctions, and many influential elites in
Rome expressed that “the Stresa structure today certainly no longer corresponds to the
Italian ideal.”272 Mussolini himself declared that “Stresa was dead” and Italy “by no means
wished to return to Stresa.” 273 He confirmed that the world would not witness “any
diplomatic or political opposition by Italy if Germany were to denounce the Locarno

of the most important security apparatus could trigger violent reactions from Moscow considering that
the crisis could be regarded as the first testing ground for newly established alliance partnership.
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Pact”274 and Rome “would not participate in any counter-reaction which might be called
forth by a German reaction to the ratification [of the Franco-Soviet Pact].”275
Third, Hitler believed that it would be difficult for London to come to Paris’ aid
due to the domestic opposition the British government faced. Policymakers in London
rejected the view that Britain should rigidly adhere to treaty obligations 276 and British
public opinion was refusing to support the French attempt to transform the League of
Nations into a one-sided organization opposing Germany.277 The Foreign Secretary Eden
clarified that none of the Anglo-French negotiations were to oblige London to defend Paris
over the German-French frontier. 278 This unfriendly response was possibly due to
“widespread annoyance about French unreliability” in London as French behaviors over
the Mediterranean crisis disappointed British people.279 The guiding idea of British foreign
policy, thus, was far from supporting France to the end but avoiding being “drawn into war
with Germany again” in any circumstances.280 Great Britain rather wanted Germany to “be
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brought back into an international system for securing peace,”281 and tried to construct
German-British-French cooperation.282
Also, the Führer knew that London was in “a bad state” of military readiness.283 The
British Ambassador in Berlin verified this by stating that the British Air Force base was
located at “too great a distance to be able, if necessary, to intervene in the event of Britain
having to fulfill her obligation to render assistance against Germany.” 284 This statement
implied that London was not only reluctant to be bound by Locarno obligations but also
failed to maintain sufficient power projection capabilities to support France when Paris
needed to level up her coercion against Germany or punish Berlin for its attempts to revise
the status quo.
Lastly, and most importantly, Hitler kept abreast of French domestic politics and
learned that Paris would face severe political opposition at home in punishing German coup
against the Rhineland Regime. The French government warned Germany many times that
there is a strong political consensus in the French government to stand firm against any
German provocation.285 It was, however, confirmed by French Foreign Minister Laval that
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the French public opinion was willing to fight only for the “defense of French soil” and
opposing “under all circumstances, to military action beyond their frontiers.”286
Furthermore, although it is not clear whether Neurath shared this report with
Hitler,287 Aschmann, Chief of the Foreign Ministry’s Press Division, wrote a report that very
accurately understood what was going on in Paris regarding the Rhineland issue. In this
report, he pointed out that French politicians passed the buck to the Army General Staff when
it came to the preparation of countermeasures for possible German coup in the demilitarized
zone. Military leaders, on the other hand, divided into two groups: one that saw no strategic
value in the Rhineland regime due to extraordinary advancement in military motorization,
and the other that believed the necessity to maintain the zone until France’s defensive
garrisons, such as fortifications along the Maginot Line, were improved. Under this disunity
in the French government, Aschmann predicted that “one is neither ready nor willing
unhesitatingly to go to war over the eventuality of a German reoccupation [underlined in the
original text].”288
All the above mentioned documentary evidence proves that Hitler was aware of
political and military obstacles that France and other Locarno powers were facing, which
should make it not very feasible for them to punish German violation of the treaty. Hitler
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precisely linked this strategic context with his decision to advance his plan by one year and
challenged the Rhineland regime on March 7, 1936. The research hypothesis, thus, survives
the smoking gun test.
The hypothesis based on the feasibility model also survives the hoop test. If it was
because of the expected infeasibility of France and other signatories of Locarno Treaty to
follow through on their threat, Germany should have exerted every effort to make it more
infeasible, or at least keep it as difficult as it was, for Locarno powers to punish Berlin’s
defiance against the status quo. Emmerson shows that Berlin took exactly this path and
worked along the line for three weeks before the remilitarization of the Rhineland.289
Germany did not participate in the economic sanctions imposed by the League of
Nations and kept open Italy’s economic supply line. By doing so, Berlin sought to buy
support from Italy. The German foreign office, Auswärtiges Amt, tried to make BritishGerman relations appear as cooperative as possible by following-up the bilateral naval
agreements and suggesting air pact negotiations. As mentioned earlier in Hassell’s report
on February 20290, Hitler himself spelled out his scheme to simultaneously offer the most
comprehensive peace treaties ever suggested by Reich when German troops marched into
the Rhineland to maximize the opportunity cost of punishing Germany and subsequently
made it politically very costly for Locarno powers to choose that route.
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Besides, Berlin worked out a very precise method in challenging the regime:
creating fait accompli but making it a non-flagrant violation. Hitler sent infantry battalions
and artillery units, a total of 22,000 men, to the demilitarized zone on March 7, 1936.
Emmerson underscores that Hitler renounced the regime by not simply incorporating the
police forces (Landespolizei) already within the zone into the army and declaring it, but
sending the considerable number of army forces. Subsequently, to coerce the withdrawal of
these troops, France should also mobilize the appropriate level of forces. However, the Reich
troops were purposely not armed with offensive weapons such as tanks and bombers. This
move made it very difficult to proclaim that the casus foederis was satisfied and France was
authorized to take immediate retaliation while receiving military support from the treaty
signatories.291
All these carefully prepared diplomatic and military measures indicate that Hitler
bet on the high likelihood that Italy, Britain, and the Soviet Union would not come to
France’s aid in punishing German attempts to renounce the Rhineland regime and France
could not do much if Paris should shoulder the burden all by herself. Again, his rationale
behind the choice of defying the French deterrent threat lay not in his confidence in
achieving a rapid and easy military victory over Locarno powers, but in renouncing the
regime at a very little cost or avoiding any punishment. Hitler was not a determined
aggressor in spring 1936, but the French direct deterrence failed anyhow.
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2. Conditions for Choice: Why Did France Decide to De-escalate?

2-1.

The French Expectation of the German Challenge

The first warning found in diplomatic documents about the possibility of a German
coup against the Rhineland regime is War Minister Daladier’s note to French foreign office
on September 4, 1933. He believed that the German reoccupation of the demilitarized zone
would deeply jeopardize “the foundation of our national defense.”292
By that time, growing worries about the rapid re-emergence of German power was
widespread in the French military. The second rise of Germany was much more alarming
considering that French military capabilities had got seriously deteriorated in the 1930s.
Under the cumulative budget cut in defense spending from 1932 to 1935, the French army
was short of modern equipment and merely maintaining offensive capabilities of
“mothballed World War I leftovers” and “canvas relics.”293 The unfortunate state of the
French military led its leadership to come up with “Plan D,” series of precautionary
measures before general mobilization that allowed the deployment of the “covering units”
in 23 days 294 because any punishment measure required a major recall of reserves under
this condition.
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In 1935, Paris started to predict that the German renouncement of the Rhineland
regime was imminent. On March 22, 1935, theFrench High Military Committee discussed
the likelihood of abolishing the demilitarized zone. In April, War Minister Maurin stated
that the Locarno regime had effectively disappeared as soon as Germany built “the
strongest military power in Europe.” Foreign Minister Laval warned that in case Paris
failed to respond appropriately to German violation of the Rhineland regime, France would
lose all her allies and suffer “German peace.”295 Hitler’s speech on May 21, 1935, which
argued that “the military alliance between France and Russia” would result “an element of
legal insecurity has [without doubt] brought into the Locarno Pact,”296 proved right about
this general fear in Paris and informed that Berlin would use the Soviet Pact as a pretext
for their challenge.
In January 1936, General Colson, General Gamelin’s deputy, asserted that
Germany could “place France brutally before at a fait accompli” by simply declaring the
incorporation of the Landespolizei into the German army.297 On March 2, French military
intelligence office Deuxième Bureau advised that France would face a fait accompli in the
Rhineland as soon as the ratification of the Franco-Soviet Pact in the Chamber and these
German forces would not withdraw unless they were defeated in a battle.298
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All these documentary evidence indicate that French policymakers had ample time
of discussion, at least a year, before the actual German challenge against the Rhineland
regime on March 7, 1936. What did they know about the strategic environment that France
was facing in 1936? Which factors led different groups within the policy circle in Paris to
come up with different countermeasures against the German coup? Which explanation for
the rationale behind French policy choice of retreat does survive when it is tested against
the documentary evidence?

2-2.

The February Meetings in 1936: “No Isolated Action”

According to the note published by the French Foreign Office on February 1, 1936,
Quai d’Orsay believed that the organization and development of Landespolizei in the
Rhineland had already violated the Locarno Treaty. The Foreign Office, however, could
not actively respond to Berlin’s piecemeal violation of the treaty because it had the
impression that Britain did not want to open this debate prematurely. 299 The lukewarm
attitude of London was crucially worrisome for French policymaking as they interpreted
that the Locarno Treaty obliged Paris to take the issue of German violation to the League
of Nations. It was too risky, thus, to make it an international issue without British blessing.
The Foreign Office thought, in this regard, Paris should prepare for the possibility of direct
German challenge against the zone by formulating precautionary or retaliatory measures
in advance. As these measures were considered a “technical problem (problèm technique),”
Quai d’Orsay requested the Ministry of War to submit proposals regarding the matter.
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Meanwhile, the office reviewed the viability of imposing an economic sanction against
Berlin, which dropped from further consideration due to enormous damage it would cause
to the members of the League in general.300
In reply to the Foreign Office, War Minister Maurin anticipated that Berlin would
attempt to renounce the Rhineland regime within the time zone from the spring of 1936 to
the beginning of 1937 under the pretext of the ratification of the Franco-Russian Pact.
Imposing a fait accompli, he added, should not be a problem for Germany as Landespolizei
was ready to be incorporated into the regular army and many barracks in the demilitarized
zone were in good condition and ready to be used at once. General Maurin suggested
possible countermeasures that Paris could take in case of German coup against the
Rhineland regime: (1) political measures – reporting German violation to the League; and
(2) military measures – setting up active troops nearby the border and preparing for
interruption of the German communications.301
Foreign Minister Flandin agreed that Paris should immediately appeal to the League
if the Reich reoccupied the demilitarized zone and the French Army should do whatever
seemed necessary for the defense of national security. He, however, underlined that Paris
should provide not only retaliatory plans against German violations but also precautionary
measures to discourage Hitler from engaging in such provocative actions.302
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War Minister Maurin, then, responded that even in the case Germany sent regular
troops to the demilitarized zone and fortified garrisons there, it would be against French
national interest if Paris repelled the Reich army and forcefully reoccupied the zone. This
military move should make France appear an aggressor. He emphasized that any military
measure should be applied only with the full support of London and in close consultation
with other Locarno powers and the League. Under this condition, he suggested four steps
of mobilizations specified in the “Plan D” (mesures d’alerte, alerte renforcée, sureté, and
couverture) to prevent enemy penetration further into the French territory. In the long run,
he recommended the French government should invest its national efforts in perfecting
French defensive organizations, reinforcing the density of French forces, and developing
manufacture capability that could provide the army with necessary materials.303
Flandin replied to Maurin, complaining that he was not answering his question. The
Foreign Minister again explained the difference between “reactionary measures of longterm rearmament plan (des ripostes sur le plan de réarmement, à échéances lointaines)”
and “precautionary measure that Paris can take immediately (précaution qui pourraient
être prises immédiatement),” and emphasized that what he asked for was the latter.
Maurin’s letter, however, did not say anything about the measures Paris could take to
“coerce Berlin to back down (intimider l’adversaire ou pour le faire reculer).” And he
corrected Maurin’s error by pointing out that France did not have the right to reoccupy the
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zone anyway under the Locarno Treaty. Paris was only authorized to make recourse to the
League.304
It seems clear that Flandin failed to read between the lines in Maurin’s letter. The
War Minister was implying that it was not possible to prevent Germany from doing what
Berlin wanted within her borders,305 and it would be detrimental for French interest if Paris
took immediate measures to repel the Reich forces in the demilitarized zone. That was why
he emphasized the importance of working closely with Britain and other Locarno Powers
as well as reinforcing the French defensive capability by recalling reserves following the
four steps of Plan D to discourage further penetration of German forces beyond the border.
We could infer this from the fact that the Ministers of Navy, Air Force, and Army
Chief of Staff thoroughly discussed possible precautionary measures for compelling
Germany to retreat. They emphasized the necessity in the presence of troops of Locarno
Powers, such as Britain, in France’s northeastern border. Along with French air forces, the
Ministers of National Defense also believed that British Air Force squadrons and Royal
Navy fleets could be used to demonstrate the resolve of the signatories of the Locarno
Treaty. 306 After all, however, they concluded that these measures would not obtain
evacuation of the Reich forces. 307 If so, what really could be done against German
remilitarization of the Rhineland was either (1) immediately and forcefully driving out
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Reich forces from the zone with the blessing of Locarno Powers yet still risking a general
war against Germany; or (2) holding fast the defensive lines along the border and bringing
the issue to the League. Maurin supported the second path. Flandin, on the other hand,
believed there was a third way: German retreat from the zone caused by a demonstration
of strong and united resolve of the Locarno powers.
In the end, the cabinet meeting on February 27, 1936, decided to take “no isolated
action (aucune action isolée).” While it was confirmed that French Government reserved
the right to take any preparatory measures, including military ones, Paris decided to
communicate with the British, Belgian and Italian Governments immediately to organize
joint action following the League of Nations pact and the Locarno Treaty. The French
policymakers made this decision about a week before the crisis, and Paris exactly followed
the path when Hitler finally sent German troops to the demilitarized zone on March 7, 1936.

2-3.

The Cabinet Meetings on March 8 and 9, 1936: Politicians vs. Military

Leaders

As German forces unexpectedly marched into the Rhineland on Saturday morning,
the first cabinet meeting could only be held the next day in the morning. Multiple sources
confirmed that there were numerous ministerial-level meetings in Paris from March 8 to
11, 1936. Unfortunately, the absence of formal records and non-chronological descriptions
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in the testimonies of French policymakers at the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry308
make it quite challenging to figure out what happened during the first post-crisis
deliberation week in the French government.309 In this regard, this section constructs the
rationale of key decision-makers of French policymakers by cross-checking their memoirs
and testimonies at the Parliament. As it is generally agreed in the literature, and
demonstrated in the pre-crisis discussion in Paris as well, that French military leaders were
not eager to follow through on the threat whereas French politicians were resolved to take
the punishment path. 310 The following paragraphs review and compare the position of
Pierre É tienne Flandin (Foreign Minister), Joseph Paul-Boncour (Minister of State and
Permanent Delegate to the League of Nations), Albert Sarraut (Prime Minister), Louis
Maurin (Minister of War), and Maurice Gamelin (Army Chief of Staff).
Flandin argues that he had advocated the immediate punishment route only to be
confronted by reluctant Ministers of National Defense and their staff in February 1936.
War Minister informed the cabinet that the French military had been entirely prepared for
defensive missions and lacking any offensive assets needed for such military operations
Flandin suggested. When the Foreign Minister asked for the possibility of blocking German
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ports of Bremen and Hamburg, Minister of Marine responded that it was infeasible without
the support of the British navy. Then Minister of Air claimed that any aerial bombardment
operation would cause devastating results as the German Air Force would penetrate the
French anti-aircraft defense and consequently, imperil lives of civilians. The military
leadership, however, did not commit to addressing this issue except for reporting this
embarrassing state of the French army, Flandin complained. 311
He describes that the cabinet meeting after the German coup against the Rhineland
regime on March 7 was in “lamentable disarray (lamentable désarroi).” British
government urged Paris not to take any action until Locarno powers convened. Minister of
War proclaimed that Paris required general mobilization for intervening in the zone
militarily. Other ministers cried out that “General mobilization six weeks before the
election? It is madness!” French public opinion, both right and left, was also against
immediate action. Only four members in the cabinet were in favor of immediate military
action: Sarraut, Mandel (Minister of Posts, Telegraphs, and Telephones), Paul-Boncour,
and himself. Flandin admitted that immediate military action should involve internal and
external difficulties, but he criticized that other cabinet members did not take into
consideration the importance of inflicting a failure on Hitler. The council concluded that
France should seize the League and secure support from London by not taking any
immediate military measures.312
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Paul-Boncour tells a similar story. He argued that the purpose of the Rhineland
clause in the Treaties of Versailles and Locarno was precisely for allowing immediate
action in case of German violation. If France was obliged, by the treaties, to bring the issue
to the League before taking any action, it is reversing the order of operation and would
endanger the League to confront the fait accompli. He acknowledged that it would be
imprudent to decide against the will of Britain, but he was certain that London would
respect the treaty obligation and walk with Paris. 313 Unfortunately, it was only Mandel,
Flandin, and himself who supported the immediate military action in the cabinet
meeting. 314 As Flandin did, Paul-Boncour also criticized that this was because Maurin
demanded the blank check of total mobilization, without providing any detailed
information on the size and nature of Reich troops in the Rhineland, to take any military
action against the German challenge. Ministers at the cabinet meeting were frightened and
failed to realize the fatal consequence of the remilitarization that paralyzed the French
alliance relationship with Poland and Czechoslovakia.315
Sarraut also testifies that Flandin and Paul-Boncour advocated delivering military
riposte along with appealing to the League of Nations and he was all the more in agreement
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with them. 316 However, the majority of cabinet members were reluctant to disregard
London’s request to a concert with Britain before taking any military actions and were
skeptical about whether there was casus foederis. Locarno Treaty stipulated that “invasion”
or “a flagrant violation of the demilitarized zone” as the condition for authorizing
immediate military action against the challenger. More seriously, Chiefs of Staff warned
the cabinet that any military action in the zone might lead to war. 317 The international
community would blame France if war broke out after Paris blindly launching an offensive
operation without consulting other signatories. Of course, Minster of War’s request for a
general mobilization played an important role in discouraging cabinet members from
supporting the immediate military action, this fear of being stigmatized as an aggressor and
an initiator of another major war had a significant impact as well according to Sarraut.
Enormous pressure from the public opinion that unanimously clamored for “Above all, no
war!” was also a great obstacle to following through on the deterrent threat.
In sum, Flandin, Paul-Boncour, and Sarraut all agree that it was the French military
leadership that was responsible for Paris’ choice not to take any immediate military
measures after the deterrence failure. Although they emphasize different aspects of the
military leaders’ arguments – Maurin’s call for total mobilization (according to Flandin
and Paul-Boncour) versus General Staff’s warning of an outbreak of war (according to
Sarraut) –, Ministers of National Defense demonstrated clear lukewarmness taking
unilateral military riposte and this was a major blow to cabinet member’s support for the
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immediate action. Although Maurin and Gamelin assert that it was “coverage level
(Mesures de couverture)” not a total mobilization, 318 they do not deny they were not
supportive of the route of immediate military action.319 Why did they take such a passive
and hesitant approach? What was their rationale? We will test the rival and research
hypotheses in the following section and compare the explanatory power of deterrence
theories and the feasibility of punishment and belief updating models that this dissertation
suggests.

2-4.

The Origin of the French Retreat: Testing Rival and Research Hypotheses

The Rhineland Crisis is absolutely anomaly to rational and cognitive deterrence
theories. The defender should be resolute in the direct deterrence situation where their
national security is at stake. The defender pays enormous audience costs if it backs down
from its commitment to protecting its people and territory. The logic of vengeance and
“loss aversion” also would not allow the defender to acquiesce in the revision of the status
quo. The defender, thus, would not take the de-escalation route, and the level of war cost
or the probability of victory in war would decide the degree of escalation. If Paris took the
limited escalation path or non-violent punishment route such as economic sanctions, the
deterrence theories would still be able to explain it: France chose gradual escalation
strategy in fear of defeat in the war against Germany. However, Paris decided not to take

318

319

Les événements, IV, 907; Maurice Gamelin, Servir: Le Prologue du drame, 1930-août 1939, Vol. II
(Paris: Plon, 1946), 2003.
Les événements, IV, p. 909.

156

any “isolated action,” yet in effect, they chose the non-action route. This French reaction
is difficult to be explained by rational and cognitive deterrence theories.
As discussed in the previous section, diplomatic records and testimonies of
decision-makers in Paris during the Crisis consistently attest that it was military leadership
that was reluctant to take any immediate military measure, and thus mainly responsible for
French policy choice of non-action. According to the new theory of deterrence failure, this
dissertation suggests, this tepidness in the French military should come either from (1) nonfeasibility of punishment or (2) belief updating. In other words, military elites wanted to
deliver military riposte against German violation of the Locarno Treaty but could not
recommend this option as they were aware of the absence of any military assets that were
ready to be projected to the demilitarized zone. Alternatively, this might be due to their
fear that Berlin was a determined aggressor given that it challenged against France’s
credible deterrent threat.
First, the feasibility model passes the smoking gun test. According to Sarraut’s
testimony, what ultimately prevented him from taking the immediate military measure was
“the incapacity or unpreparedness of the military instrument at our disposal for the
immediate act (les inaptitudes ou les impréparations de l’instrument militaire à notre
disposition pour le geste immediate).”320 After the cabinet meetings on March 8 and 9,
Sarraut wanted to press further on the isolated military riposte. Accordingly, he gathered
only Ministers of National Defense, and not any of civilian cabinet members, on the
evening of March 9. Sarraut insisted that if France succeeded and defeated Hitler’s bold
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move, Britain and Belgium would thank Paris, and he believed that this limited
expeditionary or “a military police operation (une opération de police militaire)”321 would
quickly cross the border and push back Reich forces without risking a general war. Then,
War Minister Maurin replied as follows.

Impossible! Our army is an army designed for the defense behind fortified stronghold, the
Maginot Line, and has no independent units like the one you are saying. As the active forces
and the reserve forces are tightly connected, it is impossible to detach some elements from the
whole without disrupting it. Any attempt to use a unit more than its function as a part of the
machine will cause stress to this coherent and organic mechanism. Everything fits! So if you
want to do something, you have to order a mobilization, whichever operation you are thinking
of: taking something as hostage or entering the Rhineland. We must mobilize immediately,
even for simply holding something in pledge, several ranks, and about a million and a half
troops. However, we should use caution when anticipating the reaction of a powerful adversary,
possibly a war. It is necessary to consider the implementation of the general mobilization
without delay. [emphasis added]322

Maurin emphasized that the French army was lacking any expeditionary forces for
immediate military action against Germany. Gamelin also asserted a similar point by
suggesting that air force might be the only effective asset that France could turn to for any
offensive operation.323 They were both claiming that the French army was designed for
defense as exemplified in the Maginot Line. Building small and agile forces for the
offensive mission was unnecessary because advancing beyond the fortified defense line
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after spending billions of francs on constructing the line was an “absurd idea” according to
Maurin.324 Considering the enormous advantage in defense manifested during World War
I and continued sharp budget cuts in military spending after the Depression, it is not easy
to criticize him.
Sarraut lamented to have “brave enough, but obsessed and contaminated for too
long by a purely defensive conception of the military system”325 as the War Minister. He
excoriated Maurin for reconstructing the French army in a way that left “nothing in hand
to undertake an immediate and determined action.”326 His reformulation of the military
units forced Sarraut to use “a hammer to strike a fly” or to put the hammer in a way which
to make it “too heavy and too dangerous to handle, without killing the fly [emphasized in
the source].” As this is specifically Sarraut’s rationale why the evening ministerial meeting
on March 9 ended up with the choice of no immediate military action, the feasibility
hypothesis survives the smoking gun test.
Second, the belief updating model survives the hoop and smoking gun tests. If the
model is correct, the French military must believe that war should break out once the
French army marched into the Rhineland. As mentioned earlier, French Ministers of
National Defense repeatedly demonstrated their serious concerns for the possibility of war
in case Paris decided to deliver military riposte against Germany. In fact, during the Chiefs
of Staff meeting on March 8, Gamelin argued that as soon as the French army entered the
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area, a war would ensue. 327 When Paul-Boncour mentioned at the cabinet meeting on
March 9 that French recalling of the available should constitute a threat that might lead to
Hitler’s retreat, Maurin rejected this possibility as dictators would hardly back down. He,
subsequently, believed that the French choice of immediate military action should
inevitably cause war.328 He added that precisely the weakness in French antiaircraft defense
(défense contre les aéronefs or D.C.A.) caused him not to be very positive about the idea
of punishing Germany militarily.329 According to Sarraut, whenever Ministers of National
Defense asked for general mobilization in the discussion of taking immediate military
measures against Berlin, their rationale was the risk of war.330 All this evidence shows that
the belief updating model survives the hoop test.
More importantly, the explanation also passes the smoking gun test. In the note
published by Chiefs of Staff on February 19, 1936, they underscore that even combined
forces of the British and French Army and Navy would not constitute a sufficient condition
for obtaining Reich’s evacuation in the Rhineland. What lay behind this pessimistic view
was that Berlin “passed the Rubicon at its own risk (passait le Rubicon à ses risques et
périls).” In this context, they recommend that the first line of action should focus on
“political measures” in response to a German violation of the Locarno Treaty. This record
clearly shows that belief updating logic was working among military elites in Paris: given
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that Berlin challenged the treaty risking violent response from France, it would be highly
likely that Germany was a resolved revisionist.
The French military leadership might be exaggerating the risk even though they did
not genuinely believe the actual likelihood of war. For example, Jackson points out that,
since Germany started to rearm its forces rapidly under the leadership of Hitler, the French
high command constantly inflated the German threat and distorted intelligence to serve
their agenda: securing enough defense expenditure for rearmament and modernization of
French military. Although French Army, Air Force, and Navy were cognizant of a
fundamental weakness in the Reich forces,331 Chiefs of Staff intentionally disclosed this
intelligence to “impress on civilian leaders the need for a large-scale rearmament
program.”332
Their relentless efforts started to bear some fruits as France initiated its rearmament
program in early 1936. The two-year military service was agreed to be resumed, light tanks,
anti-tank vehicles, anti-aircraft guns, and some new artillery were scheduled to be
introduced. However, French military planners still believed that they were facing more
fundamental challenges: (1) sorry state of French industrial capabilities lacking mass
production capabilities of heavy tanks and state-of-the-art aircrafts; and (2) collapse of
military cooperation with Rome in the aftermath of the Mediterranean crisis and
subsequent difficulties in devising any offensive plans.333 In this regard, it is difficult to
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deny the possibility that French military leadership continued on their joint efforts to raise
a purse for rearmament by exaggerating the risk of war and the possibility of French defeat
during the Rhineland Crisis.
However, this explanation contradicts General Gamelin’s lamentation about the
loss of the last opportunity in his memoir. He specifically writes that France “had missed
the last opportunity” for either avoiding war “by breaking the morale of Hitler’s Germany”
or at least starting a war “under conditions that would have been exceptionally favorable
to France without a doubt.”334 Gamelin, thus, believed that it was better to fight a war
against Germany in March 1936 than in any period after the crisis. If so, what good is
securing funds for building forces to overpower its adversary in the future endgame when
it seems possible to defeat the foe now? In this context, the hypothesis of French military
leadership’s exaggerating the risk of war for securing resources for rearmament does not
survive the hoop test, assuming that Gamelin is telling the truth.
However, identifying what French military leaders genuinely believed in March
1936 is neither the goal of this research nor the matter that can be objectively proven. What
matters is, according to the official records, France decided not to take unilateral and
immediate military measures against Germany mainly due to hesitation and reluctance of
Ministers of National Defense in executing the measures. They claimed that the action
would most likely bring about a war, and thus, Paris should implement general mobilization
to follow through on the path. Their rationale behind these assertions was: (1) dictators
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rarely back down (according to Maurin); (2) Berlin crossed the Rubicon by challenging the
Locarno Treaty (according to the Chiefs of Staff); and (3) French military lacked any power
projection capability like agile expeditionary forces that could be swiftly deployed to expel
the Reich forces in the zone due to its defensive doctrine, planning, and investments
(according to Gamelin and Maurin).
Paris, thus, decided to take the pre-determined countermeasure, “no isolated action,”
and chose not to implement any punishment before consulting other signatories of the
Locarno Treaty, especially Great Britain. Civilian political leaders’ eagerness to punish
German coup against the Rhineland regime faced major blow by military elites’
anticipation of war and demand for general mobilization for taking any military action to
follow through on the deterrent threat. This position of Ministers of National Defense came
from the updated belief in German determination given that it crossed the Rubicon and
non-feasibility of punishment due to the purely defensive establishment of French forces.
The French policy choice, thus, fits well with feasibility and belief updating models’
predictions. This French choice precisely reveals the limitation in the explanatory power
of rational and cognitive deterrence theories by demonstrating the case of defender’s taking
non-action path after direct deterrence failure in spite of its desire to punish the challenger.
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3. The Short-term Outcome: a De Facto Retreat of Locarno Powers

3-1.

The French Diplomatic Expedition from March 12 to 18, 1936

Foreign Minister Flandin was authorized to negotiate in London and Geneva, based
on the cabinet decision of “placing French military sanctions against Germany at the
League’s disposal” and subsequently seeking “British assistance in accordance with the
Locarno obligation.”335 During the first phase of his diplomatic expedition (from March 12
to 14, 1936), he thus focused on securing support from the Locarno Powers, especially
Britain336, in coercing Germany to withdraw from the Rhineland and imposing military or
economic sanctions in case of Berlin’s refusal. Unfortunately, this effort was largely
unsuccessful. Flandin, then, shifted his emphasis to extracting as much compensation as
possible from London for abdicating her responsibilities during the second phase of
negotiation (from March 16 to 18) in fear of returning to Paris with empty hands. 337
London had every reason to reject the French request to support its military riposte
against the Reich. Most British people in the street saw no reason why Hitler would be
prohibited from doing things that he would like to do in his own garden. Conservative
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politicians were more concerned about the rise of Bolshevism than fascism.338 However,
official records attest that the central reasons for British unwillingness 339 were: (1) the
German forces were capable of setting up “very determined” resistance if Germany
confronted an attack on a single front; (2) German retaliation against Britain, particularly
the one using its Luftwaffe bombers, for any support from London for French military
action in the zone would be devastating340; and (3) British Army, Navy, and Air forces
were simply incapable of fulfilling the Locarno obligation. London first needed to buy time
to address severe military deficiencies of its forces before supporting the French struggle
against Germany.341
Other members of the League were reluctant to punish Berlin most importantly
because the German breach of the Locarno treaty as its challenge had done without “resort
to war” stipulated by article 16 of the League Covenant, and subsequently casus foederis
did not occur.342 They showed tepidness even for taking any non-violent measures, such as
financial or economic sanctions because Germany was the third-largest market in the world
in 1936. 40.5 percentage of foreign trade in Greece and Turkey was conducted with
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Germany. The half of Bulgarian trade and one-fourth of Yugoslavian import-export totals
were dependant on the German market. Berlin was the second most important trading
partner for Chile, Estonia, Portugal, and Spain. For too many member states of the League,
it was considered suicidal to impose economic sanctions against Germany.343
This overall reaction of Locarno powers and members of the League of Nations to
the Rhineland Crisis was satisfactory for Berlin and disastrous to Paris. In the absence of
either significant opposition or military preparations for an offensive operation everywhere
including Paris, Hitler felt there was no need to take any further conciliatory gestures such
as promising not to establish fortifications in the zone. On the contrary, France had no
choice left except for changing its strategic goal from securing support for military or
economic sanctions against Germany to obtaining assurances and security guarantee from
Britain that could compensate for the annulment of the Rhineland Pact. Paris also made
every effort to avoid the situation that the guilt for the crisis to be laid in France as much
as Germany by allowing the establishment of demilitarized zones on both sides or station
of international forces both in French and German territories.

3-2.

The Decision of the League on March 19 and Germany’s Delaying Tactics

Disturbed by German stiffness displaying zero efforts to make further positive
gestures as well as greatly motivated to avoid the dishonor of non-fulfillment and loss of
confidence, London was willing to help France on this front. At the same time, however,
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British policymakers wanted to avert any formal military alliance that could drag the
United Kingdom to others’ war, especially when she needs at least three years of peace for
rearmament. London also was determined not to take any measures that could provoke
German withdrawal from the peace negotiations which would forfeit the hard-won
opportunity for the general settlement of Western European security. 344
Seeking these seemingly contradictory goals of satisfying both Paris and Berlin or
avoiding audience cost for forsaking its treaty obligations as well as a total breakdown of
the peace negotiation, Britain dexterously pursued a middle way: condemning German
treaty violation while promoting non-aggression and mutual assistance pacts.
First, London joined France and Belgium in submitting condemnation of German
action to the League for posing “a threat to European security” by unilaterally breaching
Article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles. Second, the German government was invited to
subscribe to provisional arrangements suspending further actions in Rhineland such as
dispatch of additional material and troops or fortification of the zone. Third, Britain
acknowledged Franco-Belgium demand for the establishment of “contacts between the
General Staffs” that could replace the Rhineland Pact and guarantee immediate assistance
from guarantors in case of German aggression. Fourth, London also took note of German
proposals and invited the League to discuss a revision of the status of the Rhineland “on
the basis of equality of rights of neighboring States.” The memorandum prepared by the
British Foreign Office initially suggested these points, and they were finally presented as
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the “Text of Proposals” on March 19 to the League members.345 As a result, the League
almost unanimously decided to condemn German violation of treaties of Versailles and
Locarno.346
This condemnation of the international community was an unpleasant surprise for
Berlin. After diplomatic exchanges with the majority of member states, however, Hitler
learned that Italy had no intention to ratify the proposal and seven neural powers in Europe
decided not to take note of the document. Germany, then, announced that it would submit
counter-proposals by the end of March.
Meanwhile, the British government was squeezed by domestic politics that strongly
refused to attach any military value to the Anglo-Franco-Belgian General Staff talks, which
resulted in the marginalization of the talks where even exchange of operation plans was
proscribed. On the contrary, Hitler received 98.8 percent approval in the Parliamentary
election and referendum on March 29. Consequently, the German counter-proposals
published on April 1 included nothing new. Two-day General Staff talks held in mid-April
only concluded to make no further demands for a positive gesture from Berlin. Sarraut
government, then, was replaced in May by the cabinet of Lèon Blum that was occupied
with more conciliatory and cooperative, or “naïve and weak” according to senior British
diplomat Robert Vansittart, ministers. The Rhineland Crisis officially ended when Paris’s
decision to abandon the idea of punishing Germany was released as an official
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communiqué on July 23. The fait accompli that Germany imposed on March 7 survived
and left Hitler as the sole winner. 347

3-3.

The Short-term Outcome of the German Version of Peace: Testing Rival

and Research Hypotheses

As emphasized earlier, the Rhineland Crisis is a falsifying case for Rational and
Cognitive deterrence theories. French policy choice of “no isolated action” was followed by
lukewarm supports from Locarno Powers and members of the League of Nations which
resulted in a mere verbal condemnation of German action and perfunctory staff talks among
Britain, France, and Belgium. Sanctions of any kind had not seriously considered or
implemented by signatories of the Locarno Treaty and Germany successfully got away with
its coup against the Rhineland regime. The German fait accompli survived, and the crisis
terminated without war. This short-term outcome contradicts with the deterrence literature’s
prediction: the failure of direct defensive deterrence will more likely end up in a war between
the defender and the challenger in the short-run as both the challenger and the defender most
likely choose aggressive policies.
The failure of direct defensive deterrence in Rhineland did not end up in a war as
precisely predicted by the belief updating and feasibility of punishment models. The belief
updating model indeed demonstrates some explanatory power over the conciliatory policy
choice of Locarno powers in fear of a premature war with Germany and resulted in Hitler’s
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roaring success. This explanation especially fits well with the rationale behind the French
military elites’ policy recommendations. However, it is not clear whether this line of
thinking was prevalent in London or other members of the League as they all showed no
hesitation in condemning Hitler’s action as a threat to European peace.
For this Rhineland Crisis, in this regard, the feasibility of punishment model
suggests a more convincing explanation. Neither Paris nor London could take any punitive
measures against Germany because of their economic difficulties, the absence of any
support from the public, and most importantly, lack of offensive capability that they could
swiftly project to the zone.348 Both countries just started rearmament and needed more time
to have such forces. Of course, they could implement general mobilization and punish
Germany militarily, but this should have cost enormous treasure and political support of
voters. Even economic sanctions against Germany could be devastating due to the high
dependence of the European economy on the German market, the third-largest one in
Europe by the time. Considering the fact both France and Britain officially and
unequivocally condemned Hitler’s unilateral violation of the Treaties of Versailles and
Locarno, they genuinely wanted to do something about it. London was already leading
economic sanctions against Rome following the League’s denunciation of the latter’s
invasion to Ethiopia. They, thus, couldn’t do the same to Berlin simply because taking
retaliatory measures against Germany was not feasible.
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4. The Long-term Outcome: Deterrence Collapse

4-1.

Deterrence Collapse: Austria, Munich, and War

In the aftermath of the de facto retreat of Locarno powers,349 British and French
appeasement policies were followed one after another, which were continuously
reciprocated by German attempts to revise the status quo in succession. Defensive
deterrence, thus, collapsed and French security conditions went from bad to worse as Paris
repeatedly chose de-escalation path along the way.
First, Belgium declared its armed neutrality on October 14, 1936. This declaration
made France face the challenge of defending the unfortified northern defense lines, which
provided Germany a potential route for her attack forces. This possibility, of course, led to
dramatic debasing of the Maginot Line’s strategic value and shook the very foundation of
France’s defensive strategy. The collapse of the Rhineland regime and the Belgium
withdrawal from the French alliance system made the Paris-led Western security
superstructure to check German aggression by imposing a two-front war for Berlin
inoperative. The Little Entente states lost confidence in the value of allying with France.
How could they turn to Paris “if she does not defend herself”?350 For example, Yugoslavia
concluded a non-aggression agreement with Italy in March 1937 signifying its intention to
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take a nonalignment route. Czechoslovakia wanted to have a similar arrangement with
Germany. The French security system as a whole started to fall apart after the Rhineland
Crisis.
These developments do not mean that both London and Paris were so naïve, weak,
and inconsiderate and blindly sought to make piecemeal concessions to Berlin to avoid war.
Britain did increase its defense spending substantially, a 387 percent increase from 1936
(186 million pounds) to 1939 (719 million pounds),351 and France followed the same path
by announcing the expansion of defense budget for Army and Air Force as well as
allocating further budget for purchasing battleships and cruisers. In other words, they
endeavored to prepare themselves for the imminent endgame with Berlin during the time
of temporal peace. France and Britain, however, had to sacrifice Austria in March 1938
and Czechoslovakia in September 1938 along the way of buying time for rearmament.
Especially, the Munich Conference and Neville Chamberlain’s famous statement of “Peace
for Our Time,” is widely considered as a diplomatic fiasco or “a corrupted policy of
compromise.” 352 The Munich Analogy has haunted policymakers around the world in
different contexts of defensive deterrence failure, as discussed in the following chapters.
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4-2.

Explaining the Deterrence Collapse: Testing Rival and Research

Hypotheses

As discussed in Chapter 2, the deterrence literature is divided on the issue of the
long-term effects of the defender’s policy choices. The Hopf-Mercer-Press consensus
predicts that reputation is not a variable that produces a consistent pattern, and past retreat
of defenders would not necessarily cause further challenges in the future. The feasibility of
punishment model endorses this view as reputation would not matter at all if it seems
currently infeasible for the defender to follow through on its deterrent threat. The
challenger would defy the defender’s direct defensive deterrence regardless of the latter’s
behaviors in the past.
However, it is also true that most direct defensive deterrence cases involve enduring
rivalries and significant interest at stake. As a recent rebuttal to the Hopf-Mercer-Press
consensus argues, reputation should matter in estimating defender’s future threat
credibility if the crisis involves the same challenger, the consistent issue, or crucial interest
at stake. The belief updating model supports this claim: the defender’s strategy of deescalation makes the challenger update its belief about its opponent and would most likely
result in inviting more aggressive policies from the latter in the future.
Interestingly, the declassified official records contain evidence that supports both
claims of rival and research hypotheses, and we cannot reject any of them. First, the
research hypothesis passes the smoking gun test as Hitler predicted French inaction in the
future based on the fact that the Sarraut cabinet chose not to act during the Rhineland Crisis
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due to British refusal to assist France.353 He also assured his military staff in November
1937 that London would not retaliate against Berlin even if Germany attempted to revise
the status quo in Austria and Czechoslovakia because Great Britain did not act against
German coup in March 1936. 354
At the same time, however, Hitler was not entirely sure about the French reaction
to the German challenge in Czechoslovakia. He predicted that Paris would not act alone
without British blessing and support not because of the Sarraut government’s policy choice
of inaction during the Rhineland Crisis, but the Blum cabinet was facing serious domestic
political challenges that could lead to “civil war at any time.”355 This point shows that rival
hypothesis also survives the smoking gun test: Hitler’s rationale behind his choice of
defying the French defensive deterrence in 1938 was precisely based on calculating the
French feasibility of punishment at the time rather than Paris’ past behavior of backing
down.
This finding corresponds well with the statistical trends discussed in the previous
chapter: no variable show statistical significance in predicting the future outcome of
deterrence restoration or collapse. For the Rhineland Crisis specifically, both the feasibility
of punishment and the belief updating worked toward the same direction at the same time:
it was not only infeasible for Paris to punish Germany in 1938, but also France had decided
to retreat in the previous crisis in 1936. Perhaps it would be safer to conclude now that
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long-term ramifications of defender’s policy choice after deterrence failure is not consistent
as the shadow of the past is cast distinctively on different policymakers in diverse contexts
.
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CHAPTER V
HEDGING: U.S. BLOCKADE AND THE MISSILE TRADE DURING THE 1962
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

In Chapter 4, through analysis of the declassified primary sources, we confirmed
that the feasibility of punishment model adequately explains: (1) Hitler’s decision to defy
the French direct defensive deterrent threat, (2) the Sarraut Cabinet’s decision of “no
isolated action,” (3) the short-term outcome of peaceful crisis termination, and (4) the longterm outcome of deterrence collapse. The case study finds some evidence that the belief
updating mechanism was also working during the French decision-making process in the
aftermath of the deterrence failure and Hitler’s move to provoke further challenges in
Czechoslovakia and Poland. Compared to the causal impact of the feasibility variable,
however, the Bayesian inference did not play a decisive role. The process-tracing analysis
of the Rhineland Crisis, however, fails to test rival and research hypotheses on the impact
of nuclear weapons because both Berlin and Paris did not possess the weapons.
This weakness in the case study of the Rhineland Crisis makes the Cuban Missile
Crisis a highly valuable source for hypothesis testing. It is a classic example of direct
defensive deterrence failure involving the full-blown nuclear capability of the challenger
and the defender. It is a remarkably rare case in which the human race may have been on
the brink of a nuclear holocaust and the possibility of mass extinction. This case, thus,
provides researchers an exceptional laboratory for testing various hypotheses on crisis
escalation/de-escalation as well as deterrence and compellence involving nuclear threats.
President John F. Kennedy contributed to elevating the academic significance of this crisis
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even further by recording almost all of the Executive Committee of the National Security
Council (ExComm) meetings that took place during the crisis, which allows scholars to
open the black box and to analyze the decision-making process of the crisis actor at the
critical juncture. This chapter tests all the rival and research hypotheses suggested in
Chapter 2 against the Soviet and the American policymaking during the Cuban Missile
Crisis by investigating declassified primary sources, the Kennedy Tapes, and memoirs of
the political elites in Moscow and Washington.

1. Causes of Failure: Why Did the Soviet Union Decide to Deploy Nuclear Missiles
in Cuba?

1-1.

Background of the Crisis: the Bay of Pigs, the Vienna Summit, and the

Berlin Wall

As the very name of the crisis attests, the Cuban Missile Crisis would not have
occurred without the rise of hostility between Washington and Havana since Fidel Castro
came to power in January 1959. John Kennedy came to office after the previous
Eisenhower government had exchanged bitter blows with the Castro regime such as Cuban
nationalization of U.S. oil companies’ refineries, U.S. retaliation on Cuban sugar, Castro’s
further nationalizing 850 million American assets, and Eisenhower’s announcement of U.S.
trade embargo on Cuba.356 CIA tried to convince the new president of the necessity to
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overthrow the Castro regime with covert paramilitary operations. To do so, they had to
satisfy Kennedy’s precondition for the approval of such operation: the minimum likelihood
of the Cuban opposition. CIA managed to find a proper spot along the Bay of Pigs.
Unfortunately, this isolated location was vulnerable to Castro’s counterattack without any
accessible escape path. On April 14, 1961, the Cuban refugees landed on beaches along the
Bay with the help of U.S. forces, but the offensive led by this Cuban brigade ended in a
devastating defeat. Only 14 of the exiles were rescued while 114 were killed and 1,189
men were captured.357
Although Premier Nikita Khrushchev preferred Kennedy to Richard Nixon as his
counterpart, in fact the Soviets even tried to help the Democrats win the election,358 the
Bay of Pigs incident left a deep and lasting impression that the new president was weak,
inexperienced, and easily swayed by his hawkish advisors. Khrushchev intended to exert
maximum pressure on Kennedy to secure favorable outcomes along the lines of the SovietAmerican clash, especially over the Berlin issue. They first met on June 3, 1961, in Vienna.
Khrushchev lectured Kennedy on the revolutionary version of the history that
hinted at the similarities between the rise of Castro in Cuba against the Western world and
the establishment of 1815 Concert of Europe system against the Holy Alliance. The
Premier emphasized that the world revolutionary movements had nothing to do with
Moscow but Washington desperately sought to build “dams against the flow of ideas.” In
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response, Kennedy mentioned the danger of “miscalculations” that could have catastrophic
consequences when the two superpowers possessed the capability to destroy one another.
Khrushchev exploded with anger knowing that Americans repeated this “damned word”
over and over again, and for urging the USSR “to sit like a schoolboy with his hands on
his desk.” After the summit, Khrushchev told his advisors that Kennedy was far less of a
leader than Eisenhower, in terms of the scope of thinking and statesmanship.359
Contrary to Khrushchev’s optimism, the situation in Germany was not promising
for the Communist bloc. The massive exodus of people from East to West Germany led
the population of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) to be reduced by 1.2 million
during the decade of the 1950s. The Ulbricht government asked Moscow for emergency
aid of 50 million dollars worth cash and hundreds of tons of consumer goods such as butter
and meat, which were in extremely short supply even in the Soviet Union. Although it
meant a humiliating propaganda defeat for the USSR, Khrushchev ended up separating the
internal border between East and West Berlin with barbed wire on August 13, 1961. The
Kennedy administrate protested but did nothing, which greatly disappointed the Adenauer
government. Amid this tug of war between Moscow and Washington over the Berlin matter,
especially the famous two-day stand-off at the Checkpoint Charlie, Kennedy again
“blinked” first through opening of a backchannel, between his brother Robert Kennedy and
Soviet intelligence agent Georgi Bolshakov.
The Berlin crisis again reinforced Khrushchev’s conviction that the new American
president was feeble and shaky. The more Khrushchev went through his counterpart; the
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more worried the Premier had become. Kennedy seemed no match for the powerful
military-industrial complex, and he would not be able to control “the dark forces” in
Washington. Khrushchev started to see an ominous shadow in the future of Cuba. It may
just be a matter of time for the “faction of war” to dominate the Kennedy administration
and to invade Cuba to take revenge on what happened in Berlin. 360 The confirming
evidence was everywhere. Although they did not know that Kennedy approved the
initiation of Operation Mongoose, both the Cuban and the Soviet intelligence noticed
clandestine activities of counterrevolutionary groups rocketed since October 1961. 361
Khrushchev believed he had to do something about these worrisome developments in Cuba
to protect the fellow revolutionary regime.

1-2.

Who Was Responsible for the Choice to Deploy the Soviet Missiles in Cuba?

In his memoir, Khrushchev states that it was during his visit to Bulgaria from May
14 to 17, 1962, when his idea of secretly deploying nuclear missiles in Cuba first came to
his mind.362 His son, Sergei Khrushchev, more precisely confirms that his father told him
it was when Khrushchev was having a brief rest on the shores of the Black Sea at Varna
on May 17.363 Khrushchev first unveiled this idea to Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on
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his way back to Moscow on May 20. Gromyko did not express any doubts or concerns to
the Premier possibly due to the “Stalinist school of diplomacy instilled obedience.”364 Later
that they, he discussed this idea thoroughly with other members in the Presidium of the
Central Committee, namely, Andrei Gromyko, Anastas Mikoyan, Rodion Malinovsky,
Frol Kozlov, and Alexander Alekseev.365
It is not easy to place blame on the Soviet decision to deploy missiles with nuclear
warheads in Cuba because there are so few sources left that reveal the details of the
discussion that took place in the meetings of this decision. For example, the official record
of the Presidium meeting on May 21, 1962 only includes less than ten lines, and that for
the next meeting on May 24 includes merely two lines.366 However, this dearth of records
on the Soviet deliberation might be due to “there were no deliberations.” 367 Multiple
sources testify that it was Khrushchev’s plan and no one except for Mikoyan “dared to
contradict him.”368 Neither the Soviet nor the Cuban intelligence expected that the U.S.
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invasion of Cuba was likely, which denied the core necessity of this plan. 369 Sergei
Khrushchev explains how the atmosphere was like in the Soviet Presidium during the days
of Premier Khrushchev.

During that period the Presidium generally relied on Father. His word was final. It wasn’t
even a matter of personality. Everything was determined by the structure of centralized
power, which was just beginning to change. Everything depended on the top person. Even
Presidium members tried not to push themselves forward unless their vital interests were
gravely affected. Those interests were not necessarily personal, but perhaps affected areas
where a particular Presidium member felt himself to be in charge. [...] But Cuba didn’t
affect anyone’s interests.

Therefore, it was ultimately Khrushchev’s call to arm Cuba with Soviet nuclear
missiles and “throw a hedgehog into Uncle Sam’s pants.”370 Why did he believe he should
do this? Wouldn’t this irritating provocation to put a hedgehog into Uncle Sam’s pants
surely lead to his intense reaction? After all, didn’t Uncle Sam also have some hedgehogs,
bigger and thornier ones, which can be used to retaliate against Moscow?
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1-3.

Khrushchev’s Rationale: Depriving of the American Retaliation by Secretly

Imposing a Fait Accompli

While the literature on the Cuban Missile Crisis does not agree on Khrushchev’s
true motive behind his decision to start the most dangerous crisis ever in human history,
most scholars generally concur that numerous causes moved him. Specifically, the
literature suggests following six reasons: (1) defending Cuba, (2) narrowing the missile
gap, (3) triumphing over the great ideological war, (4) seeking Western concessions in
Berlin, (5) outdoing China and winning against the rival in the Communist world, and (6)
gaining momentum for reforms in domestic politics.371 Taubman argues that Khrushchev
considered all these elements before he made his decision, and we can identify his move
as “a cure-all, a cure-all that cured nothing.”372
As Jervis rightly points out, it is fascinating to see that while “almost no one
expected Khrushchev to take this action,” researchers so easily find “lots of motives”
afterward. This interesting phenomenon is a common cognitive mechanism of humans to
bolster the decision they have made by adding further considerations ultimately for
maintaining their cognitive consistency.373 The crucial challenge in historical analysis, thus,
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is not simply stating that multiple impulses caused a certain action, but to “establish their
relative weights and how they combined.” 374 This dissertation tries to determine the
relative weights of six different motivations mentioned above using the process-tracing
technique in the next section. Before that, it is essential to identify how Khrushchev laid
out his rationale to his staff in late May 1962.
In his memoir, he emphasizes three points. First, his principal goal was to defend
Cuba from the U.S. invasion as it was the USSR’s “obligation to do everything in our
power to protect Cuba’s existence as a Socialist country and as a working example to the
other countries of Latin America.”375 Second, given the “sausage” shape of the island and
the short distance between Cuba and the U.S., defending the island through installing
surface-to-air antiaircraft missiles would be almost infeasible.376 Third, subsequently, the
sole way to defend Cuba was turning to familiar deterrence logic. The Premier states that;

My thinking went like this: if we installed the missiles secretly and then if the United States
discovered the missiles were there after they were already poised and ready to strike, the
Americans would think twice before trying to liquidate our installations by military means.
I knew that the United States could knock out some of our installations, but not all of them.
If a quarter or even a tenth of our missiles survived – even if only one or two big ones were
left – we could still hit New York, and there wouldn’t be much of New York left.377
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Khrushchev, however, acknowledged that he also had the balancing logic in his
mind. After underlining the main purpose of defending Cuba through turning to the
deterrence logic buttressed by the nuclear second-strike capability, he adds the below
passage.

In addition to protecting Cuba, our missiles would have equalized what the West likes to
call “the balance of power.” The Americans had surrounded our country with military bases
and threatened us with nuclear weapons, and now they would learn just what it feels like
to have enemy missiles pointing at you; we’d be doing nothing more than giving them a
little of their own medicine. And it was high time America learned what it feels like to have
her own land and her own people threatened.378

Khrushchev’s these two main points in his memoir are quite similar to his son’s
recollection of the evening walk with him someday in May 1962. According to Sergei
Khrushchev, his father told him that, first, that although the deployment of nuclear missiles
in Cuba did have “certain strategic importance,” the principle aim of the operation was to
“defend the Cuban revolution.” The temporal strategic advantage “did not justify the
expenditure of money and material resources” that needed for implementation of the
deployment operation. Second, this operation would work because “As soon as the missiles
were on the island, it would be just as dangerous for the Americans to attack Cuba as to
attack the Soviet Union itself.”379
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Sergo Mikoyan, Anastas Mikoyan’s son, also attests that his father told him about
how often Khrushchev reiterated that it would take less than a week for the U.S. to
overthrow the Castro regime if they invaded the island. The deployment mission, thus, was
for preventing “its adversaries’ attempts to impede with military force the worldwide
victorious march for socialism.” 380 Considering this consistency among numerous
testimonies of the Soviet policymakers, it would be valid to accept that (1) “defense of
Cuba,” (2) “advancement of the worldwide Socialist triumph,” and (3) “narrowing the
missile balance” were the three main reasons for the Premier Khrushchev to decide to
deploy the nuclear missiles in Cuba.

1-4.

The Origin of the Soviet Challenge: Testing Rival and Research Hypotheses

How well do the dissertation’s rival and research hypotheses explain the
Khrushchev’s rationale? As explained in Chapter 2, Rational and Cognitive Deterrence
literature argues that due to the inherent high credibility of the threat, direct deterrence can
fail only when the challenger is as determined as the defender. The factors decide the level
of resolve are (1) probability of victory in war, (2) level of interest at stake, (3) war cost,
(4) audience/reputational costs for not challenging the status quo, and (5) cultural/historical
hostility. When the value of these five variables turns the challenger’s resolve into the point
where it prefers war to the status quo, even direct deterrence can fail. The model, thus,
makes a linear prediction: the more resolved challenger will likely to take the more
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aggressive policies. In this regard, the rival hypothesis explains that Khrushchev decided
to throw a “hedgehog” into “Uncle Sam’s pants” because he was strongly resolute in
protecting Cuba even risking a war with the U.S.
However, the revolutionary impact of nuclear weapons should have changed
Khrushchev’s calculation decisively. Although the nuclear balance was favoring the U.S.,
approximately a 17-to-1 advantage,381 both Moscow and Washington were cognizant of
the fact that they were under MAD. This strategic condition assumes that even after
absorbing a nuclear attack, the adversary is still capable of delivering the catastrophic
damage to the attacker thanks to its second-strike capability. The probability of victory in
war, thus, converges to zero and the war cost approaches a level beyond calculable.
Although an escalation of crisis to a certain level would not be impossible,382 both crisis
actors under MAD can never be a determined challenger or defender that is ready to start
a nuclear war.
Premier Khrushchev was fully aware of this nuclear logic. When his son asked him
about the possibility of war between the U.S. and the USSR over Cuba, Khrushchev said:
“It’s one thing to threaten with nuclear weapons, quite another to use them.” 383 He
emphasized that “Every idiot can start a war, but it is impossible to win this war. [...]
Therefore, the missiles have one purpose – to scare them, to restrain them so that they have
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appreciated this business.”384 The Premier makes it clear that “we had no desire to start a
war […] our principal aim was only to deter America from starting a war.”385
Therefore, the rival hypotheses 1 and 4-1 predict that Moscow would refrain from
taking on policies that were too aggressive and would initiate an armed conflict.
Admittedly, the interest at stake and the audience/reputational cost for not taking any action
were quite high for the USSR considering the significant implication of defending the
Cuban revolution in the Western Hemisphere. However, as long as there is a chance of
nuclear holocaust, the challenger could never become a determined aggressor in terms of
the cost-benefit analysis. Subsequently, Moscow must always contain the level of
provocation and make sure not to escalate a crisis into a military confrontation.
On the contrary, despite his sharp awareness of this logic of nuclear deterrence,
Khrushchev decided to arm Cuba with nuclear missiles, which would surely provoke an
American military retaliation. Jervis also points out that the deployment of nuclear missiles
was not necessary for the defense of Cuba given that Soviet ground forces on the island
provided sufficient deterrence. They could function as a trip-wire for an American-Soviet
confrontation. 386 The rival hypotheses, thus, fail to explain Moscow’s reckless and
imprudent policy choice. Even under the strategic condition of MAD, the Premier decided
to take a military measure which could trigger a nuclear war.
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How can we explain Khrushchev’s move? How could a theoretically irresolute
challenger choose to take a rapid escalation path? Was it simply a mistake or a delusion?
As the feasibility model argues that direct deterrence can fail even when the challenger is not
a determined aggressor, the model has the potential to provide a better explanation than the
previous deterrence theories. The defender’s direct deterrent threat is regarded as noncredible if it is infeasible to follow through on its threat. This infeasibility of following
through occurs when (1) geographic obstacles, (2) domestic political opposition, (3)
normative constraints, or (4) unsupportive alliances prevent the defender from imposing
punishments against the challenger.
However, Cuba was only about a hundred miles away from Florida, and the
American Navy and Air Force maintain more than sufficient capacity to deliver a full
spectrum of firepower to the island. Kennedy's administration was a unified government, and
the opposition party was populated with hawkish Republicans, which should allow the
president to enjoy the bipartisan support for his decision to forcefully remove Soviet missiles
in Cuba.387 As it is for the national defense and the survival of its people, the U.S. decision
to retaliate militarily against the Soviet challenge should be justified by the UN charter.388 In
other words, there was nearly no ground to estimate that the U.S. lacked
military/political/normative feasibility to punish.
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Khrushchev, however, did something very unique to make it infeasible for
Washington to react. He decided to send the missiles secretly! If this secret deployment
operation succeeds, then the U.S. will not be able to retaliate not because of
military/political hurdles in punishing the challenge rather it’s the deficit in information.
Furthermore, once the Soviet nuclear missiles become operational, the nuclear logic kicks
in and it gets very difficult for Washington to attack Soviet bases in Cuba. The
military/political/normative feasibility suddenly decreases almost to zero as soon as the
nuclear weapons are ready to be launched. Then, the U.S. would not be able to do anything
other than accept the Soviet revision of the status quo.
This explanation passes both the smoking gun and the hoop tests. To begin with, it
is precisely the reason why Khrushchev believed his audacious plan should work. The
essence of his rationale was it becomes “too late to do anything about them” once the
missiles get operational. 389 The success of the plan, thus, wholly depended upon that
American policymakers were unaware of the Soviet missiles on the island until Moscow
announced them after the November elections in the U.S. 390 This made Khrushchev
obsessed with maintaining secrecy. He first ordered to assemble the S-75 antiaircraft
launchers to prevent Washington from detecting the Soviet missiles in Cuba.391 However,
he later forbade the actual use of them fearing premature initiation of a crisis. 392 As
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Khrushchev himself attests that his rationale was based on the practicability of secretly
imposing a fait accompli, the feasibility explanation passes the smoking gun test.
Besides, the feasibility model’s explanation passes the hoop test. The evidence that
confirms the validity of the model includes: (1) Moscow did not have any contingency plan
preparing for the U.S.-USSR military conflict; (2) the debate in the Presidium over the
policy choice of deploying nuclear missiles in Cuba was mainly over how to keep the
operation under the Moscow’s hat, and (3) the Soviet Union made significant efforts to
maintain its strict confidentiality in executing the plan.
First, Khrushchev’s missile deployment plan was nearly lacking any anticipation
of the American-Soviet military conflict.393 Even when there was anticipation, preparing
for a possible armed clash with the U.S. was pushed back on the priority list. For example,
many military planners advised Khrushchev to contemplate a defense plan for the ships
carrying nuclear warheads. The Premier, however, rejected the provision of “any kind of
escort” because it would increase the danger of American detection. He emphasized that
“our main weapon was camouflage.”394 It turns out that Khrushchev had no contingency
plan whatsoever preparing for the scenario what should the USSR do if the secret came out
and the U.S. forces started to retaliate militarily. Sergei Khrushchev testifies that Moscow
“had no carefully thought-out plan of action in case our missiles were discovered
prematurely.” So when it happened, he thought “we would have to improvise.”395
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Second, maintaining secrecy of the deployment plan was at the center of policy
debate. One of the two main oppositions to Khrushchev’s idea of stationing a Soviet missile
base in Cuba was zeroing in on whether the secrecy could be maintained or not. 396 As
mentioned earlier, Anastas Mikoyan, First Deputy Premier under Khrushchev, was the only
person in the Presidium who opposed the Premier openly. His opposition rested on the
impracticability of maintaining secrecy. Mikoyan argued that there were no woods but only
palm trees on the island and these “naked trees” provided little coverage. This geographic
nature of Cuba should make it almost impossible to hide the missiles from the American
air reconnaissance. Once they confirmed the existence of Soviet missiles in Cuba, the U.S.
forces could easily wipe them out in several minutes.397 The Soviet intelligence community
and Major General A. A. Dementyev, the Soviet chief military representative in Cuba,
made a similar point.398
To respond to this criticism, Khrushchev sent Marshal Sergey Biryuzov, the
commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, to Cuba when the Soviet delegation visited
Cuba to ask Castro’s consent to station missile bases on the island. Marshal Biryuzov’s
mission was to check whether there would be spots on the island that could be invisible to
the American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft.
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deployment plan after Biryuzov reported him the possibility of disguising missiles “as
coconut palms.” It would sound absurd to any sensible men, and Sergei Khrushchev could
not understand “how Father believed such primitive reasoning.” The Premier, however,
dismissed his son’s concerns by emphasizing that “professionals were at work there, and
they understood the matter better than we did.”400
Third, the Soviets did everything they could do to make sure that the U.S.
intelligence would not detect the deployment operation. Maintaining secrecy was one of
the first main decisions 401 made during the deliberation process. Khrushchev himself
underscored the importance of maintaining secrecy from the beginning. 402 Most planning
documents were handwritten in single copies. 403 All of the initial discussions with the
Cuban counterpart were conducted either in person or via hand-delivered letters.404 The
military planners chose the name “Operation Anadyr” to confuse Soviets and other
potential foreign observers.405 The final destination was informed to the ship captains via
sealed envelopes that can be opened in the presence of KGB officers only after they reached
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at designated spots in the Atlantic Ocean.406 Soviet soldiers loaded equipment only at night
at isolated piers where outsiders could not enter.407 The soldiers were ordered to disguise
in civilian clothing and allowed to be on deck exclusively at night.408 Only agricultural
machinery such as trucks and tractors were displayed on deck while all military equipment
was stored below.409 Later in August when the U.S. started to be uneasy about increasing
Soviet shipments to Cuba, Khrushchev tried to divert Washington’s attention from it by
announcing the abolition of the Soviet commandant’s office in Berlin.410
In sum, Khrushchev believed that the deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba could
serve a wide range of purposes and considered it a “cure-all.” But he was not a resolute
challenger who was ready to risk a war over Cuba. The strategic condition of MAD
prevented him from being resolved due to the devastating cost nuclear war would bring.
The fact that contingency plan was non-existent confirms this explanation.
Despite his understanding of nuclear logic, Khrushchev made a choice that could
initiate a nuclear war. Khrushchev made the seemingly contradictory moves because he
strongly believed that it was possible to secretly impose a fait accompli: deploying Soviet
nuclear missiles in Cuba. As long as the secrecy was kept, the U.S. would not be able to
react. After successfully revised the status quo, undoing the changes would become
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extremely difficult for Americans due to the activation of the nuclear deterrence. This
Soviet confidence in infeasibility of punishment – first due to American unawareness of
the existence of the challenge and later because of nuclear deterrence – was the main cause
for Khrushchev to choose a path of military defiance against the status quo.

2. Conditions for Choice: Why Did the U.S. Decide to Hedge?

2-1.

Kennedy’s Deterrent Threats in September 1962

It was difficult for U.S. intelligence and that of its NATO allies not to notice the
unusual increase of Soviet shipments to Cuba. Starting in August 1962, a series of reports
arrived in Washington about a great increase in the number of commercial ships sailing
towards Cuba.411 During this time, the Kennedy administration was reviewing Operation
Mongoose, and CIA Director John McCone wanted to obtain presidential sanctions for
taking more dramatic military measures in Cuba to remove Castro. He believed that the
astonishing boost of Soviet shipments to Cuba might be the harbinger of his worst dream:
turning the island less than 100 miles away from the U.S. into Soviet missile bases. He
feared that Khrushchev would always be tempted to deploy medium-range nuclear missiles
in Cuba to even the scales of nuclear balance significantly favoring the U.S. McCone first
raised this possibility during the Special Group meeting on August 10, 1962, and called for
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the use of the U.S. military force only to be rejected by the majority of security advisors.
He tried to pressure for the military operation again on August 21 yet opposed by others
who thought that the danger of Soviet retaliation against Berlin, Turkey, or Italy was too
great.412
The U-2 flight over Cuba on August 29 found that eight Surface-to-Air Missile
(SAM) sites were only one or two weeks from completion and a significant increase in
defense capability compared to what the previous reconnaissance flight found on August
5. Instead of following McCone’s proposal, however, Kennedy decided to give a fair
warning to Khrushchev. On September 4, the White House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger
read the presidential statement that the U.S. was aware of the presence of Soviet antiaircraft
defense missiles, motor torpedo boats and Soviet technicians on the island. Washington
confirmed that they had not found “any organized combat force in Cuba from any Sovietbloc country; of military bases provided to Russia; of a violation of the 1934 treaty relating
to Guantanamo; of the presence of offensive ground-to-ground missiles; or other
significant offensive capability.” However, the statement added that “Were it to be
otherwise, the gravest issues would arise.” 413 Kennedy reiterated this warning on
September 13, 1962, during the presidential news conference.

If at any time the Communist buildup in Cuba were to endanger, or interfere with our
security in any way, including our base at Guantanamo, our passage to the Panama Canal,
our missile and space activities at Cape Canaveral, or the lives of American citizens in this
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country, or if Cuba should ever attempt to export its aggressive purposes by force or the
threat of force against any nation in this hemisphere, or become an offensive military
base414 of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must
be done to protect its own security and that of its allies.415

How should we define these threats made by Kennedy on September 4 and 13?
Was the Cuban Missile Crisis a failure of defensive deterrence, offensive deterrence, or
defensive compellence? 416 This case is a classic example that shows the conceptual
problem in the literature mentioned in Chapter 1. Alexander George himself sometimes
categorizes it as a deterrence case 417 , but at other times he identifies it as a defensive
compellence or a coercive diplomacy case.418
Part of the reason is that while President Kennedy utilized defensive deterrence
threats twice in September 1962, he made an offensive deterrent and a defensive
compellent threat against the Soviets on October 22 once he realized that Premier
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Khrushchev did deploy Middle-range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) and Intermediate
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) in Cuba. His demands, thus, leveled up from “don’t deploy
offensive capability in Cuba” to “stop constructing the offensive assets,” and to “remove
them.” In other words, the case itself had multiple phases that include both deterrent and
compellent moments. As this dissertation project traces the whole process of threat
escalation, this should not be a problem.
A more serious issue arises from the fact that, before Kennedy made those threats,
Khrushchev already had ordered implementation of the Operation Anadyr and had done
things that were described in Kennedy’s list of don’ts. These actions include authorizing
deployments of two R-14 IRBMs regiments, three R-12 MRBMs regiments, 33 IL-28
bombers, 33 Mi-4 helicopter, 40 MiG-21s, and four Motorized Rifle Regiments.419 The
first ship carrying SAMs and supporting apparatus for the MRBMs left the Soviet port at
the end of July, 420 and the first shipment, the Maria Ulyanova, arrived in Cuba on July
26.421 Khrushchev had already embarked on doing things that Kennedy later warned the
former against doing. Kennedy’s threats in September 1962, thus, should be offensive
deterrent or defensive compellent threats, rather than defensive deterrent threats, in the eyes
of Moscow.
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However, the main element of Soviet forces that Kennedy was most worried about
had not arrived in Cuba when he made his September threats. The first Soviet MRBMs
arrived on September 15. It was two days after Kennedy’s second threat was made and
eleven days after his first warning.422 This fact, thus, still makes the crisis a direct defensive
deterrence failure. Besides, Washington was not aware of Khrushchev’s decision in June
and responded to the crisis as if the U.S. direct defensive deterrent threat had failed.
Therefore, the deliberation after the detection of the failure should be treated as an example
of the strategic thinking process after defensive deterrence failure because the defender
believed that it was such. Those complicates related to the true nature of the failure, thus,
would not pose a serious challenge to the validity of this research.
Accordingly, the following sections trace the process of deliberation throughout the
ExComm meetings from the point when Washington discovered the presence of Soviet
missiles in Cuba on October 15 and convened the first ExComm meeting the next day, to
the moment when Kennedy decided to take the naval blockade option on October 20. Those
sections compare and contrast divergent perspectives within the ExComm and, then
attempt to demonstrate which factors suggested in the rival and research hypotheses played
the decisive role for policymakers in Washington to choose different countermeasures
against the Soviet challenge to the U.S. defensive deterrence threat.
Specifically, these sections focus on the following five individuals as separate subcases within the study because they played a significant role in setting out alternatives
during the deliberation process and represented the final two approaches that emerged at
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the National Security Council (NSC) meeting on October 20.423 The five figures include,
first, McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,
second, General Maxwell Taylor, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, third, Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State, fourth, Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense, and, fifth, President
John. F. Kennedy.424 The following analysis is based on the transcription of tape recordings
of the ExComm meetings425 and the minutes of the 505th NSC meeting.426

2-2.

The First ExComm Meeting on October 16, 11:40 AM – 1:00 PM

CIA Assistant Director of Photographic Interpretation Arthur Lundahl and Sydney
Graybeal reported to the assembled government officials what they found from the photos
taken from the October 14 U-2 flight over Cuba: one MRBM launch site and two newly
established military encampments in west-central Cuba (Map 2). There were, however, too
many uncertainties surrounding the decision-making process. For example, Washington
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did not know how many other missile sites might have been under construction on other
parts of the island, when would these other missiles be operational, whether the missiles
had nuclear warheads or if not, where were they stored, and, critically, what was the
intention of the Soviets.427 In other words, while it seemed clear that Khrushchev blatantly
challenged Kennedy’s defensive deterrence posture, the exact degree and depth of the
violation was uncertain.

Map 2: Soviet Missile Sites in Cuba during the Crisis428

Secretary Rusk was the first to suggest the possible courses of action in response to
the Soviet transgression. First, he defined the missile deployment in Cuba as a “very serious
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development,” which the U.S. should eliminate. He, then, proposed two general courses of
action: (1) a surprise attack but not necessarily an invasion of Cuba, and (2) a combination
of non-violent measures that could make Moscow give up the missile bases429. Although
he was open to both paths (rapid and gradual escalations), Rusk preferred the second
option as the U.S. was believed to face “a situation that could lead to general war” and it
would be important to give “everybody a chance to pull away from it before it gets too
hard.”430
Secretary McNamara, however, argued that any type of airstrike is only feasible if
those Soviet missiles in Cuba were not operational. Furthermore, he sustains that if the
final course of action were to involve a military measure to take out the missiles, it should
be either an invasion of Cuba or an extensive and massive strike that could wipe out all
related offensive assets including the missile sites, aircraft and airfields, and potential
nuclear storage sites. Before the meeting was over, McNamara emphasized that they should
make a decision on three separate issues: (1) whether Washington should inform the public
about the discovery of offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba (2) whether the U.S. should
conduct a military action in tandem with a political action; and (3) how much time should
be allocated to prepare for effective military action.431 Indeed, similar to Rusk, he was open
to both political and military actions, but McNamara’s perspective (conditional rapid-
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escalation) was the most circumspect one among the ExComm members as he strictly set
a precondition for the airstrike option: only before the missiles became operational.
General Taylor agreed with McNamara on the need to take out all of the missiles
once the U.S. air force went into Cuba. He, however, was pessimistic about the possibility
of knowing the exact timing when the missiles would be operational. This enormous level
of uncertainty made the general suggest that the U.S. should get “all the benefit of surprise”
and destroy all the offensive weapons that include missiles, airfields, and nuclear sites as
soon as Washington acquired sufficient information on locations of those targets.
Simultaneously, two more measures should be implemented: (1) a naval blockade for the
sake of preventing further deployment of Soviet missiles to the island, and (2)
reinforcement of the Guantanamo naval base and evacuation of dependents from the base.
Whether an invasion was necessary or not could be determined after this, he argued.432 His
idea was the most aggressive approach (rapid escalation) within the ExComm.
Special Assistant Bundy’s position was not clearly defined in this first meeting, but
he pointed out that a surgical strike should not be ruled out because of the “substantial
political advantage in limiting the strike.”433 He also demonstrated his inclination to a nonviolent track of resolution by saying that the committee needed to work out a contingency
on the political measures when Kennedy summarized his staffs’ positions into three
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alternatives – an immediate surgical strike, a general airstrike, and the general invasion –,
and forgot to include the possible political moves discussed during the meeting.434
In sum, most members in ExComm, except for Taylor, were cautious about going
directly to military measures such as an airstrike (either surgical or extensive) or an
invasion. But they revealed the varying degree of circumspection: the most reluctant among
the three was McNamara, possibly the least hesitant was Bundy, and Rusk in between them.
While President Kennedy did express that the U.S. is “certainly going to do number one
[the surgical strike on three Soviet bases]”435 in the end and emphasized the importance of
making preparations for it, he preferred to listen to his advisor's suggestions rather than to
push his stance during this meeting.

2-3.

The Second ExComm Meeting on October 16, 6:30 PM – 7:55 PM

When the ExComm meeting convened at 6:30 PM again on October 16, General
Marshall Carter, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, brought additional information
to the committee based on further readout of photographic evidence reported in the
morning. First, there may be sixteen to twenty-four missiles in Cuba. Second, the missiles
were believed to be of the solid-propellant type and inertial guidance system which would
take about two weeks to be ready yet could be fired on very short notice once they got
operational. Third, these missiles were highly vulnerable even to ordinary rifle fire. Fourth,
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the reconnaissance flight did not find any evidence of nuclear warhead storage. Fifth, they
verified again that those missiles were MRBMs that matched the information provided by
“IRONBARK.”436 These reports revealed that the USSR not only flagrantly challenged the
U.S. deterrent threat that forbade any offensive assets in Cuba, but those facilities were
believed to be easily taken out by conventional weapons.
Since the missiles did not appear operational, McNamara backed the airstrike. He,
however, opposed any attack that would leave out some nuclear capabilities – missiles,
MiG aircraft, airfields, nuclear storage facilities, radar installations, and SAM sites – on
the island and specified that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) unanimously supported this
military option. McNamara explained that the extensive airstrike would require around 700
sorties a day, but that the U.S. Air Force and Navy were capable of conducting the massive
strike operation well beyond this level. Taylor concurred with him and claimed that it
would be a mistake to take any limited version of the strike as it would attract reprisal
attacks. He argued that there might not be a second chance once the U.S. attacked those
bases. Taylor underscored that JCS’s position was that Washington would rather take no
military action at all than to go with a limited strike.437
Rusk, on the other hand, raised the issue of rendering warning, including a
compellent threat to Cuba – before the attack. He shared a couple of measures suggested
by his people in the State Department namely, (1) sending direct warning message to
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Castro438; (2) indicating the imminent danger rising from Cuba to states in Latin America
that were vulnerable to communist revolutionary actions – such as Venezuela, Guatemala,
Bolivia, Chile, and Mexico; and (3) letting close allies in Europe know about the situation.
But this did not mean that his position was lopsided to the political course of action. Rusk
implied that the committee should discuss “what political preparation, if any, is to occur
before an airstrike.”439
McNamara opposed this political course of action such as warning Castro or
opening the information to allies before the attack because “it almost stops subsequent
military action.”440 He was open only to an intermediate route that included concurrent
execution of a declaration of open surveillance, a blockade, and preparation to attack the
Soviet Union immediately. Taylor agreed with McNamara and emphasized that he “can’t
visualize doing it [an air attack] successfully that way [announcing the attack]” as the
missiles were the mobile type that could disappear to forest easily.441 Although preferring
a limited strike, Bundy also aligned with McNamara on surprise attack idea.442
President Kennedy set forth his view from here. He agreed that Washington should
do something because he warned Khrushchev twice not to deploy any offensive weapons
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in Cuba and “when we said we’re not going to [allow it] and then they go ahead and do it,
and then we do nothing, then […] our risks increase.”443 But his position was different from
that of others on two grounds.
First, Kennedy was very reluctant to eliminate the limited strike option as the crisis
was “a political struggle as much as military.”444 Efforts to destroy too extensive targets
were not very different from invasion and would significantly increase “the dangers of the
worldwide effects.” 445 Selective strike, in this regard, was much more “defensible,
explicable, politically, or satisfactory in every way.”446 Bundy fully agreed on this and said
the political advantage of the surgical strike was very strong as it corresponded to “the
punishment fits the crime” – “we are doing only what we warned” and “we are not
generalizing the attack.”447
Second, even though he acknowledged that public warning prior to attack would
“lose all the advantages of our strike,” Kennedy wanted to discuss further about the way to
inform NATO allies and fragile governments in Latin America, and to make a public
statement due to the political merits of expressing Washington’s “desire to restrain.”448
Rusk responded that a combined course of action – the limited strike, plus sending
messages to Khrushchev and Castro – was feasible. The reason was that the action to take
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out the offensive assets was “none other than simply the fulfilling [of] the statement” that
Kennedy made earlier.449
To sum up, almost every participant in the second meeting, except for Kennedy,
leaned towards the rapid escalation path. This increase of aggressiveness in the American
policy choice was because it turned out that while the level of Soviet’s challenge (sixteen
to twenty-four MRBMs under construction) was very serious, it seemed quite feasible for
the U.S. to take out those missile bases. They were not operational yet and very vulnerable.

2-4.

The Third ExComm Meeting on October 18, 11:10 AM – 1:15 PM

On October 17, President Kennedy resumed his normal schedule to avoid possible
suspicions by Moscow. He met the West German foreign minister, attended the luncheon
for Libyan Crown Prince, and flew to Connecticut to support the campaign of a Democratic
candidate running for the U.S. Senate. Meanwhile, his staff continued to meet and
discussed possible countermeasures against the Soviet challenge. CIA Director John
McCone returned from his stepson’s funeral and joined the team. The JCS came up with
five different groups of targets with necessary numbers of sorties: (1) Target I – missiles
and nuclear storages (52 sorties); (2) Target II – Target I plus IL-28s and MiG-21s (104
sorties); (3) Target III – Target II plus other aircrafts, SAM sites, cruise missiles, and
missile boats (194 sorties); (4) Target IV – all military targets except for tanks (474 sorties);
and (5) Target V – all military targets (2,002 sorties). Key agendas for the ExComm
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meeting on October 17 were, first, which type of military action Washington should take;
and second, whether political actions were to precede before the attack. Kennedy returned
from his campaign trip on Wednesday night but decided to stay out of the discussion until
the next day. The meeting went on until midnight.450
The next morning, McCone informed the president of new findings from complete
readouts of images taken by U-2 flights on October 14 and 15 as well as from additional
photographs taken on October 17. First, the reconnaissance mission discovered two more
missile sites to the southwest of Havana that showed the pattern of MRBM/IRBM launch
complex. Second, the three missile bases discovered earlier seemed to have expedited the
development. Now sixteen to twenty-four missiles were to be operational within a week.
Third, two more cruise-missile sites were found at Santa Cruz del Norte. Fourth, an airfield
for IL-28s was identified at San Julian. 451 These intelligence updates revealed that the
situation was much more dangerous than the ExComm members first thought specifically
because of IRBMs that placed ninety-percent of the American population in jeopardy.452
It turned out that the Soviets had made an extremely dangerous move and most
ExComm members including Rusk, McNamara, Taylor, and Kennedy ruled out the nonaction option. Rusk argued that backing down from the clear warning the president made
earlier would inevitably “free their [Soviets] hands for almost any kind of intervention”
possibly in Berlin and Korea, and should “undermine and undercut the long support [from
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the public] that we need for the kind of foreign policy.” He recommended that Washington
should take a major military action with the legal basis of the Rio Pact or by the declaration
of war on Cuba. Rusk emphasized that a surgical strike would involve “the greatest risks”
because it was to aim at destroying too great number of targets. Nevertheless, he still shared
the note453 of Charles Bohlen, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, who asserted the
necessity of taking diplomatic actions before turning to any military measure.454
McNamara, however, sided with Rusk and underscored the need to remove any
limited strike option, aiming to destroy only Targets I or II, from the table. The new
intelligence indicated that the U.S. should at least destroy Target III. Leaving any Soviet
nuclear capability behind would pose an enormous risk to the Guantanamo naval base and
the eastern coast of the States after the airstrike on Soviet MRBMs in Cuba. He, however,
did not believe that twenty-four-hour warning before the military action would adversely
affect the success of the strike operation.455
Taylor also fully agreed with Rusk and McNamara on the necessity of extensive
strike but disagreed on the impact of warning before the attack. He reminded the committee
members of the great vigor and swift progress in the development of Soviet offensive
capabilities on the island, and time was not on the Americans’ side. Considering the
vulnerable air defense system in the southern part of the States, Washington must destroy
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IL-28s. Unfortunately, the new intelligence report showed that these jet bombers were
located in ideal and well-protected airfields. Now, U.S. forces should wipe out the SAM
sites before attacking those airbases. Also, IRBMs would turn the island into a powerful
forward base of the Soviet Union. He was very skeptical about the merit of diplomatic
action as it would never be able to stop the Soviets from building up their capability. All
the Soviet offensive missiles and IL-28s should be smashed with a massive surprise attack
as soon as possible.456
This idea of a massive surprise attack, however, was not welcomed by others.
Ambassador to the Soviet Union Llewellyn Thompson argued that it would kill a lot of
Russians which should arouse public reaction in Moscow. 457 Under Secretary of State
George Ball compared it with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and said: “It is not
conduct that one expects of the United States.”458
President Kennedy agreed that the U.S. should take some measures to punish
Khrushchev for his flagrant challenge against American deterrent threats, but those actions
should be conducive to lessening “the chances of nuclear exchange” and maintaining
“some degree of solidarity with our allies.” The unannounced attack, in this regard, was
too risky. In the same vein, he was reluctant to declare war on Cuba, even if it was merely
for providing a legal ground for the blockade, as the term gave an impression that the U.S.
objective was an invasion. In contrast, warning Khrushchev might not only lead to
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minimizing the Russian causalities but also to Moscow’s backing down. Based on these
arguments, Kennedy laid out a prospective course of action that included an announcement
about the U.S. discovery of the Soviet missiles in Cuba and limited airstrike to take out
only those missiles. He strictly went against the invasion. Instead, Kennedy suggested a
possibility of trading missiles in Turkey with those in Cuba.459
Bundy sided with the president and elaborated on the idea of a missile trade.
Interestingly, he argued that this bargaining process could occur even in a case that
Washington made the “sudden strike.” During the talk, Bundy said, it would be important
to give a message to Khrushchev that the U.S. could understand the Soviet rationale of
building these missile bases in Cuba and Washington was open to trading the U.S. base in
Turkey for Soviet missiles in Cuba. McCone opposed this trade idea, but Bundy replied
that the crisis would eventually lead to the presence of Soviet submarines in the Caribbean,
and this was “a political not a military problem.”460
Based on this discussion, McNamara outlined the two courses of action that
Washington could take: (1) “slow introduction to military action” (or gradual escalation)
that included a political statement and blockade and (2) the “rapid introduction to military
action” (or rapid escalation), a brief warning to Khrushchev followed by a forceful military
attack.461 Except for Taylor, all the ExComm members believed that Washington should
notify Moscow in any way before the U.S. military operation against the Soviet bases in
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Cuba. Before they closed the meeting, Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy’s speechwriter,
summarized the discussion that there was a “general but unanimous agreement” that “some
kind of representation to Khrushchev ahead of time [before the military action]” was
necessary.462

2-5.

The Fourth ExComm Meeting on October 20, 2:30 PM – 5:10 PM

The meeting started with the intelligence report as usual. This time, CIA Deputy
Ray Cline updated the council on missile developments in Cuba. He reported that among
those four to five MRBM sites, two of them were believed to be in the state of “limited
operational readiness.” Also, the reconnaissance mission found two fixed IRBM sites under
construction. One site estimated to be operational within six weeks, while the other site
would be so between December 15 and 31. The U-2 flight, however, still did not find the
nuclear warhead storage but the intelligence team supposed that these warheads should be
nearby given that MRBMs and IRBMs would be “ineffective” without them. The report
concluded with the estimation that around eight MRBMs were considered to be fully
operational and ready to be fired.463
The two courses of action that McNamara summarized before the conclusion of the
ExComm meeting on October 18 were developed as a Presidential message or a wellformulated scenario report and submitted to Kennedy. Because the intelligence report
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suggested that some of those Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba were operational, McNamara
switched his position from rapid escalation to “blockade route” (gradual escalation). Rusk,
McNamara, Stevenson (U.S. Ambassador to the UN), and Sorensen supported this path.
Bundy, on the other hand, converted from gradual escalation to “airstrike alternative”
(rapid escalation) as he believed that a decisive action might lead to “a fait accompli” that
is difficult to be reversed by the Soviets.464 Taylor, C. Douglas Dillon (Secretary of the
Treasury), and McCone endorsed this course of action.
Unfortunately, as the ExComm members convened in the Oval Office, we do not
have the tape recording transcripts for this meeting. Instead, we have the minutes for this
NSC meeting that are “exceptionally detailed” and included “two-turn exchanges” (e.g.,
argument and counterargument; question and answer). 465 However, they still lack “the
intensity of exchanges” between the clashing approaches. 466 This section, thus, briefly
discusses the main argument of the two competing perspectives.
First, the “blockade route” was defined as a series of attempts to prevent additional
transfer of Soviet missiles to Cuba and to remove the already deployed offensive assets
through negotiations (e.g., trading American missiles in Turkey or Italy with those Soviet
ones in Cuba, limiting the American use of Guantanamo). If Moscow responded with too
risky demands, however, the blockade could be followed by an ultimatum to remove the
missiles backed by the punishment of an airstrike. McNamara knew it might take a long
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time to take out those missiles and would damage U.S. reputation which should have some
repercussions for domestic politics and alliance relations. This gradual escalation path, he
believed, had at least four advantages: (1) causing less trouble to allies; (2) avoiding a
surprise attack that would betray the American tradition; (3) taking the only feasible
military action that fitted to “the leader of the free world”; and (4) preventing escalation to
a general war.467
The “airstrike alternative” was a path to destroy all the missiles and the jet bombers
simultaneously. Those who supported this course of action had the following rationale.
First, the very existence of those missiles could not be accepted and the longer they remain
stationed there, the riskier the situation would be.468 Second, this was the last chance for
Washington to remove Soviet offensive capability in Cuba because it would become
impossible to locate them once the Soviets completed camouflaging the weapons.469 Third,
even though some nuclear missiles might survive after receiving the extensive American
airstrike, Moscow would not retaliate against Washington with the second-strike
capability.470
The below Figure 3 summarizes the shifting positions of the American
policymakers throughout the first four ExComm meetings.
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Figure 3: American Policymakers’ Shifting Positions471
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On average (the line with circle markers), the ExComm members urged more
aggressive policies as they learned more about the nature of the Soviet challenge but swiftly
toned down their approach as soon as the intelligence team informed them that eight
MRBMs had got ready to be fired. Both Rusk and McNamara followed quite a similar
pattern of the average fluctuations within the ExComm, though McNamara showed a more
extreme change of positions. Bundy demonstrated somewhat divergent tendency in his
policy recommendations as he abruptly changed his position from gradual escalation or
hedging to rapid escalation accompanying unannounced extensive strike on Cuba. Both
Kennedy and Taylor did not display much variation in their policy choices but asserted
very stark positions: gradual escalation with political inducements vs. rapid escalation
turning to surprise air attack aiming all Soviet assets on the island.
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2-6.

The Origin of the American Hedging: Testing Rival and Research

Hypotheses

How can we explain this divergence among those American policymakers?
Rational and Cognitive Deterrence literature argues that defender’s high level of resolve is
given in direct deterrence situation because: (1) balance of interest favors the defender; (2)
the defender should pay higher audience cost; (3) the human penchant for loss aversion
and the endowment effect will make the defender become a risk-acceptant type; and (4)
the logic of revenge would dominate strategic thinking of the defender. The defender, thus,
would most likely take an escalation path and decide its degree of aggressiveness based on
(1) the war cost and (2) the probability of victory in war.
If the challenger possesses nuclear weapons, however, the “crystal ball effect” gets
activated, and the defender would not take any measures containing the use of military
force. This self-containment is caused by; first, use of violent measures could escalate the
crisis into nuclear war; and second, the war cost approaches to negative infinity, and the
probability of victory goes down to zero in nuclear wars. In other words, the U.S. would
very much like to punish the USSR for deploying offensive assets in Cuba despite
Kennedy’s explicit defensive deterrent threats. But as soon as Washington detects the
presence of Soviet nuclear weapons on the island, the American policymakers should
carefully calibrate the degree of violence in devising their countermeasures. They would
most likely turn to non-violent measures. This calming effect of nuclear weapons was
precisely what Khrushchev had expected. In sum, Rival hypotheses 2-1, 2-2, and 4-2
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collectively predict that American policymakers would most likely choose a gradual
escalation path.
This causal model based on the Rational and Cognitive Deterrence literature does
explain the general pattern of American policymakers’ shifting positions quite accurately.
The model, however, shows clear limitations when it is tested against actual policy
recommendations each ExComm member made during the initial phase of the crisis. First,
the final policy decided by the ExComm was not general escalation but hedging: the
combination of non-violent use of military force and political assurance. The Soviet nuclear
capability on the island did have some “crystal ball” effect and managed to constrain the
U.S. from taking massive air assault or invasion routes. Nonetheless, those Soviet nuclear
weapons failed to suppress Washington to adjust the degree of violence below the use-ofmilitary-force level. Although the blockade was a milder punishment compared to the
extensive airstrike, it did involve use of substantial military power that could trigger a
major armed conflict, possibly a nuclear war. What would have happened if the Soviet
ships continued on course and the U.S. Navy started to open fire on them? As Jervis rightly
explains, the blockade was not merely a signal of the American resolve but “a threat that
leaves something to chance.”472
Second, the presence of Soviet nuclear missiles failed to deter ExComm advisors
from advocating the airstrike option. On the contrary, most advisors asserted the necessity
of forcefully removing those Soviet assets as soon as U-2 flights detected Il-28 jet bombers,
MRBM/IRBM launchers, and cruise-missile sites on the island. They took it for granted
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that the U.S. should attack these bases. Their approaches diverged solely on the scope (i.e.
surgical strike, general strike, and invasion) and the sequence (i.e. announced vs. secrete)
of the strike. It deserves our close attention that the majority opinion was taking the rapid
escalation path before a major shift occurred during the fourth ExComm meeting on
October 20. The “crystal ball” effect only activated when the CIA intelligence personnel
informed the national security advisors that some of these nuclear missiles were
operational and the Soviet bases in Cuba would be able to manage to maintain a secondstrike capability after absorbing an American airstrike.
Third, more interestingly, for Bundy and Taylor, even the possibility of the
existence of the Soviet second-strike capability did not prevent them from advocating the
rapid escalation route and urging extensive airstrike on all of the Soviet bases in Cuba. It
is fascinating to see that the introduction of nuclear weapons had no impact at all for some
of the policymakers in Washington. These individuals believed that blockade only
prevented further deployment of Soviet offensive assets to Cuba and had no impact on the
missiles already had deployed. The U.S. had only two options: either “going to trade [the
missiles] out” or “going to have to go in and get them out ourselves.” 473 For those who did
not like the idea of trading missiles, the forceful removal was the only option left despite
the enormous risk it carried.
Why did the Soviet nuclear capability not have the deterrent effect that Khrushchev
expected? Why were some ExComm members recommending the rapid escalation path of
wiping out the entire Soviet bases on the island despite the strategic condition of MAD and
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the possibility of nuclear holocaust? Shouldn’t this extreme risk have enough impact on
the U.S. policymakers to choose less aggressive options even though they dislike doing so
wholeheartedly? Does this mean these weapons of mass destruction did not exert a
significant impact on the U.S. deliberation process? If so, why the American policymakers
chose not to destroy the missiles sites in Cuba right away? Why the U.S. decided to take
the hedging route that included both a military measure and a political assurance of missile
trade for responding to the Soviet challenge? How well the new theory of deterrence failure,
the feasibility of punishment and the belief updating models, does explain this interesting
anomaly?
First, the feasibility of punishment model predicts a non-significant role of nuclear
weapons in deterrence failure situations because it is very difficult to make nuclear
weapons a feasible tool for punishment. The most basic threshold for turning them a viable
method of sanction is to secure power projection capability that allows the defender to
deliver these weapons. Even after securing this delivery system called “Nuclear Triad”
(bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs),474 the weapons’ inherent nature of overkill obstructs them
from being used in most defiance cases especially when the challenger strictly turns to
conventional forces. In addition, the use of nuclear weapons has become a strong taboo in
international politics, and any crisis actor uses these immoral weapons should pay
enormous political, normative, and possibly economic costs, which makes the nuclear cane
even less feasible tool of punishment. In this context, the feasibility model predicts that
Washington would not believe that U.S. attempts to forcefully remove the Soviet bases in
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Cuba result in a nuclear war as long as the Americans religiously turn to conventional
forces.
This explanation survives the smoking gun test. Discrepancies among policymakers
in Washington precisely stemmed from their different estimation about the feasibility of
the Soviet nuclear retaliation against a conventional American airstrike. The ExComm
advisors recommended Kennedy to take announced or surprise air strikes on Soviet missile
sites in Cuba only when they were convinced that Moscow would most likely not to use
their nuclear missiles in reciprocating the U.S. attack
For example, Rusk argued that as a nuclear attack would inevitably initiate a
general nuclear war under MAD, Moscow should become very much restrained.475 He,
thus, just could not “see the possibility” of the Soviet nuclear retaliation.476 McNamara
agreed with taking the airstrike option only when it seemed likely to destroy all the possible
second-strike capability of the Soviet forces.477 Taylor expected that after receiving the
American airstrike, the Soviets would retaliate only with “some conventional weapon.”478
This prediction allowed him to strongly and persistently support the unannounced massive
air strike option throughout the ExComm meetings even though he was certain that
destruction brought by the most extensive attack would “never be 100 percent”479 and there
would always be remaining Soviet nuclear missiles ready to be used for retaliation. It is
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fascinating to find that the transcript of the ExComm meetings from October 16 to 18 is
full of statements that discredit the possibility of Moscow’s decision to use any surviving
nuclear missiles in Cuba for reprisal.
Why did the majority of the ExComm members, except for Bundy and Taylor,
change their positions and support the hedging path on October 20? Two points deserve
attention: (1) McNamara warned of the possibility that Moscow might not have full control
over the weapons; and (2) Thompson alerted the consequence of killing a great number of
Soviet soldiers on the island with the American air assault.
During the first ExComm meeting on October 16, McNamara argued that Rusk’s
assumption about the political prudence in using nuclear weapons was misleading because
it was uncertain “what kinds of control they [the Soviets] have over the warheads.”
Specifically, the authority to shoot the missiles might be at the hands of the Soviet military
leadership in Cuba rather than the political leaders in Moscow. In such a scenario, if U.S.
fighters and bombers attacked the Soviet military command, they might press the nuclear
button for defending their bases.480 Besides, when the council convened on October 18,
Thompson expressed his concerns that the unannounced strike would kill many Russians
and the U.S. would “end up the whole way.”481 McNamara concurred with this and said,
“If we kill Russians, we’re going to have to go in,” which should result in escalation to war.
If “they [the Soviets] can’t stop,” then the Americans probably “have to go on.”482 In other
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words, McNamara and Thompson pictured a scenario that nuclear missiles could be
launched by the Soviet commander in Cuba when the Soviet death tolls rocked after
receiving massive American attacks from the sky.
Although it is not certain whether Rusk or other committee members bought their
arguments, similar rationale should have evolved within their mind for them to change their
positions rapidly. The only difference from the October 18 ExComm meeting to that on
October 20 was the change in intelligence report: from “not-yet operational” Soviet
missiles to their state of “limited operational readiness.” The fact that (1) the Soviets could
manage to maintain a second-strike capability after receiving the American airstrike; and
(2) the American attack would slaughter a myriad of Soviet soldiers was sufficient for most
advisors in Washington to shift their policy recommendation from rapid escalation to
hedging. This explanation passes the smoking gun test for McNamara’s position because
he precisely explained his rationale so, and provides the hoop evidence for other ExComm
member’s convergence to the blockade option.
The ExComm members, thus, first did not worry much about the possibility of a
Soviet nuclear retaliation because, first, the missiles were not yet operational and the
Soviets lacked the military feasibility to turn to these assets for reprisal attacks; and second,
starting a nuclear war was politically/normatively infeasible. However, after the U.S.
intelligence community revealed that some of the missile sites were already operational,
the majority of the council members swiftly changed their position to recommend less
aggressive policies. This trend in the American deliberation process attests that the “crystal
ball” effect only comes to the fore in case the adversary secured the second-strike capability,
not when it simply possesses any level of nuclear capability. Although the political
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feasibility of nuclear reciprocation was still very low, the uncertainty in which type of
control the Soviet military might maintain over the nuclear warheads should have made
Washington very worried once the missiles got ready.
Was this military feasibility of the Soviet nuclear counterattack the only reason for
the U.S. not to take a rapid escalation path? The belief updating model suggests another
mechanism that would encourage the defender to become more cautious and discreet in
deciding its policy in the aftermath of direct deterrence failure. Given that a direct deterrent
threat is most likely considered credible, the challenger’s defiance against this threat
indicates that the challenger is presumably a determined aggressor. Anticipating that the
challenger is ready to fight a war, the defender might be willing to update its type and
surrender some of its strategic assets to avoid the war especially when the war expected to
bring a disastrous outcome. The very fact that direct deterrence is intrinsically credible
establishes a condition and an impetus for the defender to choose less aggressive policies
after its failure. This prediction contradicts the Rational and Cognitive deterrence theories
which suggest a linear model: the more credible the threat is, the more violently the
defender responds to its failure.
This explanation based on the belief updating model matches well with President
Kennedy’s strategic thinking. At first, the president was eager to take some military
measures right away when he first found out that Khrushchev lied to him483 and completely
ignored his fair warning. Starting from the second ExComm meeting, however, Kennedy
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persistently advocated the need to make offensive deterrent or defensive compellent threats
before initiating a strike on the Soviet bases in Cuba. In this regard, he was the antipode of
Taylor. Kennedy was deeply disturbed by Khrushchev’s deceitful actions and had a very
hard time coming to grips with the Soviet Premier’s rationale behind his reckless move.
Hasn’t Moscow been “awfully cautious” since the Berlin blockade? Didn’t Washington
make very explicit statements not to make Cuba “an offensive military base of significant
capacity for the Soviet Union”? Why did Khrushchev suddenly make an extremely
dangerous move that could lead to a nuclear showdown between the two superpowers?
This sudden policy shift in Moscow was “a goddamn mystery” to Kennedy.484
Kennedy was greatly agitated because he tried to understand and predict Moscow’s
move based on what it did in the previous encounter. The president, thus, should have
updated his belief about the Soviet Union’s type from a non-credible to a credible
challenger because he made credible deterrent threats in the earlier stage yet Moscow
decided to defy them. At a minimum, Kennedy was reluctant to agree with other ExComm
advisors on that Moscow would never reciprocate the U.S. airstrike with nuclear weapons.
He pondered on the most precarious route to deal with Khrushchev’s challenge throughout
the crisis.
However, Kennedy did not make any statement that linked the fact that Khrushchev
challenged the U.S. deterrence with his policy choice of hedging. In this regard, it is
difficult to argue that the explanation provided by the belief updating model survives the
smoking gun test. Nonetheless, the causal model survives at least the straw-in-the-wind
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test, possibly the hoop test as well, considering that throughout the ExComm meetings, he
repeatedly and precisely emphasized the following; Moscow challenged the status quo
despite explicit deterrent threats made by the U.S. president himself.
Interestingly, however, Kennedy was the only one in the committee who strived to
learn from the past. Except for him, no one in the ExComm tried to make sense of the
motive behind Moscow’s decision to deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba flagrantly defying
Washington’s fair warning. As Jervis rightly points out, Kennedy realized that “because
the established assumptions about Khrushchev’s perceived self-interest, calculations, and
view of the world had just been disconfirmed,” it was necessary to fix these inaccurate
premises and put them “on a more secure footing as a prelude to taking action.” But the
ExComm refused to update their belief about Khrushchev’s motives, which “reduced
members’ sensitivity to some of the diplomatic tools the U.S. could deploy, most obviously
a pledge not to invade Cuba.”485
Special Assistant Bundy’s position exemplified the rigidness in the ExComm
advisors’ strategic thinking that refused the Bayesian updating. While other committee
members had mixed views about Moscow’s motivation such as aiming for American
concession in Berlin or increasing its strategic strength, Bundy raised the possibility that
“they made this decision […] before you [Kennedy] made your statements.”486 The Soviets,
thus, did not ignore Kennedy’s threats but had already initiated the deployment of missiles
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before the announcement of the threats. 487 If Khrushchev had not received Kennedy’s
signal when the former decided to revise the status quo, then it negates the necessity to
update the belief about the challenger’s type. This is a smoking gun evidence that Bundy,
and possibly other ExComm members as well, refused to seriously consider the implication
of Khrushchev’s defiance against Kennedy’s threats in deciding the U.S. policy against the
USSR.
To sum up, although the general trend of change in Washington’s policy debate in
the aftermath of direct defensive deterrence failure follows the prediction of the Rational
and Cognitive Deterrence models, these models fail to explain the specific positions of
individual advisors at each information set. First, most ExComm members advocated the
rapid escalation path until the intelligence team confirmed that some Soviet nuclear
missiles had been operational. Second, even after this confirmation, Taylor and Bundy
urged Washington to take a rapid escalation path. Third, the final policy decision of
Washington was hedging, rather than gradual escalation.
This mitigated impact of the “crystal ball” effect implies that threats backed by
nuclear weapons are not credible until the defender/challenger successfully makes the use of
these weapons a feasible tool of punishment. The ExComm advisors did not “think twice”
as Khrushchev had expected until they realized that (1) there might be some surviving
nuclear missiles ready to be launched after receiving the extensive U.S. airstrike on the Soviet
bases; (2) the control of nuclear warheads might not at the hands of politicians in Moscow
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but at those of the local commander; and (3) the considerable size of Soviet ground forces in
Cuba would greatly increase the number of Soviet casualties when the U.S. air force strikes
the island. The Soviet nuclear weapons finally began to affect the American strategic
thinking once these three conditions were met on October 20.
While the feasibility model demonstrates a better explanatory power than the
Rational and Cognitive Deterrence theories, the Cuban Missile Crisis does not support the
belief updating model. Kennedy indeed left many remarks that the Bayesian updating
greatly influenced his strategic thinking. Other ExComm advisors, however, were zeroing
in on identifying the exact offensive capability of the USSR in Cuba rather than trying to
make sense of Khrushchev’s reasoning and to predict his future moves based on what he
did in the past. Considering the majority of policymakers in Washington were not
influenced by the Bayesian calculation, the belief updating model shows a clear limitation
in explaining and predicting the policy choice of the defender after direct defensive
deterrence failure.

3. The Short-term Outcome: Soviet Retreat and the Peaceful Termination of the
Crisis

3-1.

Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges: from October 22 to October 26, 1962

After Kennedy sent his first letter to Khrushchev and delivered his radio and TV
speech on October 22, 1962, declaring initiation of “a strict quarantine on all offensive
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military equipment under shipment to Cuba,”488 the two top leaderships exchanged five
secrete and public letters. The American declaration of blockade strangely evoked “a
feeling of relief” rather than anxiety because Moscow was expecting the announcement of
the U.S. invasion. Before Kennedy made the public speech, the Soviet Premier had
authorized General Issa Pliyev, the local commander who was in charge of the Soviet
forces in Cuba, to use all available Soviet and Cuban military power except for the nuclear
warheads. Disliking the restrictive language of the order, however, the Soviet Presidium
prepared the second-order granting General Pliyev use of tactical nuclear weapons against
the American assault forces in the event of their landing. The order only prohibited nuclear
strikes against the continental U.S. without a direct order from Moscow. Kremlin sent out
the first order immediately but withheld the second one to observe the future development
of the crisis.489 This existence of the second-order authorizing the use of tactical nuclear
weapons proves that Kennedy’s belief updating and McNamara’s worst-case scenario were
correct. The American invasion of Cuba or massive airstrike on the Soviet bases might end
up with a nuclear holocaust.490
In response to Kennedy’s declaration of the “quarantine,” Khrushchev sent his first
and second letters asserting that it was an “act of aggression,” “the violation of the freedom
to use international waters and international air space,” and “piratical acts.” He warned that
“We will then be forced on our part to take the measures we consider necessary and
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adequate to protect our rights.”491 However, au fond, he wanted to avoid major collision
with the U.S. Navy given that the USSR Navy did not protect those Soviet merchant ships
on route to Cuba and the MRBM sites on the island already started to be operational. The
Premier, thus, ordered any ships that had not arrived in Cuba to return to USSR including
four ships carrying R-14 IRBMs: the Almeteevsk, Nicolaeev, Dubna, and Divnagarsk. To
his relief, the Aleksandrovsk carrying twenty-four nuclear warheads for the IRBMs and
forty-four warheads for cruise missiles managed to arrive in Cuba just a few hours before
the initiation of the blockade at 10 A.M., October 24. Consequently, Moscow and
Washington managed not to open the very first door to the nuclear war.
As the ExComm worried, the blockade did not affect the Soviet forces, missiles,
and the shipments of the Aleksandrovsk that had already placed in Cuba. Moscow ordered
Pliyev to expedite the construction of missile bases. One more MRBM regiment became
operational as of October 25. 492 Kennedy sent another letter to Khrushchev, third in
sequence of date,493 which received by Moscow on the morning of October 25. The letter
reiterated his regret about the Premier’s failure to recognize the root cause of the crisis: the
Soviet defiance against Kennedy’s plain and unequivocal warning.494 Although this twoparagraph message was a mere repetition of Kennedy’s earlier points, Khrushchev
interpreted it quite differently due to the three new developments.
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First, Khrushchev expressed his willingness to meet Kennedy and resolve the crisis
via his letter to the philosopher Bertrand Russell and meeting with the businessman
William E. Knox, but Kennedy’s letter did not mention this at all.495 Second, the Soviet
intelligence picked up the fact that, for the first time in the postwar period, the U.S. army
raised its alert condition to DEFCON 2. This status was just below the military operation
level and put the American forces on nuclear alert. 496 Third, the chief of the KGB
residentura in Washington, Aleksander Feklisov, sent a report to Moscow about Georgi
Kornienko’s meeting with American journalist Warren Rogers on October 25, who was
regarded by the Soviets as the “best indicator of Kennedy’s intentions.” Rogers confirmed
that the American military’s invasion plan was “prepared to the last detail,” and the “attack
could begin at any moment.” 497
Washington did not seem to be deterred by the Soviet nuclear MRBMs already
operational in Cuba. Even though Khrushchev suspected that Kennedy was determined to
initiate a global war, the Premier worried about the possibility that the President had lost
control of the hawks. Moscow might have to go through a war with the U.S. if it persists
in keeping the “hedgehog” Khrushchev had thrown into “Uncle Sam’s pants.” As he
already discussed the need to defuse the tension during the Presidium meeting on October
25 after receiving Kennedy’s disappointing letter, Khrushchev did not reconvene the
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meeting and wrote his third letter, known as the “first letter,” 498 on his own. It was a very
long, “emotional and remarkably candid” letter, 499 basically proposed the first term of
settlement to the crisis: the Soviet bases in Cuba will be removed if Washington gives
Moscow a pledge not to invade Cuba.500

3-2.

The Shooting Down of the U-2 on October 27 and the Soviet Retreat

Around the time Khrushchev’s third letter was delivered to the U.S. embassy in
Moscow at 5 p.m., Friday, October 26 (10 a.m., Friday, October 26 EST), KGB Station
Chief Feklisov met John Scali, the ABC News correspondent, at Occidental Restaurant to
exchange their views for the possible terms of settlement to the crisis. Feklisov asked Scali
how Washington would respond to Moscow if the Soviets requested the U.S. pledge not to
invade Cuba in exchange for the dismantlement of their bases on the island. The Presidium,
however, had not authorized him to make such an offer. The KGB station chief in
Washington arranged the meeting due to his sense of unsettlement fearing the nuclear
holocaust. Even so, the ExComm members believed Feklisov’s suggestion came directly
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from Moscow. They had this idea because Khrushchev’s third letter, which finally reached
the U.S. State Department around 9 p.m. due to the great length of it, 501 proposed
essentially the same thing. The ExComm met at 10 p.m. to discuss this Feklisov-Scali
proposal which Khrushchev had confirmed. 502
Meanwhile, war clouds were hanging over Cuba. Given various intelligence
sources and the warning of the Brazilian president João Goulart, the Soviet and Cuban
forces anticipated that the U.S. airstrike would occur during the night of October 26 or at
the dawn of October 27. The Soviet commander Pliyev in Cuba had taken measures to
“disperse” nuclear warheads and reported Moscow that he would “employ all available
means of air defense” in the event of a U.S. attack on Soviet missile installations. Castro
authorized his air defense units to fire on U.S. airplanes and thought he should write a letter
to Khrushchev to motivate him to take a responsible measure. In his letter, Castro implied
the need to use Soviet nuclear weapons preemptively by saying that “the Soviet Union
must never allow the circumstances in which the imperialists could launch the first nuclear
strike” and “eliminate such danger forever through an act of legitimate defense, however
harsh and terrible the solution would be.”503
When the U.S. security advisors gathered to discuss American response to
Khrushchev’s proposal arrived on the evening of Friday, October 26, it was Saturday
morning, October 27, in Moscow. Surprisingly, Khrushchev’s mood had changed
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completely over the night. He felt confident that the American invasion of Cuba was not
very likely given that the U.S. had not attacked the island for the past five days after
Kennedy’s declaration of the quarantine. The premier started to put weight on Walter
Lippmann’s column in the Washington Post on October 25 suggesting a Cuban-Turkish
missile swap504 and other KGB reports on American journalists’ views reached to Moscow
on October 27. He disregarded worrisome reports sent by Pliyev warning of an imminent
U.S. airstrike on those Soviet missile bases in Cuba. In front of members of the Presidium
gathered at noon, Khrushchev asserted that “If we could achieve additionally the
liquidation of the bases in Turkey, we would win.” He dictated his “second letter,” fourth
in chronological order, changing the terms of settlement: the Soviets’ removal of offensive
weapons from Cuba in exchange for the American evacuation of “analogous weapons”
from Turkey. The Soviet premier decided to broadcast this offer as it took too much time
for his new message to reach Washington via the standard communication procedure.505
The rest of the day did not evolve as Khrushchev hoped. Despite his strong
assurance in his “second letter” that all Soviet weapons in Cuba “are only for defense
purposes,” strictly “in the hands of Soviet officers,” and therefore “any accidental use of
them to the detriment of the United States is excluded,”506 an American U-2 was shot down
over Cuba, killing its pilot, Major Rudolf Anderson. 507 This terrible news reached
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Washington on October 27 at 4 pm. At the time, members of ExComm were preoccupied
with devising a countermeasure to Khrushchev’s “second letter” suggesting a different
term for the settlement before Washington responded to his first proposal of October 26.
McNamara pointed out that the committee removed the limited airstrike option from the
list of policy alternatives given that Soviet and Cuban antiaircraft forces started to fire on
U.S. reconnaissance planes. Washington seemed to have no choice but to initiate a massive
air strike followed by invasion.
But would it have to be now? Was it the right moment to retaliate? Kennedy faced
an extremely difficult decision to make. He was confident that American retaliation would
invite Soviet counterattacks followed by increased escalation “the fourth and fifth step –
and we don’t do to the sixth because there is no one around to do so.”508 He, thus, chose to
wait until the next morning and sent his fourth letter to Khrushchev at 8:05 p.m. Following
the ExComm advisors’ advice, Kennedy ignored Moscow’s public demand for the missile
trade in this letter, and only mentioned the premier’s first letter of October 26.509 Kennedy
promised that the U.S. would “remove promptly the quarantine measures” and “give
assurances against an invasion of Cuba” if the USSR would “agree to remove these
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weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision”
and “to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.”510
The president, however, disagreed with his advisors on the outcome of disregarding
the premier’s second proposal of the missile trade. Kennedy believed that the U.S. would
not settle the crisis without placing the Turkish missiles on the negotiation table.511 Due to
the impression of selling over its ally to its enemy, however, this missile swap should not
be announced publicly nor regarded as a quid pro quo for removing the nuclear threats by
the Soviets. He left this delicate task to draw a fine line to his brother. Robert Kennedy met
with Dobrynin that night. He warned that there was strong pressure on the president “to
give an order to respond with fire” and replied to Dobrynin’s question about Turkey by
saying that “If that is the only obstacle, [...] then the president doesn’t see any
insurmountable difficulties in resolving this issue.”512
When Khrushchev woke up on the morning of October 28, the pressing report was
waiting for him. Malinovsky briefed the premier that an American U-2 had been downed
over Cuba. This incident was a finishing blow to Khrushchev. He felt that the “situation
was slipping out of his control.”513 Today, it was a short-ranged antiaircraft missile, but
tomorrow, a ballistic missile tipped with a nuclear warhead might be launched without his
permission. Fortunately, Kennedy’s letter accepting the premier’s first offer arrived timely
because the president had given the letter to the press as Khrushchev did. The premier
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convened all of the relevant government officials at noon at the dacha in Novo-Ogaryovo
and declared, “In order to save the world, we must retreat. I called you together to consult
and debate whether you are in agreement with this kind of decision.”514
While heavy silence fell over the room after Oleg Aleksandrovich Troyanovsky,
the premier’s aide for international affairs, read aloud the Kennedy’s letter, Dobrynin’s
report about his meeting with the president’s brother arrived. Khrushchev realized that
Washington had reached a critical point and it would explode soon if he delayed further.
An intelligence report from Washington arrived, shortly after, informing of the rumor that
Kennedy’s speech would take place at 5 p.m. Moscow time. Troyanovsky had more
disturbing news. Castro’s letter advocating the use of nuclear weapons against the U.S.
translated and reached Moscow. The Soviet premier lost his composure. He ordered Pliyev
not to obey any order to launch a missile nor install the nuclear warheads. 515 Then he
prepared his final letter to Kennedy and broadcasted it immediately over Radio Moscow:
“the Soviet government […] had given a new order to dismantle the arms which you
described as offensive and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union.” 516 The message
was beamed at 5 p.m., Sunday, October 28. It was 9 a.m. in Washington.
President Kennedy welcomed the message and lauded it as “an important
contribution to peace.” He acknowledged that this positive reply of Moscow to
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Washington’s offer of October 27 established a firm foundation for cooperation in finishing
great tasks from removing quarantine and nuclear missiles to working on issues of
disarmament, nuclear test ban, and non-proliferation. The president added that “Perhaps
now, as we step back from danger, we can together make real progress in this vital field.”517

3-3.

The Short-term Outcome of the Peaceful Crisis Termination: Testing Rival

and Research Hypotheses

Washington, Moscow and the rest of the world were on the brink of nuclear
holocaust during the Cuban Missile Crisis. It was fortunate for the human race that the
crisis ended peacefully. At first glance, the peaceful termination of the crisis seems to
contradict the prediction of the Rational and Cognitive deterrence theories’: the failure of
direct defensive deterrence will more likely end up in a war. However, this crisis involved
the two greatest nuclear powers of the time, and the introduction of these dreadful weapons
should have added enormous prudence to both policy circles of the challenger and the
defender. In this context, the nuclear revolutionist approach explains Kennedy’s and
Khrushchev’s final decisions well. They managed to terminate the crisis relatively quickly
without having war, especially because of the formidable cost of nuclear war.518 As Lebow
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and Stein rightly argue, Moscow and Washington were “eyeball to eyeball,” and both leaders
blinked “out of a wholly commendable fear of war and its consequences.”519
The revolutionist perspective, however, loses a considerable level of explanatory
power when it is tested against individual policymakers and certain phases of the crisis. First,
Kennedy was the only member of ExComm who strongly believed in the necessity of giving
assurance to Moscow, the Turkish-Cuban missile swap, to resolve the crisis. All the other
national security advisors, even McNamara who had initially opposed any strike against the
Soviet missile bases in Cuba if they were operational, and advocated for the massive airstrike
route after the downing of U-2. To nuclear revolutionists’ dismay, the Soviet MRBMs
readiness to retaliate against any possible American assaults did not have much deterrent
effect on the majority of ExComm members. Similarly, the most advanced level of American
nuclear capability failed to deter the Soviet and Cuban forces from shooting at the U.S.
reconnaissance aircraft. The rationale of most policymakers in Moscow and Washington
except for the president and the premier, thus, is explained better by the Rational and
Cognitive deterrence theories than the nuclear revolutionist approach.
Second, and more importantly, the revolutionist model fails to explain the different
levels of prudence displayed by Kennedy and Khrushchev. As soon as he perceived the
implication of the Soviet missile bases being fully operational, Kennedy persistently
demonstrated a high level of caution and discretion. In contrast, Khrushchev sharply changed
his estimation of the probability of the U.S. invasion of Cuba after he sent his first terms of
settlement on October 26. This modified estimation made him more risk-acceptant and
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pushed Washington further by revising the terms the very next day. What triggered the
premier to retreat on October 28 was neither Kennedy’s offer to trade missiles nor the United
States’ full-blown nuclear capability. It was the downing of the U-2 and Castro’s request to
initiate a first nuclear strike against the U.S. that gave him a lost sense of control. We would
never know how the crisis might have evolved if these two critical events did not occur,
regardless of whether the Rational and Cognitive Deterrence models did not have the ability
to explain the divergent degree of prudence demonstrated by Kennedy and Khrushchev.
The feasibility and belief updating models can explain these irregularities, however.
First, the feasibility of punishment model predicts that nuclear weapons would not have much
impact on the policymakers’ decision-making process until these weapons are converted into
a feasible tool of punishment. Even after securing the military feasibility, or the power
projection capability to deliver these weapons; their inherent limitation of overkill prevents
them from becoming an effective punishment measure. The feasibility model, thus, explains
well why the Soviet nuclear MRBMs could not prevent the ExComm from advocating a
massive conventional airstrike option as well as why the American nuclear capability fails to
deter the Soviet and Cuban forces from using conventional weapons against the U.S. aircraft.
Both Washington and Moscow worried less about their opponents’ nuclear capability as long
as they strictly turned to conventional measures below the nuclear threshold. It is difficult to
find archival evidence that directly supports this explanation. But the explanation logically
survives the hoop test because it was impossible to urge or implement such escalatory
measures without having confidence that their opponents would not immediately punish their
actions with nuclear strikes.
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Second, the belief updating model predicts that the crisis actors will update those
images of their adversaries based on what they did in the past. In direct defensive deterrence
failure situations, the defender is more likely to update the type of challenger as a determined
aggressor since the latter defied the credible deterrent threat of the former. Contrariwise, the
challenger would likely update the defender’s type as a non-resolute one if the latter does not
stand firm against the former’s defiance. The Bayesian updating made Kennedy more
cautious while it encouraged Khrushchev to be more risk-taking as the crisis developed. This
explanation survives the smoking gun test because the two top leaderships’ rationales were
precisely based on the belief updating as explained earlier. For example, before his
declaration of the quarantine measure, Kennedy said to congressmen on October 22 that “If
we invade Cuba, [...] there is a chance these weapons will be fired at the United States.” On
the contrary, Khrushchev emphasized to his colleagues at the Presidium on October 27 that
“It is necessary to take into consideration that the United States did not attack Cuba.” 520

4. The Long-term Outcome: Deterrence Restoration

4-1.

Deterrence Restoration and Détente

After a storm comes the calm. As Khrushchev and Kennedy fared the
unprecedented danger of mutual destruction, both leaders confirmed that their opponents
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were genuinely committed to peace. Kennedy nearly “placed his fate in Khrushchev’s
hands” when he offered the back-channel term of missile swap and demanded its
secrecy. 521 What would happen if the premier publicly announced this secret deal?
Similarly, to Khrushchev’s surprise, this young American leader managed to control the
hard-liners in Washington even after the downing of a U-2. It made Khrushchev “very
interested in cooperating with Kennedy.” As many point out, “if Kennedy had not been
assassinated in November 1963 and Khrushchev not removed from office in October 1964,
the Cold War might have ended much sooner than it did.”522
This unusual trust established between the two leaders helped both countries
navigate the troubled water that followed. Washington did not insist on-ground inspection
for verifying the dismantlement and withdrawal of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba.
Although some tactical nuclear weapons such as Luna and FKR missiles were secretly left
on the island, Khrushchev made further concessions to remove IL-28 bombers when
Kennedy categorized them as offensive capability. In return, Kennedy removed Jupiter
MRBMs not only from Turkey but also from Italy in the name of “modernizing Alliance
missile capability” despite the dissatisfaction and protest of those allies. Although Kennedy
intended to replace them with Polaris SLBMs even before the initiation of the missile crisis,
both Turkish and Italian governments resented for the fact that Washington had decided
without any meaningful consultation with them.523
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Although there were remaining grounds for quarrel such as the number of Soviet
troops stationed in Cuba, Berlin, and the nuclear rivalry, the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis
paved a way to détente and created superpower relations that were qualitatively different
from those between 1948 and 1962. In his famous American University speech, Kennedy
praised the sacrifice of the Soviets during the Second World War, for the first time in the
postwar era, and said: “We can seek a relaxation of tensions without relaxing out guards.”
Khrushchev highly commended the speech as “the greatest speech by any American
president since Roosevelt.” In 1963, Washington and Moscow established the hot-line and
signed the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.524
The most remarkable incident, however, that demonstrates the long-term impact of
the Cuban Missile Crisis is the 1970 Cienfuegos Crisis. In late August, U-2 reconnaissance
flights detected unusual construction work in Cienfuegos Bay in Cuba. It was confirmed
later that the USSR was building a submarine base there by the arrival of a Soviet flotilla
and task force in the bay on September 9 and by the additional photo images of U-2 on
September 16 that showed military barracks, anti-aircraft SAM sites, and recreation
facilities for Soviet personnel such as soccer field.525 This Soviet provocation must have
been a déjà vu to U.S. policymakers as the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding forbade
any establishment of Soviet offensive capability in the Caribbean yet Washington caught
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the Soviet violation of it again. Generally speaking, the initial stage of the Cienfuegos crisis
followed a very similar pattern of what happened during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Interestingly, however, the crisis ended rapidly through immediate communication.
When Washington warned Moscow that the U.S. would forcefully remove the base if the
Soviets refuse to do so, the USSR government agreed to end the construction honoring the
1962 understanding. Considering that there were no actual treaty or public statement issued
concerning the precise contents of the “understanding,” this prompt retreat of Moscow was
an unexpected one. The world did not have to go through another brink of war over Cuba.
The (offensive) deterrence was restored. We can confirm this successful working of
deterrence by the fact that, first, Soviet submarines occasionally visited Cuba after the
incident, but none of them were nuclear-powered SLBMs launching ones; and second, the
Soviets had not built the submarine base after all.526

4-2.

Difficulties in Explaining the Deterrence Restoration

As discussed in Chapter 2, the Hopf-Mercer-Press consensus and the feasibility of
punishment model predict that reputation does not produce a consistent effect, and past
retreat of defenders would not necessarily cause further challenges in the future. What
matters the most is not the past behavior of the defender but its current degree of resolve
and feasibility to punish any acts of defiance against the status quo. On the contrary, the
recent rebuttal to the Hopf-Mercer-Press consensus points out that past policy choice of the
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defender will have a significant impact on the challenger’s estimation of the credibility of
the defender’s deterrent threat in case the former deals with the same opponent, a consistent
issue, and a crucial interest at stake. The belief updating model supports this claim:
defender’s strategy of de-escalation would invite more aggressive policies from the
challenger in the future due to the latter’s Bayesian updating about the former’s type.
Unfortunately, due to the dearth of accessible archives related to this crisis, it is
difficult to test these theories against the case and confirm them. None of the literature on
this crisis uses Soviet primary sources. Even the published memoirs of the Soviet
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, and President
Richard Nixon barely mention this incident. 527 What can be said for sure is that those
Soviet leaders who replaced Khrushchev after the missile crisis continued to honor the
1962 understanding. It is fascinating that the 1970 Soviet attempts to test the American
position on submarine bases in Cuba reinforced, rather than weakened, the
understanding.528 This “understanding” projected after the missile crisis “was not really
effected until August of 1970, and confirmed publicly (and reconfirmed privately) only in
October of 1970.” 529 It is not clear whether Moscow did so intentionally to strengthen the
1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding. Deciphering the true intention of the Soviet
policymakers during the Cienfuegos Crisis requires a further declassification of Soviet
primary sources.
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CHAPTER VI
RAPID AND GRADUAL ESCALATION:
THE 1969 SINO-SOVIET BORDER CONFLICT, THE 1973 YOM KIPPUR WAR,
AND THE 1982 FALKLANDS WAR

Examining the archival literature using the method of process-tracing, the previous
two case-study chapters confirmed the limited explanatory power of Rational and
Cognitive Deterrence theories for the cases of direct defensive deterrence failure. These
chapters also reveal that the feasibility of punishment model better explains the crisis
processes of the deterrence failure from the policy choices of the challenger and the
defender to the short- and long-term outcomes. While the belief updating model is weakly
supported when it is tested against the policymakers of the defender in general, the model
explains well the strategic thinking and the policy choices of the crisis actors’ top
leadership such as Hitler, Kennedy, and Khrushchev.
In this chapter, the dissertation continues to test the relevance of the feasibility and
the belief updating models in explaining other cases of deterrence failure: the 1969 SinoUSSR Border Conflict, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the 1982 Falklands War. Although
the Rhineland and the Cuban Missile Crises are different enough cases in many ways, the
two crises share one thing in common. They both have symmetric dyads in terms of nuclear
capability. While the former crisis in 1936 has crisis actors of non-nuclear powers, the
latter 1962 crisis involves fully developed nuclear powers that possessed the second-strike
capability. To fairly study the population of direct defensive deterrence failure, thus, it is
was to examine other crises that comprise different types of nuclear balance such as nuclear
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disparity (a balance decisively favoring one crisis actor) and asymmetry (a dyad consists
of nuclear and non-nuclear powers). The selection of those three cases is to represent the
full spectrum of the nuclear balance. Due to the dearth of accessible archives and some
language barrier of the researcher, this chapter majorly turns to secondary sources and
engages in mini-case studies for the selected three crises.

1. The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute in 1969

1-1.

The Origin of the Chinese Challenge

Although China and the USSR have an officially agreed borderline between them
based on the treaties signed by the Chinese Emperors and the Russian Tsars in the 1800s,
they maintained stark differences in interpreting the legitimacy of those treaties and the
exact location of the demarcation line (Map 3). China repeatedly denied the legality of the
treaties, given that they were forced to weak Chinese Emperors and believed that Russia
robbed China of about 400,000 square kilometers of its territory. Also, especially for the
eastern boundary between the two countries, it was not clear who owned the hundreds of
river islands along the Amur and Ussuri rivers as the Treaty of Peking signed in 1860 listed
the rivers as the border.530
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Map 3: The Sino-Soviet Border531

Despite these differences and ambiguities of the borderline, there had not been
much conflict between the two countries until 1963 thanks to their friendly relationship
based on the Marxist ideology. The Soviet Union provided economic assistance to China
and helped Beijing build modern military capabilities, including atomic bombs in the early
1950s. However, everything changed during Khrushchev’s era. As the premier’s project of
de-Stalinization in 1956 weakened Chinese Chairman Mao Zedong’s domestic authority
and his regime’s legitimacy, the bilateral relationship deteriorated rapidly. Mao criticized
Khrushchev for taking the path of “de-Marxification” and “revisionism” and identified him
as a “Hitler-type Fascist dictatorship.” 532 The Soviets reneged on their commitment to
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support China to build nuclear capability and withdrew Soviet civilian and military
specialists from China in 1960.
Beijing started to raise the problem of “unequal treaties publicly” and, in 1963,
ignited the Sino-Soviet territorial disputes. Mao’s statement on July 10, 1964, triggered a
critical break in their relations as he accused Moscow of holding vast territories that
belonged to China only a hundred years ago, such as the east area of Lake Baikal, while
still looking for the opportunity to occupy even Xinjiang and Heilongjiang. Although Mao
clarified later that he was “firing empty canons” to scare Khrushchev and to reach a
favorable settlement regarding the border disputes, Moscow perceived it as proof of
Chinese “expansionist aspiration,” similar to Hitler’s Lebensraum, and leveled up its
pressure to Beijing by taking the following three measures. 533
First, Moscow greatly reinforced its conventional forces along the Sino-Soviet
border. From 1966 to 1969, the number of combat divisions along the border increased
from 14 to as many as 34. The Soviets also signed a defense treaty with Mongolia that
authorized them to station their troops and equipment there. The USSR even deployed
Scaleboard (SS-12) tactical nuclear missiles to the border. This great Soviet military
buildup along the border potentially opened the third military front for China besides
Taiwan and Vietnam.
Second, the Soviet forces in the Far East adopted an aggressive type of patrolling.
Although they did not use small arms, they turned to clubs and armored vehicles to evict
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Chinese from the disputed islands. A number of civilians and soldiers were injured and
killed as a result. The most serious incident occurred on January 5, 1968, in Qiliqin Island
in which five Chinese lost their lives. From late 1968, the Soviet patrols fired warning shots
at Chinese forces. Third, the USSR invaded Czechoslovakia and announced the Brezhnev
doctrine, which proclaimed that Moscow had the right to intervene in the domestic affairs
of other socialist states.534
China could not tolerate the USSR’s assertive moves any longer, especially since
Soviet pressure increased along the borderline as Chinese domestic stability deteriorated.
From 1966, Mao mobilized students and launched the Cultural Revolution to deal with the
growing revisionist tendencies in China. The Chinese government, however, soon lost
control of the movement, and before long, 60 to 80 central and provincial officials were
purged, and hundreds of thousands of people died. To quell this massive social unrest and
restore social order, Beijing brought in military, and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) units
assumed administrative control of many local areas. 535 Considering this serious level of
social turmoil in China, it was reasonable for Mao to suspect that the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia was a prelude to Moscow’s intervention in Chinese domestic affairs.
Beijing believed it was time to teach the Soviets a “bitter lesson.” Mao ordered
PLA’s Shenyang Military Region and Beijing Military Region to come up with a plan to
launch strikes against Soviet forces. The original plan was prepared after the 1968 Qiliqin
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Island incident. It was an ambush assault consisting of two designated units: using PLA’s
patrol unit as bait to lure Soviet patrols while a major attack squadron (a size of 300 soldiers)
secretly taking position on the island in advance. If the Soviet patrol approached the PLA
unit of small size (about 20-30 men) to compel the Chinese soldiers to leave the island, the
ambushed squadron would open fire and annihilate the Soviets.536 PLA executed the plan
on the Zhenbao/Damansky Island on March 2, 1969, and the Chinese forces killed 38 and
wounded about 30 Soviet soldiers destroying one armored vehicle, a command car, and a
truck.537
Why did Mao decide to launch an ambush against the Soviet patrol units risking a
war? Why did Beijing choose Zhenbao Island for implementing its contingency plan? The
literature on the Sino-Soviet Border Disputes generally agrees that the Chinese offense was
for preventing “another Czechoslovakia.” As the Soviet Union was a much stronger
adversary; its military buildup in the eastern border and announcement of the Brezhnev
doctrine should pose an enormous threat to China that was undergoing the worst domestic
turmoil in its history. Beijing believed that the only way to deter the Soviet intervention in
Chinese domestic affairs was to deliver a strong message to Moscow by “publicizing the
danger in advance and making clear that any attack will be forcefully resisted by a fearless
adversary.” It was Mao’s famous tactic of “offensive defense, or defense through decisive
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engagements.” By displaying the “worst-case contingency,” Beijing believed that it could
deter Moscow’s offense.538
To serve this purpose, China needed a “limited” and “one-time-only” battle that
PLA could (1) “fight quickly,” (2) “avoid entanglement,” (3) achieve an overwhelming
victory, and (4) “retreat to a safe location” after the fight with the proof of victory such as
pictures and Soviet weapons or equipment. Zhenbao Island was selected as it met these
conditions. First, geographically speaking, the island is located closer to the Chinese side
of the bank – only about 100 meters away from it while the Soviet bank was approximately
400 meters away –, and the Chinese bank was elevated while the Soviet side lacked any
high ground. These geographic features provided the PLA troops a better line of sight for
attack.
Second, and more importantly, the Chinese leadership in Beijing anticipated that
the Soviets would not be able to launch a large-scale war to avenge their defeat over the
island. During the party meeting for planning the operation on Zhenbao, Premier Zhou
Enlai emphasized that the Soviets needed a lot more time to turn “the relatively
undeveloped Soviet Far East into the bases for attacking China.”539 Beijing’s challenge
against the status quo, thus, was based on its confidence that: (1) the PLA could achieve
sure and absolute victory over the Zhenbao Island; and (2) the armed conflict between
China and the USSR over the island would not escalate further into a full-scale war given
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the marginal interest at stake and the limited military feasibility of Moscow to launch a
major counterattack in the Far East. It was simply a limited warfare to signal Moscow that
Beijing would stand firm against the Soviet interference to its domestic affairs.
This strategic thinking demonstrates that Beijing had no intention to start a largescale war against Moscow. It needed a quick and easy victory in a confined area to signal
China’s sufficient capability to resist any Soviet challenge and strong resolve to fight if
Moscow tried to intervene in its domestic affairs. Zhenbao Island was carefully chosen to
accomplish this purpose. Beijing was confident that it was not very feasible for the Soviets
to severely punish the Chinese challenge and escalate the crisis into a large-scale war after
their defeat on the small island. Therefore, Moscow’s low military feasibility to punish
Chinese defiance, rather than Beijing’s strong will to engage in a full-scale war against the
increasingly threatening neighbor, was the main cause for the USSR’s direct defensive
deterrence failure over the Zhenbao/ Damansky Island.

1-2.

The Soviet Response: Rapid Escalation with Conventional Forces and
Nuclear Threats

To Mao’s disappointment, Moscow received a very different message from the
Chinese ambush attack on Damansky Island. Through the foreign ministry press
conference and its communication with the GDR leadership, Moscow proclaimed that
Beijing established an “anti-Soviet and chauvinist great power course as the general line
of Chinese policy,” and the latter’s provocation proved that China had become “a power
hostile toward the socialist countries.” To demonstrate its strong resolve to stand firm
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against this anti-Soviet challenge, Moscow took two courses of action. First, the USSR
continued its military buildup along the Sino-Soviet borderline and tried to make sure other
socialist countries, including China, to acknowledge this reinforcement by inviting foreign
journalists to the area.540 Second, Moscow decided to take a limited but serious retaliatory
course by dispatching troops with many more armored vehicles and much stronger
firepower to the area to attack Chinese patrols on Damansky Island.
In the morning of March 15, 1969, the Soviet patrol led by Senior Lieutenant Lev
Mankovsky, discovered Chinese forces sneaked into the island and decided to attack them
to retaliate against the Chinese March 2 assault. When the battle started around 8 to 9 AM,
the Soviets found out that China threw more than a regiment (about 2,000 soldiers) on their
side of the riverbank and laid out anti-tank mines on the island. There were three waves of
Soviet attack until 7 PM involving tanks, armored vehicles, heavy artillery attacks, and
more than a hundred troops.541
Both sides lost considerable numbers of forces and equipment. The Soviets reported
that Chinese causalities amounted to 800 while the USSR lost 60 men, including the border
post commander, Colonel D. I. Leonov.542 The Chinese sources, however, emphasized that
the Soviets lost two tanks and seven armored vehicles and PLA additionally damaged two
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Soviet tanks and four of its armored vehicles. The Chinese side also argued that while PLA
suffered 91 casualties (30 killed, 61 wounded), the Soviets suffered more than 200 casualties
(approximately 91 killed and 109 wounded) from the two battles on March 2 and 15.543
Robinson points out that this second clash between China and the USSR on March
15 marks the starting point of the Soviet “dual strategy”: a combination of diplomatic and
military measures for “giving the Chinese periodic bloody noses” in order to “convince
them of the wisdom of border settlement along the lines of the 1964 Soviet proposals.”544
Moscow suggested talks on the borderline issue to Beijing on March 29 and April 11 while
leveling up its force reinforcement in the eastern border and making nuclear threats via
radio address.545 China responded about one month later. On April 24, the Ninth Party
Congress in Beijing released a lengthy statement that established a precondition for any
negotiation for the border issue. Moscow should admit first that “the treaties relating to the
present Sino-Soviet boundary are all unequal treaties imposed on China by tsarist
imperialism.” And the statement added that “neither a small war, nor a big war, nor a
nuclear war can ever intimidate the Chinese people.”546
In response, the Soviets continued their diplomatic efforts yet simultaneously
leveled up the military threats. In June, Soviet bomber units were deployed to Mongolia
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and Siberia to engage in military exercises practicing preemptive strikes on Chinese
nuclear facilities. From June to July, there were 429 incidents along the Sino-Soviet border,
and both sides suffered both civilian and military casualties as well as the burning down of
civilian homes. The culmination point was August 13, when a Soviet force of three hundred
men with ten tanks and armored vehicles penetrated to Tielieketi (or Zhalanshkol) in
Xinjiang province and attacked from ambush killing 20 to 40 Chinese border guards.547 On
August 27, the editorial in Pravda noted that the future Sino-Soviet conflict would
accompany both sides’ nuclear capability and “would not leave a single continent
unaffected.” 548
One very interesting point that deserves our close attention is the Soviet choice of
the Tielieketi area for implementing their major retaliatory attack against PLA. As China
carefully chose the Zhenbao Island for conducting their limited assault, the Soviet selection
of Tielieketi also came from serious strategic calculation. Moscow expected that this
retaliatory measure would possibly cause Mao to escalate the crisis even further given that
the Chinese leader always underscored “political power comes out of the barrel of a gun.”
As the escalation might lead to a general war between the two countries, Moscow did not
want to choose the eastern parts of the border as their main area of attack considering their
limited transportation capability to deliver the Soviet forces and equipment to the Far
East.549 As Premier Zhou anticipated, thus, the Soviets indeed had some problems with
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projecting their power towards the eastern border. To address this potential problem,
Moscow chose the Xinjiang area for avenging their relative defeats in two armed clashes
in May. The military feasibility to follow through, thus, was the main factor that determined
the Soviet reaction towards the Chinese challenge against the status quo over the Damansky
Island.

1-3.

Short-term Outcome: a Limited War

Beijing’s attitude toward Soviet nuclear and military threats rapidly changed in
August 1969. Only four months ago, Premier Zhou wrote a memo to Chairman Mao and
Defense Minister Lin Biao and claimed that the USSR was a “paper tiger” that made “an
empty show of strength, a show that was designed for others to watch.”550 On August 27,
however, the Chinese Communist Party entrusted the premier with preparing for evacuating
massive population and dispersing major industries out of large cities. The Chinese
government instructed civilians to dig air-raid shelters and stock up essentials. The following
day, Mao issued a mobilization order to the border provinces and directed them to “be fully
prepared to fight a war against aggression.”
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initiate an air assault on Beijing. He, thus, instructed Zhou to meet Kosygin at the airport, not
inside the city, on September 11 while nearby military forces were on alert.
When this Zhou-Kosygin meeting suddenly relaxed the intense tension between
Beijing and Moscow, Minister Lin believed that the Soviets were employing a smokescreen
tactic like the Japanese special envoy to the U.S. President Roosevelt did before their attack
on Pearl Harbor. China, thus, conducted the nuclear test twice in September to deter the
Soviet “nuclear sneak attack.” Lin also ordered the entire Chinese forces to enter “firstdegree combat readiness” because he firmly believed that Moscow would launch a surprise
attack taking advantage of the Chinese national holiday on October 1. As there was no Soviet
attack on that day, Mao and Lin were now convinced that the airplane supposed to carry the
Soviet delegation for the follow-up meeting on the border issue on October 20 should be
loaded with nuclear weapons. Accordingly, on 14 October, the Central Party Committee
advised to all military and political leaders to leave Beijing before October 20, and Lin sent
a directive to move PLA forces to forward positions and to put the Chinese nuclear forces on
alert on October 19, for the first and the last time in the Chinese history. 552
The intense 1969 Sino-Soviet border disputes involving numerous and serious
armed clashes between the two countries continued for about eight months. The disputes
finally began to cool down after the delegations from Beijing and Moscow finally sat down
on October 20. The Chinese bargaining position was greatly weakened this time because
“above the negotiating table hangs the Soviet atomic bomb.” 553 Why those Chinese
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policymakers suddenly started to believe the authenticity of the Soviet nuclear threats in
August while they disbelieved the threat in April 1969? The literature points out that there
are at least two reasons behind this.
First, Chinese policymakers were shocked by the Tielieketi incident and reassessed
their beliefs about the level of Moscow’s resolve. Mao believed that the main focus of the
Soviet foreign policy always lay in Europe. China, thus, should be able to get away with
its limited yet major military success on Zhenbao Island without having a major armed
conflict with the USSR. The continued clashes between the two sides along the border,
especially the major Soviet offensive in the Xinjiang area surprised Mao and other leaders
in the Chinese Communist Party, which enforced them to correct their wrong estimation
about their opponent.554 Second, Beijing learned that Moscow had been contacting foreign
governments to see how they would respond to the Soviet preemptive nuclear strike on
Chinese nuclear bases. Especially on August 27, the CIA Director Richard Helms released
the information to the press that the Soviets had been approaching the U.S. and other
socialist countries to ask about their reactions to the possible Soviet attack on China’s
nuclear program. 555 This Soviet move made Mao and other policymakers in Beijing to fear
that Moscow was seriously considering the implementation of its nuclear punishment
option.
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1-4.

Long-term Outcome: Deterrence Restoration

Although a negotiation on the Sino-Soviet border issue finally started on October
20, 1969, the ultimate settlement of the issue had to wait until the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the final agreement between Beijing and Moscow on June 2, 2005.556 As China
continuously insisted on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from disputed areas along the
border and the reduction of the Soviet forces in the area while the USSR repeatedly rejected
them, no real progress was made despite the numerous attempts to settle down the matter.
While the negotiation was in a stalemate, multiple incidents occurred along the border. For
example, A Soviet patrol unit crossed to the Chinese bank of the Ussuri River on May 9,
1978. One Chinese got killed and another wounded by the Soviet soldiers on the Xinjiang
area on July 16, 1979. One Chinese and one Soviet civilians were killed on the Argun River
on Oct. 5, 1980. Beijing, however, did not choose to take violent military measures again
to deal with these incidents. 557
How can we explain this relatively peaceful relationship between China and the
USSR on the border issue after the 1969 conflict? Fravel suggests four main factors behind
this. First, Beijing’s “war scare” during the summer and fall of 1969 taught them a lesson
that their estimation of Moscow’s resolve was wrong. The Soviets restored their direct
defensive deterrence against China by successfully communicating their military strength,
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especially nuclear capability, and their resolve to use them to Beijing after the deterrence
failure. Second, since the Zhou-Kosygin talks, both sides agreed to adopt measures to
prevent further conflicts instead of concluding a deal on the border issue. The combined
efforts of Beijing and Moscow for risk management surely helped them not to fall into the
trap of spiral again. Third, China managed to secure de facto control over the disputed
islands along the Ussuri and achieved its narrow goal on the territorial issue. Fourth, China
matched the Soviet reinforcement along the borderline by moving five armies from the
south. In addition, the Chinese rapprochement with the U.S. and its increased domestic
stability in the 1970s also contributed Beijing to invest more of its political and diplomatic
resources to deal with the border issue without hastily turning to military forces. 558
The above description of the initiation, development, and termination of the 1969
Sino-Soviet Border conflict reveals which model of deterrence failure, namely,
Rational/Cognitive Deterrence theories versus feasibility and belief updating models,
better explains the case. The following “conclusion” chapter compares the explanatory
capabilities of each model more in detail while summarizing key findings of all three minicase studies. The next section examines the origin, process, and outcome of the 1973 Yom
Kippur War and discusses the main factors that led Egypt, Syria, and Israel to choose
certain policy options throughout the crisis.
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2. The Yom Kippur War in 1973

2-1.

The Origin of Egyptian and Syrian Challenge

The Yom Kippur War, or the October War in 1973, is the fifth war between Israel
and the Arab world from 1947 to 2006.559 This series of conflicts between the two sides
originated from the two main territorial issues: first, the creation and existence of the
Jewish state in Palestine; and second, extensive territories Israel started to control due to
the outcome of the Six-Day War in 1967, such as the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, and
the Golan Heights (Map 4).
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Map 4: The Israeli Territory after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War

The origin of the conflict between the Jews and the Arabs stretched back to ancient
times as far as 1,200 years of pre-Christian era according to Zionist historians.560 Arguably,
however, the actual starting point for serious clashes between them was 1881 when waves
of Jewish immigration initially inspired by the Zionist idea to create a Jewish state in
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Palestine. As Palestine had been home to the Arab people561 since the expulsion of the
Jewish community from the region by the Roman Empire in 135 AD, the very existence of
the Jewish state in Palestine was a clear violation of the principle of self-determination and
thus unacceptable to the Arab world. The region had been under the de facto status of war
since the “Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel” on May 14, 1948. The
conflict between the two sides aggravated when Israel forcefully drove out about 726,000
Palestinians during its nation-building process for ensuring the Jewish majority in the
region. 562
After the 1956 war between Israel and Egypt over the Suez Canal, the Arab-Israeli
conflict got interwoven with the great power struggle as Egypt, Syria, and Iraq sought
support from the USSR while the United States backed Israel. The humiliating defeat of
the Arab world in the 1967 Six-Day War followed by another defeat of Egypt in the War
of Attrition from 1968 to 1971 against Israel, created an image of invincible Israel and the
perception of weak, hopeless, and inferior Arab states. Especially during the Six-Day War,
Israeli Air Force destroyed all of the air power of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq on the day
of the war, and occupied the area including the Gaza Strip, the entire Sinai peninsula up to
the Suez Canal, the Old City of Jerusalem, all of Jordanian territory west of the Jordan, and
the Golan Heights. These newly captured areas were three times greater than Israel’s
original territory before the outbreak of the war. This embarrassing defeat of the Arab states
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made Moscow reluctant to provide any further military equipment to them as helping the
Arabs seemed whistling into the wind. Even when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat secretly
engaged in a peace initiative using the U.S. Secretary Henry Kissinger as a backchannel in
early 1973. Both the U.S. and Israel did not feel the need to work on a peace deal with the
Arab world given the enormous power gap that existed between the two sides and, thus,
rejected Sadat’s offer.563
American and Israeli policymakers had every reason to believe that the Arab states
would not be able to do anything, and the Rational Deterrence perspective supports their
rationale. First, Israel successfully demonstrated that it possessed the superior military
capability that can beat even the combined Arab forces of four major countries during the
1967 Six-Day War. In the followed-up War of Attrition, Israel revealed that its will to fight
for the newly occupied territory in the Sinai despite the interest at stake was less than
intrinsic for them. Israel also successfully demonstrated their superior durability in fighting
a sustained artillery battle and confirmed the strength of support it was receiving from the
U.S.564 In other words, Israel effectively signaled its sufficient capability and strong resolve
to its adversaries, and accordingly, its direct deterrence policy would hardly fail in the
future. As Kissinger wrote, “the Arab armies must lose; hence, they would not attack.”565
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To Israel’s great surprise, however, Egypt and Syria launched a major offensive in
the Sinai and the Golan Heights and enforced Israel a two-front war on October 6, 1973.
There can be three explanations for the challengers’ move. First, the Rational Deterrence
theory argues that Egypt and Syria were (falsely) convinced that they could win the war
against Israel because of the change in the balance of power thanks to a major improvement
in their weapon system with the help of the USSR. Second, the Cognitive Deterrence theory
points out that the domestic political conditions of Egypt and Syria jeopardized the regime
security of these countries unless they did not challenge Israel. They initiated a war, thus,
even though they knew their defeats were certain; yet it was indispensable for them to
restore the honor and self-esteem of the Arab world by defying against powerful Israel to
ensure the domestic support for their regimes. Third, the feasibility of punishment model
explains that Egypt and Syria had confidence in wining a specific kind of war if they
imposed Israel a battle in certain ways to deprive the latter of its feasibility to punish them.
While the first two explanations assume that the challengers were determined aggressors,
the third one supposes that they were conditionally resolute or strategically opportunistic.
Which explanation fits best with the rationale of Egyptian President Sadat and
Syrian President Hafez al-Assad for initiating the war? Numerous studies, including
Sadat’s memoir and a case study based on the interview with Assad, point out that the two
Arab leaders had very different objectives. While Sadat wanted to revive the peace
initiative and shape a favorable condition for negotiation, Assad sought to regain its lost
territory by force.566
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After going through the U.S. and Israeli rejection of his peace initiative, Sadat
learned that he should break the widespread perception of the Arab inferiority before
working on any peace deal with Israel and the U.S. to regain the Sinai. He wrote;

“It was impossible, as I have always said, for the United States (or, indeed, any
other power) to make a move if we ourselves didn’t take military action to break the
deadlock. [...] The United States regrettably could do nothing to help so long as we
were the defeated party and Israel maintained her superiority. […] if we could
recapture even 4 inches of Sinai territory [...], and establish ourselves there so firmly
that no power on earth could dislodge us, then the whole situation would change –
east, west, all over.”567

This statement shows that he had a very limited goal on October 6: to show the
world that Israel was far from invincible and the Arab states had sufficient capability to
greatly disrupt not only the regional stability but also the great power relations that were
enjoying détente and relatively peaceful times in the early 1970s. Through achieving a
short-term but astonishing military victory, Egypt could secure an honorable seat on the
negotiation table for comprehensive peace in the Middle East. To accomplish this vision
of victory in “the Six-Hour War,”568 he carefully devised a specific military plan for a
limited war and sought help from Moscow to build necessary strength.
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First, Sadat did everything he could do to prevent Israel from initiating a preemptive strike and mobilizing its reserves, the pattern of Israel’s sure victory in the 1967
war. His main countermeasure to achieve this goal was deception and strategic/intelligence
surprise.569 Sadat expelled the Soviet experts in July 1972 to deceive the West that he cut
off the supply line for the Soviet military equipment. He then launched a mass media
campaign and civil defense measures in May and August 1973 to mislead Israel into
believing that the war was imminent. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan ordered full
mobilization twice for nothing wasting ten million dollars each time.570 Lastly, Sadat chose
to launch an attack on October 6, the Yom Kippur Day or the Day of Atonement, the holiest
and the most solemn holiday in the Jewish calendar when most soldiers were at home, not
on the fortified posts along the Bar-Lev line.571
Second, Sadat learned from the Egyptian failure in the two previous wars and focused
on building countervailing strength that could address Israel’s superiority in the air and largescale armored battles. He was deeply concerned with the possibility of Israel’s “deep
penetration” and air raiding on Egypt’s major cities. Interestingly, however, it is difficult to
find archival evidence that he was worried about Israeli nuclear capabilities.572 Sadat zeroed
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in on securing Soviet advanced military assets especially anti-tank and air defense
capabilities namely, SA-6 Soviet surface-to-air missile, the SAM-7 shoulder-fired missile,
the RPG-7 rocket launcher, and the AT-3 Sagger wire-guided missile.573
Assad also had no intention to start a large-scale war against Israel. He wanted to
restore the confidence of the Syrian forces by reoccupying the lost Golan Heights. 574
However, Assad had a far more ambitious aim compared to Sadat’s “4 inches of Sinai
territory.” He was very skeptical about the effects of peace talks or UN resolutions and
“wanted to put the clock back to before Israel’s conquests in the Six-Day War” by military
force.575 Assad insisted that;

“The goal was the retrieval of territory which Israel occupied in 1967. [...] it was
agreed that Syria’s aim was the recovery of the Golan while the Egyptian objective
was to reach the Sinai passes in the first stage before regrouping for the reconquest
of the whole peninsula. This was what Sadat and I decided and it was on this
principle that we went to war.”576

To achieve this goal, he concentrated 70 percent of the national budget on
increasing military strength and concluded $700 million arms deal with Moscow in 1972
after receiving $327 million worth military aid. Before the war broke out, the Syrian army
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was equipped with MiG-21 fighter planes, SAM anti-aircraft missiles, FRUG surface-tosurface missiles, T-62 tanks. 577 This massive military buildup in Egypt and Syria changed
the military balance between the Arab coalition and Israel more favorable to the former.
Compared to Arab-Israel military balance of 1.47:1 in the air, 1.71:1 in tanks, and 1.09:1
in manpower during the Six-Day War; Egypt and Syria succeeded in widening the gap to
the ratio of 2.54:1 in the air, 2.8:1 in tanks and 2.16:1 in manpower.578
With this increased power, however, Sadat wanted to buy bargaining chips for
concluding favorable peace deals whereas Assad sought to recover the lost territory by
force. The October War, thus, was mainly a “political war” for Sadat while it was a “war
of liberation” to Assad. Patrick Seale argues that Sadat deceived Assad and the Syrians
“were actually fed false war plans.” The two-front war was a misguided plan for Syria,
which was crumbling from the beginning. When Assad realized that Sadat betrayed him,
he regretted not setting “less ambitious objectives.”579
These testimonies of Sadat and Assad show that while the Rational Deterrence theory
explains Syria’s move better and the Cognitive Deterrence theory fits well with the Egyptian
policy choice. However, the fact that both Arab states had no intention to start a large-scale
war to destroy Israel even with their greatly enhanced military capabilities and pressing needs
of domestic politics should deserve our closer attention. Sadat and Assad had a limited goal
in launching a war against Israel, and they focused on building capabilities, such as SAM
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and anti-tank missiles, which could neutralize Israeli punishment measures. The Egyptian
leadership’s misperception that they had secured enough capability to negate or at least
significantly reduce the Israeli capability to punish their limited war caused the 1973 October
war.580 The Egyptian and Syrian policy choice of initiating a limited war demonstrates that
the actual trigger that determined the timing of the war was the Israeli military feasibility to
punish the Arab challenge to revise the status quo.

2-2.

The Israeli Response: Rapid Escalation with Conventional Forces

During the first few days of the Yom Kippur war, both Egypt and Syria achieved
remarkable military success. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) was in a dire predicament on both
the Sinai and the Golan fronts opened by the two Arab states due to the delay in calling up
of reserves until the very last moment. Although they knew about the imminent war on the
morning of October 6, Prime Minister Golda Meir and Defense Minister Dayan declined
the Chief of Staff David Elazar’s request to launch a preemptive strike and call up reserves.
Meir and Dayan wanted to create the image of the “opening scene” that Israel was a victim
of the Arab provocation to secure strong American and international support.581
Israel had fortified the Bar-Lev Line along the Suez Canal with 50 feet earth
mounds and 35 guard posts backed by artillery and armored vehicles. However, on October
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6, only 16 posts were fully manned, and only 600 IDF troops covered nearly 125 miles
long line. After massive air raid and artillery attacks, Egyptian infantry divisions of 90,000
troops armed with effective anti-air and anti-tank weapons crossed the Canal blasting away
the sand berm with high-pressure water pumps. Eight hundred fifty tanks and other
numerous artillery and armored vehicles followed them. Within 24 hours, Egyptian forces
captured all Israeli fortified posts along the Bar-Lev Line.582 Along the Purple Line on the
Golan Heights, Syria concentrated 60,000 soldiers with 1,300 tanks, 600 artillery pieces,
and more than 100 batteries of SAM missiles. This defense line was protected by high earth
mounds, minefields, and 112 Israeli fortified posts. By October 8, Syrian forces succeeded
in capturing more than half of the Golan and advanced to the point just a few miles from
the Israeli population centers in the eastern shore of the Sea of Galilee and the Jordan
bridges.583
The IDF launched a major armored counterattack on October 8 in the Sinai, and
Israeli air forces made every effort to support isolated and outnumbered thin defense lines
on the Golan. However, Israel lost 400 tanks, along with General Abraham Mendler, the

commander of the Israeli Armored Corps, to Egypt and 100 tanks to Syria. It was indeed
the worst defeat in the history of the IDF. 584 President Sadat proclaimed. “The myth of
Israel’s long arm, of her superior, even invincible, air force, armory, and soldiers – was
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finally shattered.”585 After his visit to the northern front on the Golan on October 7, Israeli
Defense Minister Dayan was seriously perturbed and said Israel might face “the collapse
of third temple.” He was comparing the situation to the first collapse of holy temple in
Jerusalem in 586 BC and the second in 70 AD that coincided with the destruction of the
Jewish community.586
Given that the Israeli leadership perceived that they were facing an existential threat,
playing with coercive diplomacy measures was no longer an option. They had to turn to the
actual use of force and switch over their strategic posture from direct defensive deterrence to
defense. Israel’s reaction to take the rapid escalation path does not require much explanation
in this regard. After the failure of the October 8 counterattack, the Israeli cabinet decided to
(1) hold on to the 1967 borderline as much as possible, (2) punish enemy forces, and (3)
negotiate a bargain.587 An important question we mush ask is whether the nuclear capability
of Israel affected this decision-making process after October 8. Although it is difficult to
confirm with 100 percent certainty due to the deliberate opacity in Israel’s nuclear program,
many experts underscore that Israel acquired its first deliverable nuclear weapons on the eve
of the 1967 Six-Day War. 588 As mentioned earlier, there is no archival evidence that
demonstrates either Sadat or Assad feared the possibility of Israeli nuclear sanctions against
the Arab offense. Were they right about this? Did Israel consider the use of nuclear weapons
to push back Egyptian and Syrian forces?
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Under the serious strategic and psychological crisis, Israel had every reason to turn
to its nuclear weapons. For example, by alerting the Israeli nuclear forces, it could signal
Sadat and Assad that further penetration into Israeli territory would result in nuclear
punishment. Furthermore, this move could send a strong message to Washington, which
should help Israel to resupply IDF with the U.S. military equipment.589 Numerous sources,
thus, argue that Meir permitted Dayan to get ready to use the doomsday weapons during
the October War. 590 Most of them agree that the Israeli nuclear alert was for sending
messages to the Arab states and the United States. To test this theory, we should confirm
whether (1) Israel activated the weapons during the war, (2) Egypt and Syria could receive
the warning message of nuclear punishment, and (3) the U.S. policymakers detected the
signal and responded to the Israeli move. Through the extensive analysis of primary and
secondary sources, interviewing the U.S. and Israeli government officials and carefully
cross-checking their statements, Colby, Cohen, McCants, Morris, and Rosenau conclude
that none of the three occurred.
First, none of the primary sources of the U.S. declassified archive, and American
and Israeli interviewees confirm that Israel attempted to influence Washington with
considering the use of its nuclear forces. If the Meir cabinet intended to do so, there should
have been “at least some documentary evidence of deliberations.” None was found,
however. Only William Quandt, the NSC staff on Middle East issues, asserted that the U.S.
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had detected Israel’s nuclear-related activity in the early phase of the war. However, even
he emphasizes that the report of the Israeli nuclear movement did not have any meaningful
impact on discussions among U.S. policymakers. Most government officials confirm that
they did discuss the issue of alerting American nuclear forces to deter the Soviet
intervention in the war. But the Israeli nuclear weapons were not even mentioned during
the deliberation process.591
Second, Egypt and Syria did not have sophisticated intelligence capability to detect
Israeli nuclear alerts. The only two countries that had the capability in the world were the
USSR and the U.S. Indeed, the Meir cabinet might expect Moscow to convey the
worrisome developments to its Arab clients, but why should Israel depend on the Soviets
to play the middle man role? If they wanted to send a signal, it should have been more
unequivocal to convey a blatant verbal message. Third, numerous Israeli sources confirm
that while Dayan did raise the issue during the cabinet discussion on October 7, Meir
rejected his recommendation to make nuclear weapons operational. Dayan, thus, might
ready or check nuclear delivery systems as a precautionary step on his initiative, yet he was
unable to alert the weapons.592
Why didn’t the Meir cabinet consider the use of nuclear weapons? First, the use of
nuclear weapons directly contradicts Israel’s decade old public commitment as well as the
September 1969 agreement between President Nixon and Prime Minister Meir.
Considering that the Meir cabinet even delayed the call-up of reserve until the very last
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moment to secure American support, nuclear punishment might be the very last thing that
Israeli leadership would like to take. Second, Israel maintained only modest stockpile of
nuclear warheads with very limited delivery systems.593 Third, although the Egyptian and
Syrian armies were achieving unprecedented success on both fronts, they had not breached
into Israel’s post-1949 borders, and subsequently had not crossed the “red line” yet.594
Israel and the Arab states were fighting over the land that used to belong to Egypt and
Syria.595

2-3.

Short-term Outcome: a Limited War

After this panic of “end of the Third Temple” passed, Israel did not need to consider
the nuclear option anymore because the war situation had rapidly changed since October
9. First, Israeli reserve forces joined the war within 36 to 48 hours of the war.596 Second,
after achieving remarkable victory in the “battle of crossing” and successfully repelling
Israeli counterattack on October 8, Egyptian forces oddly switched over to defensive
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posture and burrowed. This unusual movement of the Egyptian military indicates that
Sadat’s war aim was not to initiate a large-scale reconquest operation but to break the
stalemate in his peace initiative. Also, Egyptian military leadership opposed the idea to
advance beyond the SAM cover which would expose its army to the attack of the Israeli
Air Force (IAF). 597 Falling prey to the superior IAF would repeat the failure of the SixDay War. The “operational pause” on the southern front allowed Israel to concentrate its
main forces to knock down the Syrian forces on the northern front. The Arab’s two-front
war strategy collapsed.
Even before Egypt changed its operational posture to defensive, Israel devised a
plan to terminate the war by breaking Assad’s forces first. There were five reasons for this
decision. First, Israel forces did not have enough capability to conduct a two-front war. Its
reserve house was rapidly depleting especially the ammunition. It was impossible to sustain
the war without the massive resupply of the military equipment hopefully by the U.S.
Second, as explained earlier, while the Israeli forces had strategic depth in the Sinai, 598 the
Golan front was too close to Israel’s main population centers and the Sea of Galilee, the
main national source of water. Third, in terms of power, the Syrian army was a lot weaker
than that of Egypt. Fourth, Israel needed a major victory on either front to deter Jordan or
Iraq from opening a third front. Fifth, if IDF defeated the Syrian forces and penetrated its
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territory, Israel believed that it could compensate for some territorial losses on the southern
front when the Soviet Union and the U.S enforced cease-fire resolution.599
The Egyptian forces’ operational pause, thus, helped Israel to accomplish its main
military goal more easily. Assad’s troops faced “full fury of the Israeli air force,” and the
northern front turned into an “inferno.”600 Syria lost about 800 tanks, other hundreds of
armored vehicles, and 6,000 men. On October 10, Israel succeeded in recovering the prewar borderline on the Golan. The Meir cabinet authorized Dayan to penetrate 20 kilometers
into Syria to threaten Damascus with long-range artillery. Dayan emphasized the
importance of this operation for the termination of the war by saying that “The name
Damascus is even more important now than the Bar-Lev line.” As Israeli forces advance
to Damascus, the cease-fire proposal was submitted to the UN Security Council on October
13. 601 Meanwhile, under the code name “Operation Nickel Grass,” the U.S. started to
supply Israel with ammunition and weapons on that day.602
Assad repeatedly pled Sadat for immediate Egyptian offensive to ease the Israeli
pressure on Damascus and Egyptian forces finally opened attack on October 14. Sadat
could not afford the fall of Damascus as it would make him face enormous criticism in the
Arab world for its double-dealing and betrayal and cost him losing the lever on the followup peace negotiations. Unfortunately, this belated Egyptian advance ended up with a
military disaster. Without the proper level of SAM cover, Egypt lost more than 250 tanks
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on that day. 603 After this battle, IDF successfully crossed the Suez Canal between October
15 and 16, advanced to the western side of the canal, and encircled the entire Egyptian
Third Army. By October 22, the 45,000 men of Egypt’s Third Army were at “Israel’s mercy
[…] cut off from their home base and an open prey to the IAF, without food, water or
ammunition.”604
The annihilation of the Egyptian Third Army was unacceptable not only for
Moscow, the patron of Egypt and Syria but also for Washington. Neither side wanted to be
dragged into a confrontation, especially when they are enjoying the détente. The U.S. also
sought to reduce the Arab dependence on the USSR, but the destruction of the Egyptian
forces would only inflame the Arab world and encourage them to seek more help from
Moscow. They came to terms on the cease-fire on October 22, and UN Security Council
adopted Resolution 338 on October 22 calling on cease-fire and immediate termination of
military activities no later than 12 hours. However, under the connivance of the U.S.
Secretary Henry Kissinger, Israel further pressed on both in the Sinai and Syria. For
example, Israel managed to recapture the Mount Hermon observation post on the Golan
Heights on October 22.
Israel’s apparent non-compliance with the UN resolution angered the Soviet
Chairman Brezhnev and led him to threaten Washington to unilaterally dispatch the Soviet
forces in the area on October 24. The U.S. responded to this threat by elevating its alerting
status to DEFCON III, just one level below the defense readiness during the Cuban Missile
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Crisis. This increased tension could have brought another nuclear crisis between the two
superpowers. The UN Security Council had to pass two more resolutions to stop Israeli
forces. On November 1, after receiving hard pressure from Washington, Meir finally
agreed to withdraw Israeli forces to the line that existed on October 22.605

2-4.

Long-term Outcome: Reassurance and Deterrence Restoration

Militarily speaking, Israel was the clear winner in the 1973 Yom Kippur war.
Despite its initial defeats caused by “self-inflicted setbacks,” IDF managed to turn the tide
and was at the brink of slaughtering the Egyptian Third Army and destroying Damascus.
Victory in war, however, should be measured not simply by the size of newly gained
territories or the number of enemy forces’ casualties but by how much of the country’s
main objective is achieved. As Clausewitz’s famous quote goes, “war is the continuation
of politics by other means.”
Israel achieved dramatic victory at the expense of the heaviest casualties in its
history. More than 6,400 soldiers were killed or wounded, and the figure is far greater than
that of any previous wars. Israelites were outraged by the IDF’s inadequate intelligence,
problems in military strategy and planning, and incompetence of civilian leadership over
the military, which eventually ended the political career of both Meir and Dayan. In the
parliamentary election in 1977, the Labor party was defeated by the right-wing Likud
which advocated territorial maximalism, for the first time in Israeli history since its
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inception. On the contrary, although they lost the war at the tactical level, the Arab states’
achieved most of their goals. They dispelled the myth of Israeli invincibility, restored the
self-esteem of the Arabs, and successfully kicked off the peace negotiations after the
war.606
Thanks to the shared concern of Washington and Moscow for the escalation of
conflicts in the Middle East, and especially as a result of Kissinger’s “shuttle diplomacy,”
Israel and Egypt concluded two disengagement agreements in 1974 and 1975, and finally
the peace treaty in 1979. Tel-Aviv evacuated Israeli forces and civilians in Sinai and
established the demilitarized zone supervised by the UN forces and the U.S. Air Force.
Along the way, Sadat visited Israel in 1977, marking the very first “direct, official and
public contact” between Israel and Arab leaders, and gave a speech to the Knesset, the
Israeli parliament. While setting forth for his vision of peace in the region, he proclaimed
that Egypt, the most powerful Arab state in the Middle East, would acknowledge and
accept the existence of Israel as a Jewish state. Although the territorial disputes between
Israel and Syria over the Golan Heights continue even today, the two countries came to an
understanding of their mutual actions in Lebanon and enjoyed strategic stability from late
1970 to early 1980s. Most importantly, the Yom Kippur War was the last major armed
conflict between Egypt, Syria, and Israel.607
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How can we explain this stability in the region and deterrence restoration in the
aftermath of the 1973 October War? Evron suggests two main reasons behind this.608 First,
in addition to its earlier victories in the large-scale war of 1967 and the war of attrition in
1969, Israel ultimately defeated Egypt and Syria even in the 1973 limited war. This final
military victory of Israel deprived the Arab states of any military option of challenging Israel
again. Indeed, the myth of Israeli invincibility was shattered yet the fundamental military
power gap between Israel and the Arab states was rather confirmed. Especially, Israel
convincingly demonstrated that it possessed sufficient military capability to punish any
challenge to the status quo by threatening to shell Damascus and annihilate the Egyptian
Third Army. The unambiguous display of its feasibility to follow through on the deterrent
threat reinforced the Israeli deterrence posture greatly in the aftermath of the 1973 war.
Second, Israel’s territorial concessions and political reassurance shifted the balance
of interests between Israel and Egypt. Sadat decided to initiate a limited war due to the
increasing political cost of the stalemate in his diplomatic initiative to restore its lost
territories. In this regard, direct defensive deterrence failed in 1973 not because of the
change in the balance of capability but rather due to the shift in the balance of interest over
the territorial issue. Egypt politically needed to regain some of their lost territory in Sinai
to address the growing public grievance over the issue. After the war, Israel agreed to
resolve this problem by making territorial concessions. This attempt to rebalance the
relative interest at stake made Israel’s deterrence posture against the Arab states even
stronger considering that the former already manifested its military superiority through

608

Evron, Israel’s Nuclear Dilemma, pp. 54-56.

282

defeating the latter in all different kinds of war from the 1950s to 1970s. Subsequently, it
became very difficult for Egypt to defy against Israel again. This situation brought
enormous difficulties to Syria in maintaining the great struggle against Israel as it lost its
security partner who was the most powerful Arab state in the region. There were not many
things left for Syria to revise the status quo, which further strengthened the stability in the
Middle East.
In sum, the feasibility model explains the Egyptian decision to launch a limited war
and Israel’s policy choice not to use nuclear weapons to punish the Arab states’ challenge
against the status quo. Chapter 7 further compares the explanatory capability of the rival
and the research hypotheses. In the next section, these hypotheses are tested against the
Argentine and British decision makings during the 1982 Falklands War.

3. The Falklands War in 1982

3-1.

The Origin of the Argentine Challenge

The sovereignty issue over the islands about the size of Wales (or somewhat smaller
than the state of Connecticut) that are approximately 7,500 miles away from Great Britain
and 300 miles off the coast of Argentina, lies at the center of the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas
War (Map 5). The islands were thinly populated with about 2,000 inhabitants, and almost
all of them were of British origin. The issue of sovereignty goes back to the days of the
early 19th Century. After declaring its independence from Spain on July 9, 1816, Buenos
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Aires took possession of the islands. Unfortunately, after the U.S. navy’s assault on the
island in December 1831 to retaliate the islands’ Governor Louis Vernet’s seizure of U.S.
ships, majority of Argentine settlements were destroyed. Taking the opportunity, British
ship Clio arrived in those islands and expelled remaining Argentineans in 1832. While
Argentine government proclaimed that the British forces illegally seized and occupied the
Falklands, London argued that the territory was res nullius or belonging to no one after the
U.S. destruction of the Argentine settlements. Argentina has solid grounds for claiming its
sovereignty of the Malvinas islands from the legal perspective. However, the effective
British occupation of the Falklands over a hundred years and the strong inclination of the
islands’ inhabitants toward London made it very difficult to solve the territorial disputes
between the two countries diplomatically.609
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Taking advantage of the opportunity presented by the decolonization movements
in the 1960s, Argentina successfully gained support from the UN General Assembly, and
the two countries entered into negotiation in 1966. The talks led to “Memorandum of
Understanding” and London agreed to transfer power over the islands to Argentina
eventually. However, the Falklands inhabitants lobbied the British government to include
the condition that the transfer would only occur when it took into account the “wishes” of
the islanders. This condition granted the British-friendly people on the Falklands a veto
power against the transfer. In 1976, negotiation was interrupted by the Argentine
destroyer’s attempt to intercept the British ship Shackleton which was engaging in
scientific research in the South Atlantic area. London protested vehemently to the UN
Security Council while Buenos Aires accused the ship searching for oil. The UN
Resolution 31/49 of December 1, 1976, urged the two parties to expedite the negotiations
and urged both countries not to introduce any “unilateral modifications” in the situation.
Argentine-British diplomatic relations resumed after the incident, yet the
negotiations were not moving forward especially after the Falkland Islands Legislative
Council took part in the rounds of talks in January 1981. The Argentinean government,
now under the new military leadership of Leopoldo Galtieri, stated on March 1, 1982, that
it would “put an end” to negotiations and “seek other means” to resolve the territorial issue.
After the illegal landing of Argentine scrappers led by Constantino Davidoff on South
Georgia Island, situated 800 miles east-south-east of the Falklands, on March 18, Britain
reversed the decision to withdraw HMS Endurance, an ice patrol ship, from the South
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Atlantic and ordered to ship to move to the island to put pressure on those Argentineans.
Buenos Aires responded to this British move by invading the Falklands on April 2, 1982.611
Why did the Galtieri regime decide to invade the Falklands? The literature on
historical studies on the Falklands War suggests four explanations. First, the invasion was
part of Argentina’s grand strategy to achieve regional dominance and to secure an
advantageous position in another territorial dispute with Chile over the Beagle Channel.
As the country which possesses the three islands of Picton, Nueva, and Lennox would have
the leverage for expansion into the South Atlantic and Antarctica, the tension between the
two countries was getting fierce especially after the international court awarded the islands
to Chile in 1977. Argentina refused to accept the verdict and took the path of gunboat
diplomacy, which led the two countries at the brink of war in 1978. As Buenos Aires and
Santiago agreed to resubmit the case for arbitration to Vatican, the Argentine invasion of
the Falkland Islands was to influence the Vatican’s decision. 612 However, this argument
lacks solid archival evidence and is not very convincing given that Argentina’s aggressive
policies in the Falklands would not help much to get favorable reactions from Vatican.
Rather, the move would only provide the Chilean government with an opportunity to
strengthen its ties with London.613
Second, the invasion was simply a follow-up measure after Buenos Aires failed its
brinksmanship policy over South Georgia Island. Nearly all of the Argentine press covered

611

612

613

Allcock et al., Border and Territorial Disputes, pp. 551-556; Jessica L. Weeks, Dictators at War and
Peace (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2014), pp. 107-109;
Gibran, The Falklands War, pp. 65-66.
Amy Oakes, “Diversionary War and Argentina's Invasion of the Falkland Islands,” Security Studies 15,
no.3 (2006): p. 444.

287

the mounting tension between London and Buenos Aires over the Davidoff's party on the
island by March 26. If the military government backed down, it would cause the junta to
pay enormous audience costs especially considering the political consequence of “being
shown to be weak in precisely the area where it was supposed to be strong.” Given that the
military regime repeatedly had promised to the Argentine people that they would restore
the islands, the government’s backing down from the public pledge might cost the regime
security. Besides, the incident seemed to trigger major British military reinforcements in
the South Atlantic, which would arrive within a couple of weeks. Buenos Aires, thus,
believed that they should occupy the islands before the arrival of the British
reinforcements.614 As Oakes rightly points out, however, this argument cannot explain the
fact that the Galtieri regime planned to invade the Falklands in December 1981, two to
three months before the South Georgia Island incident. The invasion, thus, was a
“deliberate choice” rather than the “unintended consequence” of a brinkmanship
strategy.615
Third, a majority of studies acknowledge that the Argentine invasion of the Falklands
was a classic example of the diversionary war. Since the military coup in 1976 overthrew
the civilian government of Isabel Peron, Argentina was struggling with deep economic
downfall and political disorder. The junta’s economic policy to promote export and foreign
investments failed, and triple-digit inflation, public run on the banks, rocketing foreign debts
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from $19 billion to $30 billion within a single year of 1980 drove Argentina into a serious
economic recession. Even after the severe and successful repression of human rights or “dirty
war” of 1976-1979 under the pretext of eradicating “ideas that are contrary to Western and
Christian civilization,” it could not stop people from going for general strikes in the late
1970s.616 By the time General Galtieri seized power, even the solidarity of the military group
was falling due to the growing fear of total failure and collapse of the regime.617 On March
30, 1982, only three days before the invasion of the Falkland Islands, a major demonstration
took place in which about 40,000 people came out to street demanding the end of military
rule. 618 The Argentine government, thus, desperately needed a unifying mission to lead
people rallying around the junta’s leadership again.
Although this argument seems convincing and historical accounts of the events
before the war generally support it, this diversionary war hypothesis has several problems
as well. First, the hypothesis cannot explain why the Galtieri government turned to a
diversionary conflict for addressing the social unrest problem instead of pursuing further
reforms or initiating stricter repressions.619 Second, as mentioned earlier, the planning to
invade Falklands was prepared in December 1981, and the decision to launch the attack
was made on March 26, four days before the major demonstration in Buenos Aires. Third,
if the invasion was really about seeking “rallying around the flag” effect, why the military
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leadership did not simply wait for London to escalate further over South Georgia Island?
The image of the British navy’s forcefully evicting Argentine civilians would have enough
positive impact on securing domestic and international support for the Argentine
government, and this calculated passivity should have been a lot less risky than occupying
the Falklands.620
In this context, all the above mentioned three possible reasons behind Galtieri’s
choice to invade the islands on April 2, 1982, fail to suggest a sufficient condition for the
junta’s move to go for a war. The feasibility of punishment model proposes an alternative
explanation that can address this problem. Buenos Aires took the path of invasion not
because of the rivalry against Chile, the failure of its brinkmanship over South Georgia
Island, or the need to provide a unifying mission to the public; but because of the high
possibility of London’s backing down and subsequent political gains that the adventurous
move would bring to the junta. Galtieri believed that if he successfully occupied the
Falklands without killing many British soldiers and imposed a fait accompli to United
Kingdom, then London would accept the change as a new status quo rather than punish his
defiance.
On what basis did he believe so? First, United Kingdom demonstrated its
decreasing interest in protecting the Falklands since the late 1970s. British aid to the islands
was continuously declining from 1976 to 1980. Despite sharp criticism from the parliament
and the Islanders (or Kelpers), London pursued rapprochement with Argentina by selling
a huge amount of British arms to Buenos Aires from 1978 to 1982. Especially in 1980, the
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British Foreign and Commonwealth Office noted that the Falklands were difficult to defend
and more like a liability than an asset, and recommended to discuss “leaseback agreement”
with the Argentine government. This arrangement would officially transfer the sovereignty
over the islands to Argentina yet would allow Britain to lease the land for a long enough
time.621
Second, London was believed to be lacking sufficient power projection capability
to deal with Argentina’s challenge. In June 1981, the British Parliament upheld the
government’s decision to withdraw HMS Endurance in 1982. The ship symbolized the
presence of the British Navy in the region. The decision had a major impact on Buenos
Aires’s strategic calculation.622 Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine Navy Jorge Anaya
said, considering her declined navy power, London “lacked the capability to respond 8,000
miles from home.” Withdrawing important navy assets would only aggravate the British
power projection problem. London’s nuclear capability, especially 100 Polaris missiles that
could reach Argentina from an appropriate distance in the Atlantic, should technically
impose a serious threat to Buenos Aires. But Galtieri and his advisors did not believe that
Britain would use ultimate weapons to protect a small island lacking any real economic or
strategic value for London. 623
Before the invasion of the Falklands, Argentine Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa
Mendez received opinion from Argentine missions in London and New York that Britain

621

622

623

Gibran, The Falklands War, pp. 44-51.
Marc Fourches, “Defence Policy and the Falklands War,” in Carine Berberi and Monia O’Brien Castro
eds., 30 Years After: Issues and Representations of the Falklands War (Burlington: Ashgate, 2015), p.
125.
Paul, “Nuclear Taboo and War Initiation in Regional Conflicts,” p. 709.

291

would most likely impose sanctions in response to the invasion but would refrain from
taking any military measures. Argentine military leaders perceived that London was ready
to give up the islands and merely looking for an “honorable way out.” Buenos Aires, thus,
regarded that the imposition of a fait accompli with the invasion and occupation of the
Falklands was doing a favor for Britain to some extent.624

3-2.

The British Response: From Gradual Escalation to Hedging with
Conventional Forces

Argentina launched Operation Rosario, landed on a shallow water beach of the
Falkland Islands at 5:40 AM on April 2. Although one soldier was killed and several were
injured, the Argentine forces successfully occupied the Government House at 9:25 AM
without killing any Royal Marine troops. At 7:15 AM, Buenos Aires launched the second
invasion, and South Georgia was occupied on the following day, again, without taking any
British lives. The junta accomplished all of its goals without incurring any British
casualties and was riding on a massive wave of public support. Now it seemed that Galtieri
would only need to wait for London to approach Buenos Aires to resolve the conflict
diplomatically. Most likely, Great Britain would accept the fait accompli and agree to
conclude a term favorable to Argentina.625
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Galtieri’s hope was not ungrounded. Until late March of 1982, London was not
determined to go to war, hesitated to punish Buenos Aires by force, and ready to seek a
diplomatic solution even if Argentina occupied the islands. When the British intelligence
reported compelling evidence that the Argentine invasion of the Falklands was imminent
on March 31, government officials from the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defense
met with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at her room in the House of Commons. First
Sea Lord Henry Leach recalls the meeting as follows;

“When I went in, that the sort of advice she [Prime Minister Thatcher] had been
getting prior to that had tended to deflect her from doing anything beyond
negotiating, and putting the screws on with words again. She had been receiving
advice, I think, that under no circumstances should she do anything about it,
because it was too far away, and much too difficult.”626

The Ministry of Defense was worried that if Britain decided to punish the Argentine
challenge militarily, it would require a task force that included at least a carrier given that
the force would meet Argentine air and sea attacks as soon as they arrived at the Falklands
after three weeks of its sailing. It would be a very expensive mission considering the cost
of providing logistics, especially the fuel cost, not to mention creating problems with
NATO by taking away the carrier from its assigned mission in Europe. Even on the
morning of April 1, Thatcher government’s preference was still a diplomatic solution as it
notified Washington that London had no intention to escalate the situation. 627
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To Galtieri’s great surprise, however, London’s position rapidly hardened after the
Argentine forces occupied the islands. When the full Cabinet met on the evening of April
2, everyone except for Trade Secretary John Biffen agreed that the Task Force should sail
immediately. During the special emergency debate in the House of Commons on the
following day, Michael Foot from the Labour Party compared Argentina’s “unprovoked
aggression” with those of Hitler and Mussolini before World War II. Foot emphasized that
it was “a moral duty, a political duty, and every other kind of duty” for London to ensure
the wish of Kelpers to be associated with Britain.628
Britain pressured Argentina through passing Resolution 502 in the UN Security
Council on April 3. The Resolution urged “immediate cessation of hostilities” and
“immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces.” London also froze all Argentine assets in
Britain, imposed a trade embargo against Buenos Aires, and called for economic sanctions
against Argentina. The European Economic Community (EEC) members answered the call
and fully supported the UN Resolution. On April 7, London launched Operation Corporate
and the Task Force, including two carriers, three submarines, eleven destroyers and frigates,
and over 100 logistics ships (50 naval vessels and 54 private ships), was en route for the
Falklands.629
How can we explain this British move from gradual escalation to hedging from late
March to early April? Why did London rapidly change its policy choice concerning the
Argentine’s challenge against the status quo? Daniel Gibran lays out four reasons behind
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the British choice to escalate the situation based on the literature on the Falklands War.630
First, London escalated the crisis stimulated by its nostalgic imperialism to maintain and
regain its influence over her previous colonies. This North-South conflict explanation,
however, is falsified because, first, the Rio Pact did not discuss concerted defense measures
against the British forces (which meant that the South did not consider the Royal Navy as
an external threat); and second, Argentine people always identified themselves as white
European and citizens of a developed country. Besides, this perspective cannot explain
why the Thatcher government’s position rapidly switched to hard-line policies on the
evening of April 2.
Second, London decided to punish Buenos Aires because of the economic (e.g.,
minerals and fisheries), geopolitical (e.g. proximity to Antarctica), and strategic
importance (e.g. “unsinkable aircraft carrier” near the sea lanes around South America) of
the Falkland Islands. However, the intrinsic value of the islands was far from significant
as Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges called the Falklands/Malvinas conflict as “two bald
men fighting for a comb.”631 The Falklands had never been mentioned as a defense priority
in any British defense reviews or white papers.632 This explanation also fails to identify the
cause for the rapid policy turn in London on April 2. Third, Great Britain sought to defend
democratic principles of “self-determination” and “liberty” of the Kelpers. This
explanation loses validity and even seems hypocritical given that the British troops
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forcefully deported native islanders in Diego Garcia (about the same number of population
in the Falklands) against their will in 1966 to turn the island into a U.S. military base.
The only surviving explanation, thus, is that domestic economic and national honor
considerations motivated Britain. Given the serious economic recession, massive
unemployment, and decrease in real wage incomes in Britain and Thatcher’s repeated
failure to turn the tide, the Falklands War was a welcome distraction for the government.
Furthermore, the widespread and explosive reaction of the British people to the humiliating
image of Royal marines lying face down on the ground in front of the Government House
in the Falklands hurt the national pride, honor, and prestige of the Englishmen. Willie
Whitelaw, a Conservative Party politician, said that “if we didn’t send a Task Force, what
else should we do? […] if we hadn’t reacted very strongly we probably couldn’t survive as
a government.” Other politicians also worried about the impact of British submission to
the Argentine challenge on London’s credibility to stand firm in future crises with other
adversaries in different parts of the world. 633
The explanation demonstrates the importance of audience cost and the political
feasibility in choosing a stricter punishment route after the deterrence failure. Although
numerous factors such as strategic interest at stake, cost of military conflict, probability of
victory, power projection capability, did not change much for London, the emotional
outburst in Britain after Argentina’s actual occupation of the Falklands dramatically
increased the degree of the audience cost for backing down and the political feasibility to
punish Buenos Aires. The Thatcher government became more resolved after the Cabinet
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and Parliamentary debates on April 2 and 3 due to the hardened atmosphere of British
society. The general support from the parliament and the public for a tougher policy against
Argentina also marginalized the voice of the opposition forces that could delay policy
execution and made it politically much more feasible for London to escalate the crisis.

3-3.

Short-term Outcome: a Limited War

The decision to send the Task Force, however, did not mean the outbreak of war. It
was a three-week sailing distance from London to the Falklands, and Thatcher made it clear
on April 3 that “I cannot foretell what orders the task force will receive as it proceeds.”
Argentine navy and air force possessed equally powerful weapons that could inflict serious
damage to British forces. The British Military calculated that a naval battle with Argentina
could take away up to 3,000 English soldiers’ lives. Due to the enormously long logistical
tail, the British Task Force could not afford many mistakes as sunken ships would not be
reinforced shortly. Single loss of an aircraft carrier or failure in the amphibious operation
could jeopardize the whole military enterprise. In this regard, although it would be a smallscale war, the outcome could be disastrous for Britain. Accordingly, Thatcher was hoping
for the success of diplomacy before her fleet reached the islands. 634
In order to keep diplomacy alive, the British forces should walk a fine line:
preparing for the success of future military missions to retake the islands while not ruining
the negotiation process by taking a too aggressive measure. Their first choice of action,

634

Ibid., pp. 79-80, 110.

297

thus, was declaring the “Maritime Exclusion Zone” (MEZ). A circle of 200-nautical-mile
around the Falklands was established, and any Argentine battleships found within the zone
would be treated as hostile and be “liable to be attacked by the British forces.” The
exclusion zone meant the imposition of a blockade, yet London wanted to avoid legal
complications regarding the use of the term, as President Kennedy preferred to call it
“quarantine” during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The MEZ was announced on April 7 and
was scheduled to come into force on April 12.
Second, the Task Force launched Operation Parquet and recaptured South Georgia
Island on April 26 before entering the Falklands. The possibility of engaging in a fierce
battle over the island was highly unlikely because South Georgia was located beyond
Argentine air-cover and merely about 60 Argentine marines were garrisoned. Even so,
nuclear submarines were deployed to deter any Argentine surface vessels from providing
support to the Argentine garrison on the island. When Argentine planes arrived and
hovered over the island, the British destroyers did not fire on them as they did not launch
an airstrike on the British forces. The Operation Parquet, thus, vividly demonstrated the
“fine distinctions between war and peace” that the Task Force tried to maintain. 635
Unfortunately, the prospect of a diplomatic solution was rather bleak. First,
Argentina was in a more advantageous position as soon as it occupied the island and
maintained a lukewarm attitude towards peace proposals. Although Resolution 502
demanded withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falklands, it did not give London
blank check to evict them from the island forcefully. U.S., EEC, and UN emphasized the
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importance of a peaceful resolution, but the peace mediation would likely recommend a
path fell short of full restoration of the British sovereignty over the island. The Thatcher
government could not but reject the proposal, then London could easily be blamed for its
intransigence and suffer from backlash. Also, if the British Task Force sinks an Argentine
ship within the MEZ, this could provoke major anti-colonialist reactions in UN. This
diplomatic advantage of Buenos Aires gave them the incentive to delay the negotiation
process as much as possible until Britain made some mistakes and lost the support of the
international community. 636
Second, there was a fundamental difference between London and Buenos Aires in
their ultimate foreign policy goals about the Falklands problem. They were ready to make
concessions on specific issues of the territorial dispute such as simultaneous withdrawal of
both forces, a temporal administration of the islands and its composition, and selection of
an arbitrator between the two governments. However, it was almost impossible to find
common ground between Britain’s emphasis on the UN Charter Article 73 (selfdetermination, or “taking into account the rights and interests of the Islanders”) and
Argentina’s demand, “the transfer of sovereignty over the islands.”637 Both countries were
on the verge of war precisely because of this fundamental difference and their continuous
failure to narrow it down.
In this context, the shuttle diplomacy of U.S. representative General Alexander
Haig and the Peruvian government’s peace proposal was doomed to fail. Until the British
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Task Force arrived at the area, both governments had not progressed on a peaceful
resolution. Once these forces took place on the scene, it is almost impossible for civilian
leaders to control the commanding general of the military units fully. Following the
military logic, the British submarine Conqueror attacked the Argentine cruiser General
Belgrano, one of the most serious threats to a British amphibious operation, outside the
Exclusion Zone on May 2, killing 321 Argentine soldiers. Argentina retaliated by sinking
the British HMS Sheffield incurring 24 casualties on May 4. Now both countries crossed
the Rubicon, and the diplomacy was dead. They were officially at war.638
The developments of crisis from the first week of April to early May in 1982
demonstrate that the direct defensive deterrence failure ended up with war because both
Argentina and Britain were determined not to concede to each other on the sovereignty
issue over the Falklands. The audience cost that both governments should pay for backing
down increased excessively, which made them very determined to stand firm during the
negotiation process. The rational and cognitive deterrence theories, thus, explain the shortterm outcome of the Falkland War better than feasibility or belief updating models.

3-4.

Long-term Outcome: Deterrence Restoration

After hitting and sinking Sheffield, the Argentine air force continued to destroy and
disabled numerous British battleships and auxiliaries during the British amphibious
operations at Port San Carlos on East Falkland on May 20. Eventually, however, Argentine
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forces were pushed back to Port Stanley by the British Task Force. 639 The United States
greatly supported the Royal Navy. To illustrate, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
allowed the British forces to use American communication channels, provided satellite
photo-reconnaissance, and supplied advanced weapon systems such as the Sidewinder
AIM-9L which enforced Argentine bombers drop bombs at low altitude and misfire.640
Argentine forces surrendered on June 15, 1982, which ended their short-lived occupation
of the island. Almost 1,000 soldiers died, and 2,000 were wounded during the armed
conflict. 641 The fundamental difference over the Falklands issue between London and
Buenos Aires continues even today, yet Argentina never attempted another violent
provocation to resolve the matter after the 1982 war. British deterrence was restored.
This project’s research and rival hypotheses suggest two explanations for this
successful restoration of the British direct defensive deterrence. First, the Thatcher
government’s policy choice to gradually escalate the crisis, eventually to the point of using
violent measures, led Buenos Aires to update its belief about Britain’s resolve, and not to
challenge the status quo again. Second, it was because London fixed the problem that had
caused the deterrence failure: Britain’s low military and political feasibility to punish the
challenger’s defiance. Unfortunately, because the crisis occurred recently and the two
countries did not experience additional crises after 1982, it is difficult to find archival
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evidence that permits us to confirm the validity of these explanations. This section, thus,
zeros in on examining what London did after the Falkland War.
The White Paper and Secretary John Nott’s Defense Review published before the
Falkland War identified the key security task of London was to enhance its capability to
defend Britain from any Soviet attacks in Europe. Those security documents, thus,
emphasized the need to maintain independent nuclear deterrence and to upgrade air
defenses. Due to the tight budget constraints, this capability enhancement came at the
expense of reducing the size of the fleet. This strategic priority of the British defense did
not change even after the 1982 wars. The White Papers released in the aftermath of the war
continued to define the Soviet Union as the major threat to London. 642
What deserves our attention, however, is that London made two interesting
decisions after the Falklands War. First, when replacing the equipment lost during the war,
the Ministry of Defense prioritized securing tactical mobility. Helicopters, new T-22
frigates were purchased, and the two amphibious ships that were supposed to be scrapped
according to the Nott’s Review remained in service. London’s measures demonstrate that
the British forces decided to take a more balanced approach to defense policy: from
overemphasizing London’s commitment to NATO to maintaining and upgrading the
strategic flexibility of its military forces. Second, despite the bad economic condition and
tight budget, the British government decided to extend the British garrison on the Falklands.
The crux of this “Fortress Falklands” policy was to construct new airbase for
accommodating modern jet fighters, and to retain a sizable British forces on an around the
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island. These policies imply that London learned a lesson from the war that “it is almost
always better to deter a war than to fight a war, even if the war ends in victory.”643
Considering the measures Britain took after her victory of the 1982 war, it seems
that London wanted to send a clear signal to Buenos Aires that her military feasibility
problem had been addressed. The feasibility explanation, thus, passes the hoop test.
However, this does not mean that Argentine leadership’s belief updating about the strong
resolve of the British government to protect the Falklands did not have any impact on
restoring the deterrence. Rather, it might be precisely the reason why the British Ministry
of Defense focused on fixing the feasibility problem. Given that London already had
demonstrated its resoluteness over the Falkland issue by dispatching the Task Force and
fighting a costly war, what Britain needed to do further was reinforcing Britain’s weak
point – her power projection capability. In this regard, both feasibility and belief updating
explanations should not be rejected. Unfortunately, with the limitation in locating archival
evidence, it is difficult to confirm whether they survive the smoking gun test or not.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

Finding ways to establish a credible and successful deterrence has been the center
of international security studies. Formulating a proper policy after its failure, however, is
remarkably overlooked in the literature. In answering this question, this dissertation
examines (1) causes for a challenger to defy the defender’s direct defensive deterrent threat,
(2) conditions for the defender’s certain policy choice in the aftermath of the deterrence
failure, (3) short- and long-term outcomes of each policy option and (4) the impact of
nuclear weapons on the direct deterrence dynamics. By specifying the cause for the
deterrence failure and conditions for the defender’s policy choice, this research project
sheds light on the origin of the crisis. With tracing the consequence of each policy choice
after the deterrence failure, the dissertation lays out a foundation for predicting the effect
of a policy option. Examining the impact of nuclear weapons during crises of deterrence
failure helps us to correctly grasp what this doomsday machine does to the minds of
policymakers.
This chapter, first, reviews and summarizes the key findings of the statistical
analysis and the five case studies illustrated in the previous chapters. The second section
discusses the policy implications of these findings. And lastly, it explains how this project
adds to the existing literature on direct deterrence and identifies the limitations of this study
and areas for future research.
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1. Summary of the Findings: Testing Rival and Research Hypotheses

The deterrence literature is composed of two main perspectives: Rational
Deterrence and Cognitive Deterrence theories. They maintain a stark difference in
identifying the conditions for a credible deterrent threat and making predictions about the
crisis outcome. The gap, however, is remarkably narrowed down when it comes to cases
of direct defensive deterrence: the defender’s deterrent threat is deemed to be credible in
the eyes of a potential challenger. Its failure indicates that the challenger is more likely a
resolute aggressor given that it defied this credible threat. As the defender is also resolute
in the direct deterrence situation, the challenge would most likely lead to war. The longterm implication of this defender’s policy choice is not certain, however. Some scholars in
the Rational Deterrence camp believe that the defender’s choice of standing firm would
restore the credibility of deterrence, whereas others see that the defender’s action does not
leave any systematic long-term impact. But both perspectives generally agree that the
introduction of nuclear weapons into deterrence dynamics would reduce the possibility of
crisis escalation and buttress the deterrence stability. These explanations and predictions
of Rational and Cognitive Deterrence theories form rival hypotheses for this research.
This dissertation suggests new theories, the feasibility of punishment and the belief
updating models, which offer alternative explanations. Direct defensive deterrence can fail
even when the challenger is not a determined aggressor. The challenger attempts to revise
the status quo when it is militarily and politically infeasible for the defender to follow
through on its threat. The defender, who was resolved before the crisis, could choose the
path of inaction after the deterrence failure because it updates the challenger’s type as a
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capable and resolved aggressor given that the challenger defied the defender’s credible
threat. This infeasibility of punishment and belief updating would likely make the defender
difficult to escalate the crisis and war would most likely not ensue. While the feasibility of
punishment model does not expect that the defender’s policy choice had any impact on the
long-term outcome, the belief updating theory sees that the choice casts a long shadow on
the future. The feasibility hypothesis believes that nuclear weapons are highly infeasible
tools of punishment and do not affect the deterrence dynamics much. These propositions
set the research hypotheses.

1-1.

The Origin of the Challenge

In explaining the cause of direct defensive deterrence failure, the rival hypothesis
attributes it to the challenger’s level of resolve. The research hypothesis, however, ascribes
it to the defender’s military or political infeasibility to punish the challenger. Statistical
trends uphold the feasibility hypothesis. As Table 3 shows, both military and political
feasibilities were statistically significant, and they are negatively correlated with the
aggressiveness in the challenger’s policy choice when considered alone. The challenger’s
degree of interest at stake does have a significant impact on its behavior when its level of
resolve is considered alone. However, in a fully specified model, only the military
feasibility variable is statistically significant.
In the five selected cases, none of the challengers were resolved enough to launch
a war against the defender. Those challengers in 1936, 1962, 1969, 1973, and 1982 crises
and wars expected that their defiance against the defenders’ direct defensive deterrence
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would not be confronted by the latter’s massive military retaliation. Germany, the USSR,
China, Egypt, and Argentina were aware of colossal problems that Paris, Washington,
Moscow, Tel Aviv, and London faced in punishing the challenge due to their limits in
projecting offensive military capability. Furthermore, the challengers purposely imposed a
fait accompli in a way to make it difficult for the defenders to respond militarily.
Although being aware that Germany was “not yet ready” to start a war in Europe,
Hitler decided to challenge the French and Locarno powers’ deterrent threat and
remilitarized the Rhineland regime on March 7, 1936. He precisely mentioned that this was
because the German defiance would not be “be answered by military action – though
perhaps by economic sanctions” given that the military and political obstacles the defender
confronted to implementing violent punishments.
The Soviet Premier Khrushchev decided to deploy Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba
in late May 1962, not because he was determined to start a nuclear war over Cuba but to
protect it from an American invasion. The premier emphasized many times that nuclear
wars were unwinnable and only an “idiot” would start it. His decision to defy the U.S.
deterrence was based on his confidence that the missiles could be deployed and
operationalized secretly. Once the installation of the missile bases completed, it would
become “too late to do anything about them” due to their second-strike capability.
Beijing launched an ambush attack on Zhenbao/Damansky Island on March 2, 1969,
not because it was determined to solve the territorial disputes by force but because it wanted
to teach Moscow “a bitter lesson” and to prevent the Soviet intervention in the Chinese
domestic politics. Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou believed that the PLA forces had a major
advantage if the fight was confined to a local skirmish. Their decision was precisely based
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on their prediction that the armed conflict between China and the USSR over the island
would not escalate further into a full-scale war. The outbreak of a major war was deemed to
be unlikely given the marginal interest at stake and the limited military feasibility of Moscow
to launch a major counterattack in the Far East.
Egyptian President Sadat had no intention to start an all-out war with Israel when
his army crossed the Suez Canal and imposed a two-front war for the latter with the help
of Syria on October 6, 1973. He intended to recapture a small portion of Sinai territory that
was taken away from them during the 1967 Six-Day War and demystify the Israeli
invincibility and Arab inferiority. Sadat’s peace initiatives to restore the Egyptian
sovereignty over the Sinai Peninsula had reached a deadlock, and he believed that it was
due to Israeli and American hubris not taking Arab states seriously. As soon as the president
accomplished this goal by occupying Israel’s fortress along the border and repulsed the
first Israeli counterattack, Egyptian forces rapidly switched over to defensive posture and
did not advance.
The Galtieri regime invaded the Falklands on April 2, 1982, but it had no intention
to initiate a major military conflict with London. The Argentine forces tried their best to
minimize the British casualties while they occupied the island. The Argentine President
Galtieri and his military advisors expected that the imposition of a new fait accompli would
lead to the backing down of Britain given that her resolve to protect the Falklands was
decreasing as illustrated by the decision to withdraw HMS Endurance. Furthermore,
London’s navy power was declined and believed to be lacking “the capability to respond
8,000 miles from home.”
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The regression analysis and case studies demonstrate that direct defensive
deterrence failure is mostly not caused by determined aggressors who want to revise the
status quo risking all-out wars. In the population of 192 deterrence failure cases, the
challengers’ policy choice in their defiance against the defenders’ deterrence posture was
more significantly influenced by the defender’s military power projection capabilities than
the former’s interest at stake, probability of victory, or audience costs for accepting the
status quo. In all five selected cases, those challengers were expecting minor resistance or
non-violent punishments of the defenders. The finding attests that direct defensive
deterrence most likely fails because the deterrent threat was considered non-credible due
to its limitations in military and political feasibility to follow through, not because the
challengers are warmongers.

1-2.

Explaining the Defender’s Response

The rival hypothesis’s prediction of a challenger’s high level of resolve in the crisis
of direct defensive deterrence failure is based on its assumption that the defender is
determined to follow through on its threat due to its significant interest at stake, the high
audience cost for backing down, the tendency of loss aversion, the “endowment effect,”
and the logic of vengeance. Accordingly, the defender’s policy choice in the aftermath of
the deterrence failure would only correspond to the change in the probability of victory. As
chances of victory in war increases, it would choose the more aggressive policy. On the
other hand, the research hypothesis focuses on two variables. First, as expected by the
challenger, the defender might be stuck with the quagmire prevents it from punishing the
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challenger due to its limited military and political feasibility. Second, the defender’s choice
is affected by its belief updating about the challenger’s resolve given that the latter
attempted to revise the status quo despite the former’s credible threat.
The two-stage logistic regression analysis shows that the defender’s probability of
victory fails to have a statistically significant impact on its policy choice after the deterrence
failure. Instead, the challenger’s policy choice and the defender’s power projection capability
are statistically significant factors, and they are positively correlated with the defender’s
policy direction. In other words, the more aggressive policy the challenger chooses and the
more it becomes militarily feasible for the defender to punish the challenger, the more violent
measures defender takes. This result demonstrates the validity of the research hypothesis.
The case studies on five deterrence failure crises reveal that those defenders were
affected by numerous factors mentioned above including the probability of victory, the
audience cost, the interest at stake, and their military and political feasibility to follow
through. The feasibility variable, however, always exerted a significant impact on those
policymakers during the deliberation process. Interestingly, the belief updating thinking
was neither common nor strong when the defenders were devising countermeasures after
the deterrence failure.
When Hitler attempted a coup against the Rhineland regime, Paris decided not to
take any “isolated action,” yet in effect, this choice led to the non-action path. Those
civilian leaders including Foreign Minister Flandin, State Minister Paul-Boncour, and
Prime Minister Sarraut wanted to launce “a military police operation” and punish the
German provocation. The French military, however, rejected the idea as its army was
“designed for the defense behind fortified stronghold” and lacked any “independent units”
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that could be used to serve the purpose. War Minister Maurin and General Gamelin also
emphasized that dictators would rarely back down, and Berlin crossed the Rubicon by
challenging the Locarno Treaty, which indicated that Germany was determined to start a
war to restore its sovereignty over the Rhineland. They, thus, suggested ordering general
mobilization if Paris decided to punish Hitler. The French reaction, in this regard, was
decided by (1) the updated belief in German determination given that it had taken an
irreversible path; and (2) non-feasibility of punishment due to the purely defensive
establishment of French forces.
After the U-2 reconnaissance flight revealed that Khrushchev defied President
Kennedy’s deterrent threats, the ExComm members urged airstrikes and invasion of Cuba
to punish Moscow. But they, except for General Taylor and Special Assistant Bundy,
swiftly changed their positions and recommended the blockade option as soon as the
intelligence team informed the committee that eight MRBMs had got operationalized.
Considering that the probability of victory in a nuclear exchange goes down to zero and its
war cost reaches negative infinity, which should make the defender non-determined to
stand firm, this general pattern supports the rival hypothesis. The level of the defender’s
resolve was the main cause of its policy choice. However, the major shift in the ExComm’s
policy debate did not occur until the confirmation that the Soviet nuclear missiles were
ready to be fired. More importantly, those operationalized missiles did not prevent Taylor
and Bundy from asserting the extensive airstrike route. Nuclear threats, thus, are not
credible until it becomes militarily and politically feasible to follow through. Meanwhile,
the belief updating occurred only in the mind of Kennedy, and all the other ExComm
members did not follow the logic.
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After the local battles on the Zhenbao/Damansky Island on March 2 and 15, 1969,
Moscow embarked on its “dual strategy” combining diplomatic and military measures
against China. The USSR sought to settle down the border issue by repeatedly offering
negotiations while giving the Chinese periodic bloody noses. The major Soviet retaliation
against China’s provocation over the island took place in Tielieketi/Zhalanshkol in
Xinjiang province on August 13. This Soviet move is interesting because Moscow
responded in the western part of the border even though Beijing challenged the status quo
in the east. This Soviet choice of the Xinjiang area for avenging their defeats in May reveals
that Moscow indeed had some problem with projecting their military forces towards the
eastern border. The Soviets anticipated that a major war could follow after their retaliation
because they updated China’s level of resolve after the Zhenbao/Damansky conflict.
Moscow, thus, believed that it would be more advantageous to have a war on the western
border. Both the military feasibility to follow through and the belief updating played an
important role in determining the Soviet reaction towards the Chinese challenge.
Israel’s decision to fight back against the Egyptian and Syrian invasion is not very
interesting as the challengers did not leave many options to Tel Aviv. Israel was determined
to defend its border and had the military and political capability to switch over its strategic
posture from direct defensive deterrence to defense. Her decision, thus, was supported by
both Rational/Cognitive Deterrence theories and the feasibility of punishment model. On the
other hand, the Thatcher government could have some time (about three weeks) to deal with
the Falklands crisis as the Royal Navy should sail to the islands in the South Atlantic Ocean
located 8,000 miles away from London. Due to its marginal interest at stake and enormous
difficulties in projecting her power over the long-distance, Britain first chose to
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diplomatically resolve Argentina’s illegal occupation of the Falklands accompanied by
economic sanctions. When these non-violent measures failed to derive any change from the
Galtieri regime, London decided to sink the Argentine light cruiser General Belgrano and
started the war. The decision was made not because of the strategic significance of the island
or a high probability of victory. Rather, it was motivated by the emotional outburst in the
British society that made it politically very costly for Prime Minister Thatcher to back down
and rapidly increased London’s political feasibility to punish Buenos Aires. The dynamics
of belief updating was not found in the relevant archives and secondary sources on the British
policy choice after Argentina’s challenge.
In sum, while the regression analysis supports the research hypothesis, case studies
demonstrate that both rival and research hypotheses are not rejected when they are tested
against the five deterrence failure crises. The defenders’ level of resolve played an
important role during the deliberation process in most cases. When they confronted with
severe military and political obstacles to executing the punishment policy, they had to
adjust the aggressiveness in their response or to choose a geographically distanced area for
avenging what the challenger did somewhere else. The only variable that continued to exert
significant influence on the defender’s policy choice was the defender’s military feasibility
to punish the challenger. Belief-updating thinking is found in a couple of leaders’ minds,
which led them to use more caution in devising countermeasures. However, its role in
deciding the defender’s policy route is quite limited as the rationale had never shared by
the majority of policymakers during the decision-making process.
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1-3.

Short- and Long-term Outcomes

The rival hypothesis predicts that the failure of direct defensive deterrence would
most likely end up with war given that both the defender and the challenger are determined
not to back down. The research hypothesis, however, expects that the deterrence failure
would not lead to war. First, most challengers are opportunists rather than determined
aggressors who defy the deterrence on account of their belief that it is militarily and
politically infeasible for the defenders to punish them. Second, the belief updating
dynamics could make the defender revise its level of resolve and decide not to escalate the
crisis fearing the risk of a costly war.
Statistical analysis upholds the research hypothesis. The majority of crises (44.79%)
terminated without any violence. The two factors, (1) the defender’s political feasibility to
punish the challenger and (2) the challenger’s level of resolve, have a statistically
significant impact on this short-term outcome. Case studies also show that either the
defender or the challenger backed down in the course of crisis development (i.e. France
and the signatories of the Locarno Treaty and Khrushchev), or both sides did not escalate
the armed clashes into a full-scale war involving destruction of densely populated cities.
The military and political feasibilities, rather than the belief updating, were at the center of
this peaceful termination of crisis or the short-term outcome of limited wars.
With regard to the long-term outcome of crisis actors’ policy choice after the
deterrence failure, both Rational/Cognitive Deterrence theories and this dissertation’s two
new theories do not suggest a uniform prediction. While the Hopf-Mercer-Press consensus
predicts that reputation of standing firm does not have any systematic impact on future
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crisis actors’ thinking, others argue that reputation can be transferable for similar enough
cases (i.e., proximity in time, same potential challenger, same region/issue-area/regime,
etc.) and the crisis involving a significant interest at stake. The Cognitive Deterrence theory
points out the action-reaction paradox in crisis actors’ strategic thinking, and the reputation
could make both self-defeating and self-fulfilling prophecies.
The feasibility of punishment model agrees with the Hopf-Mercer-Press consensus.
The challenger’s decision to revise the status quo is based on the defender’s military and
political feasibility at the moment, not its action in the previous crises. The belief updating
model, however, anticipates that reputation for standing firm casts a long shadow and
prevents further crises over the same issue.
Statistical trends uphold the reputation skeptics like the Hopf-Mercer-Press
consensus and the feasibility model. After the failure of direct defensive deterrence, 48.44%
defenders did not experience another crisis during the subsequent five-year period
(deterrence restoration) while 45.83% of them had to deal with the additional crisis over
the same issue (deterrence collapse). However, none of the two-stage logistic regression
models finds that the long-term outcome of the crisis is systematically affected by policy
choices of the defender and the challenger during the crisis. The only relevant variable in
explaining the long-term outcome is the crisis outcome of stalemate, which should encourage
crisis actors to engage in another conflict.
The case studies also fail to identify a sufficient condition for deterrence restoration.
The Rhineland Crisis was the only case that led to deterrence collapse. In this crisis, Hitler
decided to start another crisis over Czechoslovakia not only because he updated his belief
about the defenders’ level of resolve based on the Locarno signatories’ in-action during the
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Rhineland Crisis; but also because he was convinced that London and Paris were lack of the
political feasibility to follow through. For all the other four cases, Washington, Moscow, Tel
Aviv, and London did not experience another deterrence failure crisis with the same
challengers. Deterrence was restored. However, as there were no additional crises (the cases
of “dogs that did not bark”), it is difficult to say with certainty that among the various factors
listed in the literature, which was the sufficient condition for the restoration of direct
defensive deterrence. Testing rival and research hypotheses for this particular question
require an alternative method, and possibly, a new dataset.

1-4.

The Impact of Nuclear Weapons

The final question tested in this study is the impact of nuclear weapons on direct
defensive deterrence. Nuclear revolutionists argue that the crisis actors’ possession of
nuclear weapons would buttress the stability of deterrence. The direct deterrence would
rarely fail; and even if it fails, it should not escalate into a major war. On the other hand,
the nuclear pessimists believe that the impact of introducing nuclear weapons into
deterrence dynamics would be marginal due to the paradox of “strategic stability-tactical
instability”; their overly destructive power and tactical redundancy; and the logic of “selfdeterrence.” The feasibility of punishment model agrees with the pessimist. Nuclear
weapons would start to affect deterrence dynamics only after those crisis actors secure
reliable military capabilities to deliver those weapons. Even if they successfully satisfy this
military feasibility condition, the enormous political cost to use these horrible weapons
should continue to minimize the possibility of their actual use.
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Regression analyses in Chapter 3 support the argument of nuclear pessimists. When
the defender’s economic openness to the international community increases – implying its
political feasibility to implement nuclear punishment decreases, the challenger chose more
violent policies. Although the defender’s policy choice is not affected by the challenger’s
nuclear capability, it is greatly influenced by the challenger’s policy choice. This challenger’s
policy choice is mostly caused by the defender’s military and political feasibility to impose
nuclear sanctions against the challenger. The defender’s military feasibility of nuclear
punishment was a statistically significant factor in deciding the short-term outcome. The
long-term outcome of crisis, however, was not systematically influenced by the nuclear
variable.
Case studies reveal that nuclear weapons indeed had some calming effect during the
crisis. Washington did neither take airstrike nor invasion routes after detecting the Soviet
nuclear missiles in Cuba. Beijing launched a limited war against the USSR over a small and
strictly confined area. Egypt was refrained from escalating the conflict into a full-scale war
after its successful crossing of the Suez Canal. Buenos Aires made every effort not to kill
any British soldiers when the Argentine forces occupied the Falklands. In this regard, some
researchers argue that nuclear deterrence was effective as it had eliminated excessively
violent measures from the crisis actors’ policy options.
However, this “crystal ball effect” was activated only when the Soviet forces had
secured a reliable power projection capability to deliver those nuclear warheads during the
Cuban Missile Crisis. More importantly, those nuclear weapons of Moscow, Tel Aviv, and
London failed to prevent their adversaries from taking military measures and from deterring
the outbreak of wars in 1969, 1973, and 1982. China, Egypt, and Argentina were convinced
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that their opponents would not impose nuclear sanctions as long as they restrict the scope of
war not to include the defenders’ major cities. This prediction was accurate: none of those
defenders with nuclear capability used their doomsday machine to punish those challengers.
Due to their inherently limited tactical value because of their destructive power to
overkill and enormous political and possibly economic costs involving their actual use,
nuclear weapons are hardly an attractive tool of punishment. This fundamental problem of
nuclear option almost always lacking political feasibility to follow through could
encourage the challenger to revise the status quo below the nuclear threshold. This intrinsic
infeasibility of nuclear punishment and the challengers’ subsequent impulse to defy against
the nuclear deterrence are confirmed by the process-tracing analysis of the four selected
crises.

2. Policy Implications and Future Areas of Research

What are the policy implications of this dissertation’s findings? As this project
provides a more comprehensive list of variables for deterrence success/failure and crisis
outcomes, it helps the policy circle to formulate desirable security policies in the aftermath
of deterrence failure.
First, a defender should not make any deterrent threat if it is militarily and
politically not feasible to follow through. The literature has overemphasized the role of
signaling a high level of resolve in making a successful deterrent threat. The Costly
Signaling model’s recommendations to increase the audience cost as a key to deterrence
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success is a classic example. However, public pledges repeatedly made by the Sarraut
cabinet failed to deter German remilitarization of the Rhineland failed in 1936. Obama
administration’s effort to dissuade the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons by setting
a “red line” publicly, also failed in 2013. Demonstrating a strong resolve to follow through
on the threat is not a sufficient condition for deterrence success. The first threshold that
needs to be satisfied with the success is to secure and maintain the feasibility of punishment,
not demonstrating a high level of resolve.
Second, it is premature for the defender to update its belief about the challenger’s
type as a determined aggressor after the direct defensive deterrence failure. The population
of the deterrence failure from 1918 to 2015 reveals that a majority of challengers were
rather opportunists. Prudent strategic thinking should always go two ways. The deterrence
might fail because of the challenger’s being extremely dissatisfied with the status quo and
resolute in revising it. However, it is also very possible that the failure was caused by the
deficiencies in the defender’s deterrence posture. Identifying the right origin of the problem
should be the first step in devising a proper countermeasure after the deterrence failure.
Third, fixing the military and political infeasibility to punish the potential
challenger is a matter of utmost importance in the aftermath of the defensive deterrence
failure. The defender should credibly signal to the challenger that it has secured (1)
enhanced weapon systems that could overcome geographic obstacles and penetrate the
adversary’s defense system; and (2) all-party and wide public support for tougher measures.
This move might not derive any positive outcomes if the challenger was indeed a
warmonger. But in most cases, addressing this feasibility problem would spur a deescalation move of the challenger.
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Fourth, the utility of nuclear weapons for deterrence needs to be discounted. The
feasibility model suggests that punishment too difficult to be imposed can never buttress
deterrence stability. Political, economic, and normative costs involving the use of these
weapons have soared since their bombing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the political
feasibility of nuclear sanction has plummeted accordingly. The backbone of deterrence,
thus, should be carefully arranged conventional weapons rather than all-destructive nuclear
weapons.
This dissertation research is not without limitations. The most significant problem
is that the project could not find a method to properly test hypotheses about the long-term
outcome of each crisis actor’s policy choice. Also, although the selected cases in this study
include all possible policy choices of the defender, every challenger in the five cases is the
authoritarian government. The selection, thus, does not fully represent the population of
direct defensive deterrence failure. Lastly, the dissertation does not analyze further on why
some policymakers are more open to the Bayesian updating while others are not. As this
belief updating is assumed in the analysis of most incomplete information games in the
formal modeling, identifying the conditions for the Bayesian updating should have
enormous theoretical implications. Future studies need to focus on addressing these issues.
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